Category Archives: criminal law

Santa and Restraining Orders

Today we got a very interesting question in the comments on our classic post on Santa Claus and the law.  We decided that the question was still fair game for this year since for many people it’s technically still the Christmas season.  Heck, if you’re Russian Orthodox then Christmas is still 12 days away, and for the 14,000 adherents of the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem it’s 24 days away.  But enough about non-Gregorian calendars.  Let’s talk about getting a restraining order against Santa.

Ann writes:

Could an individual get a restraining order against Santa for stalking them? He does, after all, watch people all the time (both when awake and asleep), and keeps notes on them in the form of a list determining if they are good or bad in his estimation. And what would happen if one parent in the house got the peace order, but the other was helping the kids write their letters to Santa?

Restraining orders—also called protective orders in this context—can be issued in many kinds of cases, most commonly stalking or domestic violence.  We’re assuming that Santa’s relationship with Mrs. Claus is a peaceful one, so we’ll limit the discussion to stalking.

I. Criminal Stalking

A protective order is a civil remedy, but it’s often tied to criminal behavior.  New York law defines stalking in the fourth degree this way:

A person is guilty of stalking in the fourth degree when he or she intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and knows or reasonably should know that such conduct:
1. is likely to cause reasonable fear of material harm to the physical health, safety or property of such person, a member of such person’s immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted; or
2. causes material harm to the mental or emotional health of such person, where such conduct consists of following, telephoning or initiating communication or contact with such person, a member of such person’s immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted, and the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct; or
3. is likely to cause such person to reasonably fear that his or her employment, business or career is threatened, where such conduct consists of appearing, telephoning or initiating communication or contact at such person’s place of employment or business, and the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct.

We don’t think Santa’s behavior would meet this standard.  People couldn’t have a reasonable fear of material harm because Santa has an unbroken record of hundreds of years of peaceful activity.  It could be enough that he has actually caused material emotional harm to someone, except that the harm would have to be caused by contact or communication initiated by Santa.  The problem here is that Santa doesn’t initiate communication; instead people write letters to him.  Arguably he initiates indirect contact by entering people’s homes, but there’s no evidence that he enters homes where he is unwanted.  In fact, staying up late to ‘catch’ Santa is traditionally considered to cause him not to visit.  And of course visits from Santa Claus have rarely, if ever, caused someone to lose their job.

We won’t go into the details of the higher degrees of stalking, but suffice to say that if Santa doesn’t meet this standard then he wouldn’t meet the higher ones.

All is not lost for our hypothetical plaintiff, however.  As mentioned, a protective order is a civil remedy.  So what about a pure civil case with no underlying criminal behavior?

II. Civil Suits

As discussed in our prior post, Santa probably couldn’t be sued for trespass, but could he be sued for invasion of privacy?  When we say invasion of privacy what we really mean is the tort of intrusion.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts, gives three elements for intrusion: (1) an intentional intrusion, physical or otherwise, (2) upon the plaintiff’s solitude or seclusion or private affairs or concerns, (3) which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.  See Mauri v. Smith, 324 Or. 476, 483 (1996) (applying the Restatement definition).  Santa definitely meets the first two elements: he intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, into a person’s private affairs or concerns.  It’s questionable whether this would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, however, since Santa’s been doing it for hundreds of years without too many complaints.

But let’s suppose the plaintiff was successful or that the plaintiff was able to get a preliminary injunction against Santa while the suit proceeded.  Such an injunction could include an order for Santa not to enter the plaintiff’s property or keep the plaintiff under observation.  If Santa violated the order then he could be found in contempt.

According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).  The standard for a preliminary injunction is similar but requires that the party seeking the injunction have a substantial likelihood of success in the case.  As mentioned, we don’t think our hypothetical plaintiff has much chance of success, but let’s assume they pull it off somehow (maybe Santa fails to show up and they get a default judgment).

The first two factors are closely related.  An injury can be irreparable if retrospective relief (e.g. a payment of money damages) is inadequate and instead the injury requires ongoing, prospective relief.  In this case the plaintiff may have no monetary damages but still needs to prevent a recurrence of the injury.

The balance of the hardships could also weigh in the plaintiff’s favor.  Since Santa gives toys away for free, it’s very easy for him to give toys to one less person.  Heck, since suing Santa would probably be a one way ticket to the naughty list anyway, he probably wouldn’t have much of a complaint against an injunction, apart from the negative publicity.

The public interest is generally favored by enforcing privacy rights.  Arguably the public has an interest in policing morality (see, e.g., various stories about converting Scrooge-type characters to the Christmas spirit), but we doubt the courts would favor Santa’s “self-appointed arbiter of right and wrong” approach. So all four factors argue in favor of an injunction.

However, this four-factor analysis changes if, as Ann asks, “if one parent in the house got the peace order, but the other was helping the kids write their letters to Santa.”  In that case, where one parent (and presumably the child) wanted Santa to monitor the child’s behavior.  In that case there’s a significant hardship for Santa: if the child is good then he can’t toys to a child that wants them (and according to Santa, deserves them) .  And now the public (in the form of these third parties) has a strong, well-defined interest in allowing Santa to monitor the child’s behavior and give those gifts.  The first two factors still weigh in the plaintiff’s favor, but now they must be balanced against the other two.

III. Conclusion

Although Santa probably isn’t breaking any criminal laws, he could potentially be enjoined from monitoring someone who didn’t want to be (NB: children whose parents want Santa to keep tabs on their kid probably wouldn’t be able to bring a suit against Santa, since their parents can consent to the observation).  Of course, we doubt Santa would ever do that, which may explain why it remains a hypothetical question even in this litigious age.

Law and the Multiverse Classics – Christmas Edition

Many parts of the world will observe Christmas tomorrow.  In case you missed it two years ago—or want to check it out again—here’s our classic post on Santa Claus and the law.

Green Lantern # 76

With Green Lantern # 76, first released in April 1970, DC started a radically different project than anything they’d done with the title before. For the next fourteen or so issues, Green Lantern would team up with Green Arrow to travel the country—mostly the Pacific Northwest, it seems—to find “the real America” and deal with pressing, real-world social issues along the way. It’s timely that we look at this now, for not only is Arrow now running on The CW, but DC has re-released this iconic run in a trade paperback. One imagines that this might have been timed to coincide with the show.

The run is not renowned for its subtlety—comic books were largely targeted at teenage boys (as they mostly still are) and hadn’t gained the sheen of respectability they now enjoy—but it does have this classic page, where a superhero is actually asked why they seem to be so useless.

Anyway, as one might imagine, this run is chock full of stuff for us to write about. In the first issue, #76, we have the case of a slumlord who gets in a street altercation and is allegedly planning to raze a tenement he owns. Continue reading

Arrow: “Honor Thy Father”

This is the second episode of Arrow, and it contains two excellent legal issues for your consideration. First, the legal procedure of coming back from the dead. Second, whether the “evidence” Queen provides against Martin Sohmers would be admissible. Continue reading

Arrow: Pilot

Arrow is the new show on the CW network, the same network that ran Smallville. This isn’t actually a spinoff about Justin Hartley’s Green Arrow from Smallville (much to the disappointment of some fans, I’m sure) nor does Allison Mack make a reappearance as Chloe Sullivan (much to my disappointment), but it represent’s the CW’s exercise of its existing rights to the Green Arrow character.

The show actually provides some rather unique opportunities to delve into legal issues, for two reasons. First, and perhaps most obviously, Green Arrow isn’t a superhuman. He’s a guy that happens to be really good with a bow and arrow. So there’s no obvious connection to Krypton, alternate dimensions, other planets, all the stuff that, while fun to watch, doesn’t leave very much for us to talk about. That’s why we’ll probably never talk about Firefly or Star Trek: those worlds, while fun, are obviously using a different legal system than ours. It’s also why shows like Smallville only occasionally gave us good fodder. We had a series of posts about it last year (one, two, three) but especially as the series went on, the stories had more and more to do with the fantastical, taking it out of our particular area of interest.

But second, and more importantly, one of the main characters—Arrow’s version of Dinah Laurel Lance, known in the comics as Black Canary—is a lawyer. This is a departure from Lance’s portrayals in other media, so we do not at this point know if she is destined to become Black Canary in the TV show. But having  only watched the first two episodes so far, there’s some real potential for recurring legal interest here.

Not a whole ton happens in the pilot episode. Oliver Queen, billionaire playboy, returns to society after having spent five years on a presumably deserted island in the North China Sea. A lot of the implications of that, and what actually happened, are going to be explored in future episodes. But Queen does take on the mantle of Green Arrow in this episode. And boy howdy does he not mind roughing people up. Getting shot with a broadhead arrow, the kind that Green Arrow mostly uses so far, is no laughing matter. They’re reputed to slice through ballistics vests, and that aside, they’re designed to cause large amounts of damage. Getting hit with one would be at least as bad as getting shot with a pistol or rifle. At least they don’t leave a huge honking shaft in you afterward. And several people get shot every episode, with no mention of Queen using non-lethal arrows with blunted tips, which would suck but probably not do much damage most of the time.

This puts Queen on pretty shaky ground, legally speaking.  In most (if not all) states he’s using a deadly weapon.*  He’s also using deadly force, as he’s causing serious bodily injury or at least engaging in conduct which is reasonably likely to do so. And at least so far, he isn’t using deadly force in his own defense or the defense of others. Not in a context that the law would recognize as a defense anyway. Defending self or others with deadly force has to be the in the context of immediate peril of serious bodily injury or death. The fact that someone is engaged in unjust litigation or has defrauded other people? Not grounds for violence of any kind.

* New Hampshire’s Supreme Court has held that a bow and arrow is not an inherently deadly weapon (and thus a felon may lawfully use one to hunt animals), but using a bow and arrow against other humans (as Green Arrow does) would make it a deadly weapon.  State v. Pratte, 959 A.2d 200 (N.H. 2008).

We’ll take a look at the legal issues that the series raises as we watch more episodes. Somewhat irritatingly for us it’s not clear what state Starling City is located in; maybe that will be cleared up in the future.  But for starters, this is a violent version of Green Arrow that runs on the darker side of what it means to be a hero. This is actually somewhat in keeping with the Green Arrow from the comics, as starting in the late 1960s with Denny O’Neil, Oliver Queen has been a somewhat anti-establishment figure. As we go through the Arrow series, we’ll also be taking a look at the classic Green Arrow/Green Lantern pairing O’Neil wrote, which is widely regarded as a watershed moment in comics history. Look for those posts to come!

Castle: “Probable Cause”

There are a lot of spoilers in this one, so we’ll cover the setup inside. But the issue we’re looking at here is the nature of the criminal offense of escape and its potential sentence under New York Penal Law Continue reading

Castle: “Cloudy With a Chance of Murder”

I’m getting up to speed on the latest season of Castle, and there’s a quick pair of issues in episode two which aired back on October 1.  The first issue was brought to our attention by Naomi, who writes:

In [the] episode, a suspect is arrested and immediately calls for his lawyer. While they’re waiting for the lawyer to arrive, Beckett and Castle remain in the interrogation room and ignore the suspect, but openly discuss the case in front of him in a (successful) effort to bait him into saying something incriminating. Legally, is this kosher? If it had turned out that the suspect was guilty of the murder, would his outburst have been admissible in court?

So is this okay? Also, what’s the deal with the suggestion that someone is going to jail for violating environmental regulations? Spoilers inside! Continue reading

Looper and Abandoned Attempt

In this second post about Looper we’re going to delve considerably more deeply into the movie, and with that comes a couple of pretty serious spoilers.  You have been warned.

Continue reading

Looper

Looper is a pretty great movie.  The story, acting, music, and effects are all top notch.  While watching it this weekend, a couple of legal issues came to mind.  This post ran a little long, so there will be a second Looper post later this week.  There are some spoilers ahead, but I’ve tried to self-censor the most significant ones.

Continue reading

Daredevil #18

The most recent issue of Daredevil raises some interesting legal questions, though unfortunately we may have to wait until the next issue to get all the details.  Nonetheless, let’s see what we can figure out from what we know already.

(As usual, there are spoilers ahead, but you really should be reading Mark Waid’s Daredevil run.  It’s available digitally via Comixology or in print at your friendly local comic book store, so go get a copy and come back.)

I. Accessory to Murder

The “client of the month” in this issue is the brother of Adele Santiago, a nurse working for drug kingpin Victor Hierra.  Adele was charged with being an accessory to Hierra’s murder.  The only problem is that he and she were in a locked room when Hierra was killed, drained of his blood without leaving a trace of evidence.  Presumably lacking enough evidence to charge her with the murder directly, the prosecutor charged her with being an accessory.  Under N.Y. Penal Law § 20.00, acting as an accessory to a crime carries the same criminal liability as the underlying crime:

When one person engages in conduct which constitutes an offense, another person is criminally liable for such conduct when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct.

We can probably eliminate the “solicits, requests, commands, [or] importunes” part, leaving “intentionally aids.”  I suspect the prosecutor’s theory will be that Adele helped the murderer enter and leave, presumably taking Hierra’s blood with him.

Now, you might think, “wait, how can Adele be charged with being an accessory to murder if the prosecutor can’t prove who killed the victim?”  It turns out that it doesn’t matter:

In any prosecution for an offense in which the criminal liability of the defendant is based upon the conduct of another person pursuant to section 20.00, it is no defense that: … 2. Such other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense based upon the conduct in question

N.Y. Penal Law § 20.05.  Thus, it’s enough that the prosecution can prove that Hierra was murdered (which should be easy: draining someone’s blood without leaving any evidence doesn’t exactly happen by accident) and that Adele helped.  The evidence is all circumstantial, but that can be enough if there’s no reasonable doubt.

II. The New Business Model, Redux

So that’s what Adele is charged with, but she isn’t the one who came to see Foggy at the former Nelson & Murdock (now just Nelson) law office.  Rather, Adele’s brother (first name not given) showed up, asking about Nelson & Murdock’s services assisting clients in representing themselves.  We’ve written about that before and concluded that, while difficult to do well, it is theoretically ethically sound, at least in New York.  That makes this exchange between Adele’s brother and Foggy kind of weird:

AB: [Adele’s corrupt public defender] barely makes an effort.  You must teach me what I need to know.

Foggy: *Sigh* Mr. Santiago, this isn’t a dispute over a neighbor’s fence.  This is way above your pay grade.  I can’t teach you.

It’s just as well that Foggy ultimately decides to take the case as Adele’s lawyer, since Adele’s brother couldn’t represent her himself.  (Basically) anyone can represent themselves, but only a lawyer can represent another person, at least in the US.

Similarly, since Adele’s brother isn’t a lawyer, Foggy couldn’t ethically teach him to teach Adele, for at least two reasons.  First, attorney-client privilege would go out the window because everything would be going through a third party.  Second, it’s hard enough to do a reasonable job of teaching someone to represent themselves; teaching a person to teach another would be much more difficult.  So while Foggy came to a correct result (representing Adele directly), the alternatives he seemed to be considering made no sense.

III. Conclusion

Several more legal questions came up in this issue, but we’ll have to wait and see what happens before we can comment on them fully.  We may also revisit Adele’s case and Foggy’s representation.  It will be interesting to see where Waid goes with both.