Category Archives: criminal law

Grimm – Let Your Hair Down

The past couple of episodes of Grimm have not been especially fertile grounds for legal issues, but the most recent one did raise a couple of interesting questions related to warrantless searches, which seems to be a running theme in the series.  Spoilers below.

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The Incredibles

In today’s mailbag we have a question that several people have asked about, most recently Thomas, who wrote: “In The Incredibles, Mr. Incredible is sued for foiling a suicide attempt. Would a superhero be liable for something like that? Aren’t suicide attempts illegal?”

(If you haven’t seen The Incredibles, you should check it out.  Like most Pixar movies, it’s pretty great.)

This is an interesting question with significant ramifications for the story.  If the suicide attempt was a crime, then arguably Mr. Incredible had an airtight defense: he was justified in using reasonable force to prevent the commission of a crime.  And if the lawsuit was bogus, then maybe the supers wouldn’t have been driven into hiding in the first place.  It’s not clear what state The Incredibles takes place in, so rather than give an exact answer we’ll have to look at the broader history of the issue.  It’s also not clear to what extent Mr. Incredible was acting as a government official with the benefit of qualified immunity.  For simplicity, we’ll assume he was acting as a private citizen.

I. Common Law History

At common law suicide and attempted suicide were both crimes: suicide was a felony and attempted suicide was a misdemeanor.  Since a “successful” suicide can’t be punished in the usual way, a more creative sanction was developed: the deceased was given an ignominious burial and his assets were forfeited to the crown.  The burial usually took the form of driving a stake through the body and burying it at a crossroads (i.e. not a proper Christian burial).  This was the law in the early American colonial era, but by the time of the American Revolution the states had generally moved away from the common law punishments, although suicide was still technically a crime, just an unpunished one.  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711-13 (1997).

II. Attempted Suicide and Modern Developments

Most courts held that once suicide itself was no longer punishable, attempted suicide could likewise no longer be punished.  May v. Pennell, 101 Me. 516 (1906); Com. v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 162 (1870).  At least one court took a different view, however, holding that attempt was still punishable.  State v. La Fayette, 15 N.J. Misc. 115 (Ct. Com. Pleas 1937).  A few states, such as New York (though it has since repealed it), made attempted suicide a crime by statute even as they rejected the common law crime of suicide.  See Darrow v. Family Fund Soc., 116 N.Y. 537 (1889).  This makes a certain amount of sense, given that the attempter can be sentenced to jail or fined, whereas punishing a suicide only punishes the innocent (and likely grieving) survivors, which was the main reason for abolishing the common law punishments in the first place.

Coming somewhat closer to the modern era we have State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473 (1961).  This North Carolina case followed the logic of La Fayette. Suicide was a common law crime and is therefore still a felony under North Carolina law, which defines a felony as, among other things, “a crime which was a felony at common law.” Similarly, attempted suicide was still a misdemeanor.  The fact that suicide had no punishment was immaterial because North Carolina had a catch-all statute that said “All misdemeanors, where a specific punishment is not prescribed shall be punished as misdemeanors at common law.”  In this case, that means fines and imprisonment were theoretically possible, although the court recognized that “This, of course, does not mean that the court may not place offenders on probation, or make use of other state facilities and services in proper cases.”

Interestingly, Willis has not been overturned or distinguished, and the relevant North Carolina laws are essentially still in place.  If The Incredibles took place in a similar jurisdiction, a court could agree that attempted suicide was still theoretically a crime and so Mr. Incredible was justified in stopping it.

But what about something more straightforward: are there any jurisdictions left that still criminalize attempted suicide by statute?  As far we can tell, no U.S. state still has a statute criminalizing attempted suicide.  The Willis / La Fayette approach would seem to be the only way for it to remain a crime.

III. An Alternative Approach

Even if it isn’t a crime where The Incredibles takes place, that doesn’t mean Mr. Incredible couldn’t be justified in stopping the attempt.  As the Minnesota Supreme Court held in 1975: “There can be no doubt that a bona fide attempt to prevent a suicide is not a crime in any jurisdiction, even where it involves the detention, against her will, of the person planning to kill herself. Had defendant seized complainant as she was about to leap from a building, and had he kept her locked in a safe place until the authorities arrived, it is clear that a conviction for the crime of false imprisonment could not be sustained.”  State v. Hembd, 232 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Minn. 1975).  That case was decided in the criminal context, but a civil court could come to the same conclusion.

IV. Conclusion

Regardless of the law of the jurisdiction, Mr. Incredible probably could have beaten the case.  Would it have been enough to keep the supers from retiring?  Maybe, maybe not, but at least one of the sillier lawsuits in cinema history could have been thrown out.

The Invisible Woman and Indecent Exposure

Today’s post was inspired by William, who pointed us to Amazing Spider-Man #657.

In the issue, Spider-Man reminisces with Mr. Fantastic, the Invisible Woman, and the Thing about the recently deceased Human Torch, each one telling a story about him.  The Invisible Woman’s story involves a fight with members of the Fearsome Four.  While searching for the Four, Spider-Man and the Invisible Woman find the Human Torch signing autographs.  Seeing an opportunity to bring him down a peg, Spider-Man sneaks up and pantses the Human Torch.  Sure enough, the Fearsome Four choose that moment to show up.  With the Torch too embarrassed to fight pants-less, the situation looks grim until the Invisible Woman realizes how she can turn the tables.  Using her power to make things invisible, she effectively removes the pants of the three Fearsome Four members, who are then easily rounded up by Spidey and the Torch.

As the police take the villains away everything looks like it will turn out okay until the Invisible Woman (aka Sue Storm) explains her trick.  The officer taking her statement says “Ms. Storm, I’m sorry, but if what you say is true, I’m afraid I’ll have to bring you in as well.”  Asked what she’s being charged with he replies: “Indecent exposure.  She pantsed three men in public.  That’s a serious offense.”  And sure enough she gets arrested and booked, though apparently she avoids conviction.

So, is rendering someone’s pants invisible indecent exposure?  Or if it isn’t, is at least some other kind of crime?  Luckily we know the story took place in New York, so we can refer to the law there.

I. Indecent Exposure

In New York the crime commonly called indecent exposure is called “exposure of a person.”  Exposure of a person is a violation, less serious than even a misdemeanor, and is (basically) defined thus:

A person is guilty of exposure if he appears in a public place in such a manner that the private or intimate parts of his body are unclothed or exposed.

N.Y. Penal Law § 245.01.

As you can see, exposure is defined in terms of the exposed person being responsible for the exposure, rather than being exposed by another person.  So could Sue Storm be guilty of exposure of a person?

Probably not.  As mentioned, the statute is worded in terms of the nude person exposing themselves, not being exposed by another.  The best theory we can come up with is that, if the villains could claim a defense of duress (i.e. that they did not intend to expose themselves but rather were compelled to do so), then perhaps Sue could be liable under the theory that someone who compels another to commit a crime is liable for that crime.  But this is a weak argument because the villains didn’t remove their pants under Sue’s compulsion; rather, she rendered them invisible all on her own.

So if she can’t be brought up on charges of indecent exposure, are there any other options?

II. Assault, Invasion of Privacy, and Emotional Distress

Ordinarily a person who exposes another would be guilty of assault, since normally the only way to do so is to forcibly remove their clothing.  Even someone with the power of telekinesis could still be charged with assault, since even an intangible force can be enough to constitute assault.  See, e.g., Adams v. Com., 534 S.E.2d 347 (Ct. App. Va. 2000) (holding that shining a laser pointer at a police officer constituted assault).  But the Invisible Woman’s power doesn’t seem to touch an object at all but rather to warp light around it.  So she might not be guilty of assault, either.

Scraping the bottom of the barrel we have the torts of invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The villains could theoretically try to sue Sue (heh) in civil court, but it would be a hard sell.

III. Defenses

Even if a prosecutor could bring an exposure or assault charge under some theory (or if the villains sued in tort), Sue would have an excellent claim to self-defense and defense of others.  The villains attacked without provocation and clearly intended to kill the Invisible Woman, the Human Torch, and Spider-Man.  Since the heroes would have been justified in killing the villains, something as mild as a minor public humiliation would certainly be a reasonable force.

IV. Conclusion

On the whole this is a pretty good issue (for those interested, it’s collected in Spider-Man: Matters of Life and Death), but we aren’t surprised that Sue apparently managed to beat the rap.

Daredevil #7

There weren’t a lot of legal issues raised in the most recent Daredevil, so this will be a slightly short post, but there are a couple of points, including a nice detail about the tort defense of necessity.  Spoilers inside!

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Sleeper

The inspiration for today’s post comes from Promethee, who suggested we look at Sleeper, a comic series by Ed Brubaker and Sean Phillips.  We’re going to take a look at the premise of the story as well as one of the character’s unusual superpowers.  Minor spoilers inside.

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Preacher

Preacher is the iconic series by Garth Ennis, starring the Rev. Jesse Custer, a Texas preacherman who, accidentally possessed by some kind of supernatural being, unintentionally flattens his church, kills most of his congregation, falls in with a vampire, and goes on a rampage across at least two continents. So it’s basically a traditional, conservative morality play which maintains decent standards of… no, just can’t do it. It’s one of the most violent, disturbing, and alternatively terrifying, disgusting, and downright irreverent but also most interesting comics that’s been written in the last two decades. It’s up there with Sandman in terms of inventive comics, particularly in the non-superhero genres.

Those already familiar with the series will know that Custer gains the power of The Word, i.e. the ability to order anyone to do basically anything, and have them do it. Literally. If it’s impossible, they’ll either do it or (sometimes and) die trying.

Which raises an interesting series of legal questions related to theories of conspiracy and accomplice liability, but also some more subtle ones. There aren’t really any spoilers here, but we’ll move the rest inside for length’s sake.

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Once Upon a Time, Episode 5

This post was inspired by some questions in the comments on the last mailbag post.  There was some disagreement in the comments regarding the facts, but after reviewing the episode I think it’s arguable that each party was threatening the other, so we’ll consider it from both angles.  Now, on to the questions (and the spoilers).

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Mailbag for December 2, 2011

In today’s mailbag we have a question from Steven, who asks about the first Addams Family movie (Spoiler Alert!):  “Did Uncle Fester commit a crime? He was a conman pretending to be Fester, but unbeknownst to him [because of amnesia suffered in the Bermuda Triangle], he actually was Fester.”

(We consider this question fair game for the blog because the Addams Family actually started as a series of New Yorker cartoons, which are close enough to comics in our opinion.)

I. The Setup

First we have to consider the crimes Fester might be accused of.  There are several possibilities in New York (where The Addams Family takes place), but a reasonable choice is second degree criminal impersonation, which is a class A misdemeanor:

A person is guilty of criminal impersonation in the second degree when he:

1. Impersonates another and does an act in such assumed character with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another;

N.Y. Penal Law § 190.25.  Since Fester (who believed himself to be a man named Gordon) thought he was impersonating someone with the intent to gain access to the Addams Family’s wealth, this seems to fit.  The question is whether Fester’s real identity is a defense despite his belief that he was committing a crime.  We think the answer is that he may not be guilty of impersonation but he is likely guilty of attempted impersonation.

II. Impersonation

The New York courts have held that impersonation requires falsely identifying oneself as a specific, real person. “It is evident that the gravamen of the offense is holding oneself out as some other specific individual.”  People v. Danisi, 449 N.Y.S.2d 874, 875 (Dist. Ct. 1982) (emphasis added).  Even though Fester had the necessary mental state for the crime (i.e. he thought he was lying), he did not perform the prohibited action of holding himself out as some other individual because he was, in fact, who he said he was.

One might be tempted to argue that Fester has a defense of mistake of fact, but we don’t think it would apply here.  Ordinarily mistake of fact is invoked because the defendant believed he or she wasn’t committing a crime because it negates the mental state required by the crime.  For example, if an unrelated man named Gordon suffered memory loss and came to believe he was really Uncle Fester, then he could claim mistake of fact in that he reasonably believed he was entitled to part of the Addams Family fortune and so could not have intended to defraud them.

But here Fester’s mental state was exactly what was required by the crime.  He fully intended to commit a crime and even believed that what he was doing was a criminal act.  His factual mistake actually gave rise to the guilty mental state and so can’t be claimed as a defense.  His only defense is that he simply did not commit the act prohibited by the crime.  But he certainly tried to, and that leads us to the next section.

III. Attempted Impersonation and Factual Impossibility

A person is guilty of an attempted crime in New York when “(1) … the defendant had the intent to commit a specific offense; and (2) … the defendant engaged in some affirmative act to carry out that intent.”  People v. Coleman, 74 N.Y.2d 381, 383 (1989).  In this case Fester definitely had the required intent, and he did engage in various acts to carry out the intent (e.g. showing up at the mansion, claiming to be Fester, trying to find the Addams’s money).

So does it matter that Fester couldn’t actually be committing a crime because he was actually telling the truth about himself even though he thought it was a lie?  Perhaps surprisingly, no, he can still be guilty of attempted impersonation even though he couldn’t be guilty of impersonation.  This is the doctrine of factual impossibility, which we’ve discussed here before.  New York has even codified the doctrine in N.Y. Penal Law § 110.10:

If the conduct in which a person engages otherwise constitutes an attempt to commit a crime pursuant to section 110.00, it is no defense to a prosecution for such attempt that the crime charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission, if such crime could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as such person believed them to be.

So Fester likely has no defense to attempted impersonation.*  The good news is that attempted second degree impersonation is only a class B misdemeanor, which carries a maximum sentence of three months imprisonment, so at least it’s a lesser offense.  Given the extraordinary nature of the case, though, and the fact that the Addams welcomed him back with open arms once they learned the truth, we doubt a prosecutor would pursue the case.

* He could argue insanity, but while Fester is more than a bit weird we don’t think he qualifies as legally insane.  He could also argue something like duress, since the woman who claimed to be his mother certainly threatened and badgered him, but she really only did that once he started having second thoughts about conning the Addams family.  He was initially a more-or-less willing participant in the scheme.

All-Star Superman II: The Trial of Lex Luthor

As we previously discussed, Lex Luthor is arrested and put on trial for his actions which result in the death of Superman. In the first issue of All-Star Superman, the arresting officer says that the warrant is for “attempted murder and crimes against humanity.” In issue 5, we see the conclusion of the actual trial, and it seems that at some point the attempted murder charge was seemingly dropped, as when the judge hands down the verdict, he says “Guilty on all counts, of crimes against humanity.”

This is interesting, because there isn’t actually indication of what court we’re in, and “crimes against humanity” aren’t actually crimes in most jurisdictions, in part because the term is at least as much a political term as it is an actual offense. Be that as it may, you will not find “crimes against humanity” listed in any criminal code in the US, state or federal (Well, technically it’s a crime in Puerto Rico (a first degree felony!), so maybe Luthor got busted while returning to his vacation home in San Juan, but we doubt it.). So right off the bat, there’s something we need to talk about. More than that, there’s also the question of what court, if any, would have jurisdiction over such charges. Lastly, we’ll look more generally at the issue of prosecuting supervillains, which as we’ll see is far from simple. Continue reading

All-Star Superman I: Criminal Liability for Lex Luthor

All-Star Superman is the non-canonical, bi-monthly limited Superman series written by Grant Morrison and drawn by Frank Quitely which ran from January 2006 to October 2008. It’s the second title published by DC’s All-Star imprint, designed to let authors take a new run at old heroes by freeing them from the constrictions of continuity, both retrospective and prospective, similar to the Marvel Ultimate series. While All-Star Batman and Robin the Boy Wonder was rather poorly received, All-Star Superman is generally regarded as a successful and interesting take on Superman. One can say without offering much of a spoiler that the whole premise of the series is that Superman learns he is terminally ill and sets about setting his affairs in order before his impending death, setting the scene for a rather more poignant and thoughtful set of stories than one would normally expect from the Man of Steel. It also presents a pair of related legal issues which we’ll consider here: is Lex Luthor criminally liable for Superman’s death, and even if he were, how would one go about prosecuting something like that? This time we’re going to look at the first issue, saving the second for another post. Continue reading