Category Archives: movies

The Hobbit Contract, Part 5

After the first four parts of our ongoing series about the contract in The Hobbit movie we’re finally entering the home stretch.  Today we’ll take a look at a group of clauses dealing with disputes arising under the contract.  This is an important part of many contracts.  If you’re going to the trouble of creating a formal legal agreement, then you might as well contemplate what might happen if the deal goes bad.

I. Mandatory Binding Arbitration

Somewhat anachronistically, the contract contains an arbitration clause:

Disputes arising between the Contract Parties shall be heard and judged by an arbitrator of the Company’s choosing

I say “somewhat anachronistically” because although arbitration has a long history in the common law—going back at least as far as 1609—it was for centuries frowned upon by the courts.  One early case, Vynior’s Case, held that mandatory arbitration clauses (i.e. requiring a party to a contract to submit to arbitration) were revocable.  In other words, parties could submit to arbitration but only by ongoing, mutual agreement.  It was not until the 1800s that mandatory arbitration really became acceptable in either England or the US.  See, e.g., Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344 (1854).

The other issue is that the clause allows the Company to choose the arbitrator.  This is highly unusual and may actually invalidate the arbitration clause.  In order  to comport with due process, a mandatory arbitration agreement must, among other things, provide a neutral, impartial decision maker.  Typically this is done by allowing the parties to jointly select an arbitrator or to have an impartial third party (such as an arbitration agency) select one.

II. Choice of Language

The next part of the arbitration paragraph is a rarity for an American lawyer:

… and all pleas shall be pleaded, shrewed [sic], defended, answered, debated and judged in the Dwarvish Tongue

Obviously this is a significant disadvantage for Bilbo, as he evidently cannot read (and presumably cannot speak) Dwarvish.  Choice of language clauses like this one are much more common in international contracts than in contracts between parties in the United States.  They are also much more common in contracts that contain arbitration agreements rather than forum selection clauses (e.g. “any disputes arising under this contract will be heard in the courts of Capital City, State X”) because in most many countries the courts only deal in one official language, making a choice of language clause redundant.  But when the case will go to arbitration, the chosen arbitrator could potentially speak multiple languages.

However, the most common reason for a choice of language clause is when the contract itself is translated into multiple languages for the benefit of the parties.  In that case it is common for the contract to specify that one version is the “authoritative” version

III. The (Non-Existent) Choice of Law Clause

The one thing that leaps out at me about this contract is that it doesn’t contain a choice of law clause.  Such a clause allows the parties to specify what jurisdiction’s law will govern the contract.  This is particularly useful when multiple jurisdictions may potentially apply.  The area of the law that deals with figuring out which court has jurisdiction and which law applies is known as conflict of laws.  Conflict of laws is a complex subject.  Typically it is a stand-alone course in law school.  So we won’t go into too much detail here, but suffice to say that arguably both the law of the Shire and the law of the Dwarven Kingdom could conceivably apply to this contract.  Some of the factors that a court might consider include:

  • The parties are a Hobbit of the Shire and a group of Dwarves.
  • The contract was signed in the Shire.
  • The contract concerns services to be performed in the Dwarven Kingdom.
  • The most likely source of the breach of the contract occurs in the Dwarven Kingdom.

Since the applicable law is debatable, this is precisely the kind of case in which a choice of law clause makes sense, so its absence is notable.

IV. Attorneys’ Fees

Finally, the contract includes a clause regarding attorneys’ fees*:

In the event of a dispute arising in relation to the terms of this agreement, the non-prevailing party shall reimburse the prevailing party for all reasonable fees and costs resulting therefrom.

This clause is notable because it tells us something about the (actual, non-fictional) writer of the contract.  They were very likely either been an American or at least were copying from an American contract.  In essentially every other Western country, the default rule is that the losing side pays (or at least contributes to) the winning side’s costs.  This is commonly called the English Rule, in contrast to the American Rule in which each side bears its own costs by default.  There’s nothing unusual about a clause like this in an American contract; in fact, they are pretty common.  But I think it would be unusual elsewhere.

* The precise spelling of “attorneys’ fees” is a matter of some dispute.  See Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Assoc., 2008 WL 906031, n.1 (W.D. Mich. 2008).

We’ve probably only got one or two more posts about the contract to go.  If any of our readers have questions about the contract (maybe you bought a copy or read about it elsewhere) please let us know before we wrap up the series and we’ll try to include it.

The Hobbit Contract, Part 4

The first three parts of our ongoing series about the contract in The Hobbit movie have already taken us through a variety of contract law topics.  At this point, unless there’s a strong call to go through the entirety of the contract, we are going to start skipping less interesting clauses in favor of ones that present new or more complex issues.

I. Signatures and Witnesses

At the beginning of the second ‘page’ of the contract we have this paragraph:

The principles [sic] agreeing to this contract, namely the Company [as represented by Thorin Oakenshield] and the Burglar, and known collectively henceforth as the Parties, shall signify their agreement to all clauses contained herein [the Conditions of Engagement] by signing or making their marks in the spaces provided for so doing, and affixing seals if applicable.  The Witnesses to this Contract, being those others whose signatures, marks or seals are affixed hereto, affirm, state and declare their understanding and unbiased agreement to all that is contained herein.

This language is a little unusual.  Contracts—at least modern ones—do not normally specify the signature process in such detail.  But there’s nothing inherently wrong with it, either, apart from the misspelling of ‘principal.’

The signature clause states that the parties may “sign or make their mark.”  This is correct.  There is no legal requirement that a signature be the signer’s name, much less the signer’s name handwritten in cursive.  Instead, “the signature to a memorandum may be any symbol made or adopted with an intention, actual or apparent, to authenticate the writing as that of the signer.”  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 134.  A mark or even an affixed seal could suffice.

Most legal documents do not require witnesses unless they require them by their own terms.  One notable exception is a will.  The exact requirements vary by jurisdiction, but most require that wills be witnessed, typically by disinterested parties.  In this case a witness signature does not seem to be required in order for the contract to be valid, but it’s not a bad idea in case there is a dispute later.  It is curious, however, that the witnesses (in reality the witness, since only Balin appears as witness) “affirm, state and declare their understanding and unbiased agreement” to the contract.  It’s unclear what, if anything, the contract requires a witness to agree to.  The role of a witness is usually not to understand and agree to the contract but rather to witness the signing by the parties: did the parties sign, were they the correct people, were they mentally competent, etc.  So this paragraph is a little odd but probably harmless.

II. Written Contract Required?

Relatedly, one might ask if a written and signed contract was necessary at all.  Some types of contracts must be in writing.  The Statute of Frauds refers collectively to laws that list the kinds of contracts that must be in writing.  Although the Statute of Frauds got its start in England in 1677, it has since been almost entirely repealed there while it has grown more influential in the US.    But the most substantial repeal of the Statute of Frauds in England didn’t occur until 1954, well after The Hobbit was written, and so Tolkien may have contemplated some sort of Statute of Frauds existing in Middle Earth.

However, none of the traditional Statute of Frauds categories likely apply in this case.  The closest category would be contracts that cannot be performed in one year, but the adventure was complete within the year 2941, not counting the return trip.  Thus, the contract could be performed within a year.  Note that it’s not contracts that might not be performed in a year but rather contracts that cannot be performed in a year.  An example would be if the contract said something like “the Parties shall leave for the Lonely Mountain two years from the signing of this contract.”

III. Non-disclosure Agreements

Next we have a non-disclosure or confidentiality clause:

Confidentiality is of utmost importance and must be strictly maintained at all times.  During the course of his employment with the Company, Burglar will hear, see, learn, apprehend, comprehend, and, in short, gain knowledge of particular facts, ideas, plans, strategies, theories, geography, cartography, iconography, means, tactics and/or policies, whether actual, tangible, conceptual, historical or fanciful.  Burglar undertakes and agrees to maintain this knowledge in utmost secrecy and confidentiality, and to neither divulge nor make known said knowledge by any means, including but not limited to speech, writing, demonstration, re-enactment, mime, or storage and retrieval within means or apparatus currently known or unknown or as yet unthought of.

(It is a plain drafting error to refer to “the course of [the Burglar’s] employment with the company”, since a later clause specifies in no uncertain terms that “Burglar is in all respects an independent contractor, and not an employee … of the Company.”)

This confidentiality agreement is a little overbroad, since by its strict terms it requires Bilbo to keep confident anything he learns on the journey, not just things he learns in confidence.  The fact that information is already publicly known is usually a defense to a breach of confidentiality, since the information wasn’t actually secret.  Overbreadth probably isn’t fatal to the clause, however.

What’s really unusual about this part of the contract is that it doesn’t appear to include a clause acknowledging that monetary damages alone would be inadequate compensation in the event of a breach of confidentiality.  The purpose of such a clause is to make it easier to obtain an injunction ordering the breaching party to stop disclosing the confidential information.  Ordinarily breach of contract results in a payment of monetary damages, and getting an injunction usually requires showing, among other things, that those damages are insufficient to remedy the harm done.

What’s doubly weird about this is that the contract does have this clause later on:

Burglar acknowledges that monetary damages alone will be adequate compensation for a breach of this contract by the Company.

We’ll talk more about this clause in a later post, but it’s curious that the contract only contemplates injunctions defensively (i.e. protecting the Company from them) and not offensively (i.e. making it easier to enjoin Bilbo).

The Hobbit Contract, Part 3

Our first two posts about the contract in The Hobbit movie brought us through some boilerplate and into the substance of the contract, namely some of Bilbo’s obligations and the nature of the Adventure.  From a legal standpoint we’ve discussed integration clauses, amendments, severability clauses, consideration, defined terms, contract interpretation, and liability waivers.  And we’ve still only begun!

I. More Waivers

The next section is yet another waiver

Burglar holds harmless and without blame in perpetuity the Company and its successors for any notoriety, incarceration, or proceedings brought against, in regard to or as a result of the adventure or any activities related thereto.

Also includes slander, libel, loss of face or of social standing in country of Burglar’s origin.

Remedies shall similarly not be sought for any unlooked-for misfortune befalling Burglar’s home during his absence.

The smaller text is written in the margin or otherwise in smaller writing.  There’s a lot of that kind of writing in the margins that we’ll be referring to as we go through the contract.  For the most part the size of the print doesn’t matter, but there are some contract terms, such as warranty disclaimers, that must be printed conspicuously, which usually means large print or all caps.  UCC §§ 2-316(2),  1-201(b)(10).  At common law we suspect the rules were even looser.

This set of waivers is not particularly objectionable.  As discussed in the prior post, the actual scope of the waiver may not be as broad as the language suggests.  For example, if the Dwarves intentionally burned down Bag End, this waiver would not prevent Bilbo from suing them for the damage.

It may bear mentioning that the slander waiver only protects the Company.  Bilbo could still sue the actual slanderer, of course.  Traditionally this has been easier to do in England than the United States.  At common law, for example, truth was no defense to criminal libel (also known as seditious libel).  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67-68 (1964).

II. Payment

Now we come to some terms of the contract actually described in the book:

Cash on delivery, up to and not exceeding one fourteenth of the total profit [if any]. Not including any of the gross paid to other parties in lieu of royalties or help and provisions given or loaned.

All traveling expenses guaranteed in any event. But refer to attached and appended conditions, clauses and riders regarding any Return Journey. ‘Traveling expenses’ shall be understood to mean basic fare as seen fit by the Company. ‘Luxury’ catering or accomodation over and above this standard shall be enjoyed only at Burglar’s considerable [but justifiable] expense.

Funeral expenses to be defrayed by us or our representatives if occasion arises and the matter is not otherwise arranged for. Basic funeral to ‘commoner’ or peasant standard is allowed for only. Lavish ceremonies and jewelled (sic) or gilded coffins not provided. Plain pine box is the normal standard. Transport of any remains, in whole or in part, back to the country of Burglar’s origin is not included.

Most of these clauses are fairly straightforward.  In terms of the plot, the more important clause is the one regarding profits.  Already we see part of the definition: it excludes royalties paid to others and anything given or loaned to Bilbo counts against it.  In the margins we see some more relevant terms:

Burglar acknowledges and agrees that each item of the Company’s valuables, goods, money or merchandise which he recovers from the Lonely Mountain [the ‘Recovered Goods’] during the term of his engagement with the Company, shall remain the Property of the Company at all times, and in all respects, without limitation.

Furthermore, the company shall retain any and all Recovered Goods until such a time as a full and final reckoning can be made, from which the Total Profits can then be established.  Then, and only then, will the Burglar’s fourteenth share be calculated and decided.

So Bilbo can’t just pick up some treasure that he likes and decide that it’s part of (or the entirety of) his share.  Instead, as provided by yet another clause, he will be paid in gold or its equivalent, in correct weight or of good quality, respectively.  So Bilbo really can’t lay claim to any particular article of treasure.  Indeed, the Dwarves could conceivably purchase gold from somewhere else and pay him with that.  He’s not entitled to any part of the treasure itself as such.

III. Spoilers and Conclusion

In this section we’ll discuss how these contract terms could affect the plot.  The book has been out for about eighty years, but nonetheless, spoiler alert:

Continue reading

The Hobbit Contract, Part 2

In the first part of our analysis of the contract in The Hobbit movie, we discussed several of its more standard clauses, including the entire agreement clauses and severability clause.  Today we’re going to get into the substance of the contract.

I. The Adventure and Consideration

Two clauses describe Bilbo’s primary obligations:

I, the undersigned, [referred to hereinafter as Burglar,] agree to travel to the Lonely Mountain, path to be determined by Thorin Oakenshield, who has a right to alter the course of the journey at his so choosing, without prior notification and/or liability for accident or injury incurred.

The aforementioned journey and subsequent extraction from the Lonely Mountain of any and all goods, valuables and chattels [which activities are described collectively herein as the Adventure] shall proceed in a timely manner and with all due care and consideration as seen fit by said Thorin Oakenshield and companions, numbering thirteen more or less, to wit, the Company.

All contracts require some consideration from all parties to the contract.  Consideration, in the contract sense, means a bargained-for performance or promise.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71(1).  Basically, this is something of value given or promised as part of the agreement.  This can be anything that the parties agree is valuable; the classic example is a single peppercorn.  Whitney v. Stearns, 16 Me. 394, 397 (1839).

Here, Bilbo is promising to go with the Company to the Lonely Mountain and performing various services there, including extracting the treasure, plus a few more services we’ll get to later.  In turn, as we shall see, the Company promises to pay Bilbo one fourteenth of the profits, plus a few other obligations.  Thus we have “a promise for a promise,” otherwise known as a bilateral contract.

II. Defined Terms and Illegal Contracts

There are some other details to notice in these clauses.  One is the use of defined terms (e.g. “referred to hereinafter as Burglar”).  The parties to a contract may define terms however they wish, even in ways that contradict the definition used in statutes or regulations.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201(1) and comment c.

The objective of interpretation in the general law of contracts is to carry out the understanding of the parties rather than to impose obligations on them contrary to their understanding: “the courts do not make a contract for the parties.” Ordinarily, therefore, the mutual understanding of the parties prevails even where the contractual term has been defined differently by statute or administrative regulation.

Id. comment c.  This is important in this case because of the use of the defined term “Burglar.”  As some commenters on the last post noted, contracts to do something illegal are ordinarily unenforceable (e.g. collecting on an illegal gambling debt).  But here what matters is not that the parties used the word ‘burglar’ but rather what sort of meaning they assigned to that defined term.  As we shall see, the contract doesn’t require Bilbo to do anything illegal (or at least not obviously illegal), and so the contract will probably not fail for use of a questionable term.

III. Contract Interpretation and the Limits of Liability Waivers

These two clauses also pose something of a contradiction.  On the one hand we see the first of many liability waivers: “[Thorin has] a right to alter the course of the journey at his so choosing, without prior notification and/or liability for accident or injury incurred.”  But on the other hand we see this explicit obligation of care: “[the Adventure] shall proceed in a timely manner and with all due care and consideration.”

Ordinarily “due care and consideration” signifies taking on liability for negligence, so this conflicts with the earlier liability waiver.  Perhaps the two can be reconciled by the phrase “as seen fit by said Thorin Oakenshield and companions.”  Thorin and Co. could always claim that the amount of care and consideration they saw fit was extremely minimal, though that runs the risk of making the clause meaningless, which courts usually don’t like to do.  “As a general proposition, whenever possible, the law favors reconciliation of clauses within a contract which appear contradictory.”  City of Columbia v. Paul N. Howard Co., 707 F.2d 338, 340 (8th Cir. 1983).  Taken together with the numerous other waivers and disclaimers, I think a court would probably conclude that Thorin & Co. were not taking on any particular duty of care.  “A writing is interpreted as a whole.”  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(2).

Waivers or disclaimers of liability are an important part of many contracts.  These can include waivers of a product warranty (seen all the time in software license agreements) and waivers for liability due to negligence (often required before doing something dangerous like skydiving).  But there are limits to liability waivers.  While a party to a contract can ordinarily waive liability for negligence (although not in every jurisdiction), one cannot waive liability for gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional misconduct.  So the numerous (and sweeping!) waivers and disclaimers may not be as effective as they appear at first glance.

IV. Conclusion

We aren’t quite done with the substance of the contract, but before we get there we have some more boilerplate to cover.  There is a lot of standard language in this contract, and this is similar to real-world contracts, particularly form contracts, which tend to have a lot of standardized language surrounding a handful of fill-in-the-blanks.  So far the Dwarves haven’t committed any unsalvageable drafting errors or done anything that might jeopardize the validity of the contract.  We’ll see if that keeps up!

The Hobbit Contract

Ordinarily we don’t discuss legal issues relating to fictional settings that are dramatically different from the real world in terms of their legal system.  Thus, Star Wars, Star Trek, Tolkien’s Middle Earth, etc are usually off-limits because we can’t meaningfully apply real world law to them.  But the contract featured in  The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey (which comes out this next weekend!) was just too good a topic to pass up, especially since you can buy a high quality replica of it, which is what I’m using for these posts.  The contract is over 5 feet long unfolded and is fairly dense with text, so there will probably be multiple posts about it.

There are a couple of reasons why I’ve decided to break our rule and write about the contract.  First, it seems fairly clear (to me, anyway) that Tolkien wrote the Shire (where hobbits live) as a close analog to pastoral England, with its similar  legal and political structures.  For example, the Shire has a mayor and sheriffs, and there is a system of inheritance similar to the common law.  The common law fundamentals of contract law have not changed significantly since the time that the Shire is meant to evoke, so it makes sense that the contract would be broadly similar to a modern contract (and likewise that we could apply modern contract law to it).  Second, reading the contract it seems likely that a lawyer (or at least someone who had read a lot of contracts or did some research) had a hand in writing it.  We will not have to struggle to find legal issues to discuss here; they pretty well leap off the page.

So, without further ado it, let’s get to it.

I. The Contract in General

As mentioned, the contract is quite long.  This is in contrast with the contract as described in the book, which is very terse.  Its terms amounted to this:

For your hospitality our sincerest thanks, and for your offer of professional assistance our grateful acceptance. Terms: cash on delivery, up to and not exceeding one fourteenth of total profits (if any); all travelling expenses guaranteed in any event; funeral expenses to be defrayed by us or our representatives, if occasion arises and the matter is not otherwise arranged for.

Even in the book’s version we see an issue: the dwarves accept Bilbo’s “offer” but then proceed to give terms.  This is not actually an acceptance but rather a counter-offer, since they’re adding terms.  In the end it doesn’t matter because Bilbo effectively accepts the counter-offer by showing up and rendering his services as a burglar, but the basic point is that the words of a contract do not always have the legal effect that they claim to have.  Sometimes you have to look past the form to the substance.

But back to the movie version.  It has at least 40 major sections and numerous footnotes and digressions in smaller type.  We will begin at the beginning, go on till we reach the end, and then stop, except where the form of the contract requires some jumping around.

II. Entire Agreement Clauses and the Parol Evidence Rule

The contract (titled “Conditions of Engagement”) begins thus:

Agreed hereto, freely and under neither duress nor force nor coercion nor extortion nor threat to life and/or limb and superceding any prior contract, agreement or undertaking, survivable clauses notwithstanding, signed and witnessed below, as set forth hereunder:

This section has two major parts.  First, there is a recital that the contract is entered into voluntarily.  Mutual assent is required for any contract, and although duress would make a contract voidable, the recital isn’t terribly meaningful.  After all, one can just as easily be forced to sign a contract that has such a recital as one that doesn’t, so it doesn’t really prove anything.  However, it’s the sort of “can’t hurt”, boilerplate legalese that sets the style for the rest of the contract.

Next, there is a kind of “entire agreement clause” or integration clause.  This is a very common and important part of many contracts.  The purpose of an integration clause is to make it clear that the contract constitutes the entire agreement between the parties (hence the term).  That is, that all other prior versions of the contract, oral or written negotiations, etc are immaterial.  What matters is only what’s on this particular written contract.  Why is this important?  Because otherwise one party or the other might try to import terms or definitions into the contract from earlier versions or from prior negotiations or discussions.

For example, suppose the contract defines the term “profits” in a certain way, and further suppose that Bilbo and the Dwarves discussed profits at the party before signing the contract.  If there is a disagreement about the meaning of the term, can Bilbo or the Dwarves bring up the prior discussion?  Not if there is a valid integration clause.  This is what’s known as the parol evidence rule.

The integration clause at the beginning of the contract is backed up by another one later on in the contract:

This agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties, and replaces and supercedes all prior understandings and agreements, whether written or oral, with respect to the subject matter described and set forth herein.

Now that clause could have been lifted directly from a modern contract (and probably was).

III. Additions and Changes

Next we see a few different places in the contract that refer to changes to or amendments to the contract:

(And as appended to from time to time at the sole discretion of the Director, with the new material being read as if originally included herein)

Conditions subsequently appended or added to this Contract are automatically assumed to be agreed upon, as if they were present, read and understood at the signing and witnessing thereof.

Burglar may not modify or charge this Contract in any way except by a writing signed and agreed to by both parties hereto.

As you might guess, the first two clauses are highly suspect.  The parties to a contract can always agree to modify a contract or substitute a new contract, but there is still the requirement of mutual assent, and one can’t assent to something that one hasn’t seen.  The third clause is much closer to what one sees in modern contracts, particularly the requirement of a signed writing for any modifications (as opposed to allowing modification by oral agreement).

Since the contract has a couple of blatantly unenforceable terms, does that make the whole thing unenforceable?  Ordinarily it might, but not in this case, thanks to…

IV. The Severability Clause

The contract contains a couple of severability clauses, which allow unenforceable parts of the contract to be severed from the contract without affecting the rest:

If any provision of this Contract is held unenforceable, then such provision shall be modified to reflect the parties’ intention. All remaining provisions of this Contract shall remain in full force and effect.

If any part of this Contract is found to be invalid, the remainder of the contract will continue in full force and effect as if the defective and invalid provision or clause or condition had been deleted, provided that the parties to this contract are entitled to negotiate a valid and enforceable provision in replacement of the invalid provision.

Severability clauses (also sometimes called savings clauses) are a common part of modern contracts.  They’re also sometimes included in new laws, so that if part of the law is struck down then the rest of it remains in force.

V. Conclusion

So far the contract is reasonably well written, although it contains a few suspect terms.  We’ve only just scratched the surface, so look forward to more coverage of the contract in the coming weeks!

Lincoln

Lincoln is the 2012 Steven Spielburg biopic starring Daniel Day-Lewis, who bears an uncanny resemblance to the titular President. The film is excellent, but as always, we’re not really reviewing it on its merits, but on its handling of the legal issues it touches. The movie is a dramatization of the 2006 book Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln by Doris Kearns Goodwin, which centers at least as much on Lincoln’s Cabinet, especially William H. Seward, Salmon P. Chase, and Edward Bates, all of whom were candidates for the Presidency in 1860, all of whom were recruited by Lincoln to serve in his administration. The movie focuses mostly on William H. Seward (David Strathairn, apparently on break from Alphas).

Here, we’re going to look at three particular issues. First, the procedural requirements for the passage of a constitutional amendment. Second, the procedure regarding contested congressional elections. And third, the use of patronage to accomplish Lincoln’s political goals. Continue reading

Law and the Goonies

A while back we got a question from JD, who asked:

[In The Goonies], would they really have been able to keep the jewels Mikey got off the pirate ship? Or would the State have asserted ownership of the discovered “historical relics”?

If you haven’t seen The Goonies, you should.  It’s a classic 80s movie, and although it was directed by Richard Donner, the story was written by Stephen Spielberg, and the movie has his fingerprints all over it.  The Blu-Ray edition came out a couple of years ago, and we can recommend it.  For more nostalgia, check out the cast reunion video that Empire magazine put together.

Anyway, back to the question.  We’ve written about lost property before, including treasure troves.  In this case the issue is complicated by two facts: 1) the movie is set in Oregon, so we have to apply Oregon law and 2) the treasure is on a boat.

I. Oregon Law and Lost Property

As you might guess for a state high up on the west coast, there aren’t too many Oregon cases dealing with treasure (just what was a 17th century pirate doing in northwest Oregon anyway?).  But there are enough to get some basic definitions.

In Oregon, a treasure trove is the property of the finder and consists of “[m]oney or coin, gold, silver, plate, or bullion found hidden in the earth or other private place, the owner thereof being unknown.”  Bergeron v. Aero Sales, Inc., 134 P.3d 964, 969 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Or. 129 (1948)). “The treasure must have been hidden or concealed so long as to indicate that its owner, in all probability, is dead or unknown.”  Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Or. at 140.

Notably, “the ownership or possession of the land upon which [treasure trove or abandoned property] was found is immaterial.”  Hill v. Schrunk, 292 P.2d 141, 142 (Or. 1956).  “It seems to be the principle respecting treasure trove, owing to its peculiar nature of being coin, that the present property is in the finder, as against every one but the true owner, provided that the true owner is unknown, and it matters not where or when the same is found, so that it is secreted in the earth or other private place.” Jackson at 144 (quoting Ferguson v. Ray, 44 Or. 557 (1904)).

One-Eyed Willie’s ship (and thus the treasure) was hidden in an underground lagoon, which seems to count as both hidden in the earth and a private place.  One-Eyed Willie is obviously dead, and I don’t recall any descendants being discussed in the movie, certainly not any known ones.  And it doesn’t matter that the Goonies found the treasure on somebody else’s land.  So the Goonies may have a legitimate claim to the jewels as part of a treasure trove.

II. Admiralty Law

Here’s where it gets sticky.  If the treasure is considered a treasure trove, then the answer is easy enough.  But the treasure wasn’t buried underground as such; it was on a boat floating on an underground lake.  This means it might actually be a salvage operation, and salvage and treasure trove are mutually exclusive.  Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 459 F. Supp. 507, 525 (S.D. Fla. 1978), aff’d, 621 F.2d 1340 (5th Cir. 1980), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 458 U.S. 670, (1982).  So what is salvage, exactly?

“Salvage” is the compensation or reward allowed to persons by whose voluntary assistance to a ship at sea or its cargo, or both, have been saved in whole or in part from impending sea peril or by which such property has been recovered from actual peril or loss, as in cases of shipwreck, dereliction, or recapture.

Am. Jur. 2d Salvage § 1.  Since the ship was still more-or-less seaworthy, this would seem to be a case of a derelict ship rather than a shipwreck.  If the Goonies had actually engaged in a salvage operation then they would not have any right to the ship or its contents but rather only to receive a salvage award.  That means no fair keeping the jewels, but the salvage award would be more than enough to compensate.  The problem is that the boat went sailing off into the ocean, and getting a salvage award can take years.  That’s cold comfort when the evil Astoria Country Club is breathing down your neck.

Hope is not yet lost, however.  Salvage only applies to ships that have not been abandoned by their owners.  Columbus–America Discovery v. Atlantic Mut. Ins., 974 F.2d 450, 459 (4th Cir.1992).  When a ship has been abandoned, then a different law applies, the law of finds.

Under the law of finds, the finder gets the ship and its contents, not a salvage award.  Helpfully for this case, abandonment can be inferred when neither the owner nor their heirs have attempted to reclaim the vessel for a considerable length of time.  See, e.g., Marex Intern., Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 952 F.Supp. 825, 828-29 (S.D. Ga.  1997) (holding that a vessel sunk in 1840 was properly considered abandoned).  Willie’s ship, The Inferno, is certainly old enough to qualify as abandoned, and again there are no signs of any heirs.  Under the law of finds, the Goonies could sue to establish title to the ship and its contents.  If no heirs showed up to contest it, it would be theirs.

Even under the law of finds there is a catch, however.  The Inferno may be an historic shipwreck.  If it is, then the court could impose an archaeological duty of care before handing over title.  Marex, 952 F.Supp. at 829.  The Goonies would also have to show some reasonable prospect of success at recovering the ship.  Given the Goonies’ fairly cavalier approach to treasure hunting (and the fact that the movie ends with the ship floating out to sea), bringing in some professional archaeologists and recovery experts might not be a bad idea.

III. Conclusion

Whether the law of lost property or admiralty applies, the Goonies just might have a good claim to the treasure.  The law of lost property would probably treat them better, however.

Looper and Abandoned Attempt

In this second post about Looper we’re going to delve considerably more deeply into the movie, and with that comes a couple of pretty serious spoilers.  You have been warned.

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Looper

Looper is a pretty great movie.  The story, acting, music, and effects are all top notch.  While watching it this weekend, a couple of legal issues came to mind.  This post ran a little long, so there will be a second Looper post later this week.  There are some spoilers ahead, but I’ve tried to self-censor the most significant ones.

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The Rocketeer (1991 film)

Previously, we discussed The Rocketeer in its 1980s Dave Stevens comic book, instantiation. This time, we’re talking about the 1991 Disney movie. A lot of the main issues are the same, but this may actually be one time where the movie is significantly better than the comic book. The plot of the comic was pretty scattered, and the book seems to have just sort of ended without any significant resolution of any plot points. The movie really streamlines things and has a much more satisfactory plot arc.

One major way that the movie differs is the introduction of Neville Sinclair, played by James Bond Timothy Dalton, who serves as the movie’s main villain, a Nazi spy (sorry, we’re not warning about spoilers in a movie from 1991). While the Hindenburg stand-in is perhaps unrealistic—commercial zeppelin flights seem to have pretty much ended after the disaster, a year before the movie is set—but the idea that a well-placed celebrity was a Nazi sympathizer or even agent is not as implausible as it sounds.

Regardless, there is a plot point in the movie that raises an interesting question: is Secord’s “sabotage” of the rocket pack murder? Continue reading