Category Archives: criminal law

Grimm: Game Ogre

[Note! This post is the subject of Law and the Multiverse Retcon #11. The 2020 U.S. Supreme Court decision Ramos v. Louisiana has reversed the law in Oregon (and Louisiana) and also my analysis of this case!]

It’s been a while since we’ve done a post on Grimm, and today we have a brief post about an interesting quirk of Oregon law brought up by episode 8, “Game Ogre.”

I. The Setup

The villain of the episode is, unsurprisingly, an ogre.  Nick’s partner Hank helped put him in prison 5 years before the episode, and after escaping from prison the ogre comes after Hank.  In the episode, Hank admits that he “misplaced” a faked security camera tape that might have established an alibi for the ogre.  Hank’s reasoning was that the ogre had a really good lawyer, and if only a single juror felt that the tape established reasonable doubt, then the ogre would have walked.

Interestingly, Oregon—where the show takes place—is the only state in the country for which that isn’t necessarily true.  The Oregon Constitution provides that “in the circuit court ten members of the jury may render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, save and except a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, which shall be found only by a unanimous verdict, and not otherwise.”  Ore. Const. art. I § 11.  Oregon has since replaced first degree murder with aggravated murder, but the unanimity requirement applies to aggravated murder.  See, e.g., State v. Sparks, 336 Or. 298 (2004) (en banc).  We’ll come back to aggravated murder in a moment; first a discussion of jury verdicts and the Constitution.

II. Unanimity and the Constitution

Federal statutory law requires a unanimous verdict in federal cases (Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 31).  However, this requirement is not necessarily rooted in the Constitution, and the states can permit convictions on less than unanimous verdicts.  Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).  There was not a clear majority in Apodaca, so depending on which Justice you want to believe, the reason for this is either because the Sixth Amendment simply doesn’t require it or because that part of the Sixth Amendment isn’t incorporated by the 14th Amendment.

So just how much less than unanimous is okay?  The Supreme Court hasn’t drawn an exact line, but the Apodaca case upheld 11-1 and 10-2 convictions, though a later case held that 5-1 was impermissible.  Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979).  Justice Blackmun, concurring in Apodaca, said that he’d be okay with 9-3 but not as far as 7-5.

So that’s the constitutional law aspect.  Now let’s turn to the facts of the case.

III. Aggravated Murder and Lesser Included Offenses

The show isn’t specific, but the ogre was probably charged with aggravated murder.  From the definition of aggravated murder in ORS § 163.095:

 “aggravated murder” means murder as defined in ORS 163.115 which is committed under, or accompanied by, any of the following circumstances:

(e) The homicide occurred in the course of or as a result of intentional maiming or torture of the victim.

In this case the ogre tortured his victim for two days, which would surely count.  So a guilty verdict would have to be unanimous, right?  Not necessarily, via the magic of lesser included offenses.  Basically, the concept of a lesser included offense recognizes that many crimes consist of “committing crime X, plus some other stuff.”  Thus, if someone commits the more serious crime, they’ve necessarily committed the lesser included offense of crime X.  A classic common law example is that robbery is larceny plus assault (i.e. stealing something by force or the threat of force).  So if someone commits a robbery, they’ve necessarily also committed both a larceny and an assault.

This has a few different practical effects.  For one, a defendant can’t be convicted of both an offense and a lesser included offense for the same criminal act.  So for example someone who forcibly steals a purse can’t be convicted of both robbery and larceny, since the larceny was part of the robbery.  Of course, if they forcibly steal a purse and then non-forcibly shoplift some jewelry, then that’s two separate acts and they could be convicted of both a robbery and a larceny.

Another practical effect of this doctrine is that a defendant can, however, be convicted of any lesser included offense of the crime charged.  Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973).  In fact, in a capital murder case, the Constitution requires the jury to be given instructions for lesser included offenses like manslaughter.  Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).

So, in the ogre’s case, the jury would have been instructed that they could find him guilty of aggravated murder, which requires a unanimous verdict, or they could find him guilty of a lesser included offense, which would require only 10 guilty votes, or they could acquit him.  So if one or two jurors believed the faked alibi tape, but the other 10 or 11 still thought the ogre was guilty of aggravated murder, the jury could still find him guilty of regular murder or manslaughter, the one or two votes to acquit notwithstanding.

In just about any other jurisdiction, the jurors who believe the alibi would vote to acquit and the result would be a hung jury.  Of course, if three or more jurors believed the alibi then all bets are off, even in Oregon.

IV. Conclusion

“Game Ogre” wasn’t the strongest Grimm episode, but more recent ones have been better.  We’ll definitely cover those in future posts, but we couldn’t resist the opportunity to make a post out of what is ordinarily a piece of legal trivia (although maybe it’s not so trivial to criminal defendants in Oregon!).

Ultimate Comics: Spider-Man

The new run of Ultimate Comics: Spider-Man from Brian Michael Bendis is getting rave reviews.  There haven’t been a ton of overt legal issues, but a scene from the recent issue #6 caught my eye.  Spoilers ahead!

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Knightfall

Batman: Knightfall is a major Batman story arc from the early 1990s in which the Caped Crusader faces off against Bane, the villain who will reportedly be featured in the upcoming Dark Knight Rises. The series is available in a collection of recently reprinted trades: Knightfall, Knightquest, and KnightsEnd. The story opens in Batman # 491, when Bane and his accomplices break open Arkham Asylum. The inmates go on to cause general havoc for the next dozen-odd issues. In this post, we’re going to look at just how much of that Bane is going to be liable for. Continue reading

Dollhouse: Haunted

We’ve written generally about the TV series Dollhouse before, but this is our first look at the legal issues raised by a particular episode from season one.  The show was recent enough that we’ll give a spoiler warning.

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Sherlock: The Reichenbach Fall

Sherlock is the critically-acclaimed BBC adaptation of Arthur Conan Doyle’s classic Sherlock Holmes stories in a twenty-first-century setting. The latest episode, “The Reichenbach Fall,” is a re-telling of “The Final Problem,” in which Sherlock, battling with arch-nemesis Moriarty, plunges down the Reichenbach Falls, presumably to his death.  It is the final episode of the second season.

He didn’t die in the original story, of course (it isn’t a spoiler if it was published a century ago, people!), but the following will contain some pretty serious spoilers for “The Reichenbach Fall,” so you’ve been warned. Continue reading

Buffyverse Vampires and Criminal Liability

The inspiration for this post comes from an email from Will, who asked about vampires in Joss Whedon’s Buffy the Vampire Slayer and Angel.   Buffyverse vampires are a bit different from most mythological or fictional vampires.  For legal purposes, the biggest difference is that Buffyverse vampires retain their memories from mortal life but are possessed by a demon’s soul, so they tend to be evil.  This raises some interesting questions about vampires’ potential for criminal liability, especially for the character of Angel.

Note that I’m going to gloss over the issue of whether vampires are subject to the human justice system in the first place.  It’s arguable that, as non-humans, they lack legal rights.  From a legal perspective, the original human has died  because their cardiovascular functions have irreversibly ceased.  Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7180(a) (the California version of the Uniform Determination of Death Act).  Since they’re dead, they can’t be human.  That’s not very satisfying or interesting, though, so I’m going to ignore it.

I. Mental Capacity

Most vampires seem to be mentally competent, or at least as competent as they were in life.  Some of them aren’t very bright, but they aren’t anywhere near the level of mental incapacity required to be a defense under California law.  In California, the test for mental incapacity is the same as for insanity:  the accused must be incapable of understanding the nature of his or her act or distinguishing right from wrong. People v. Phillips, 83 Cal. App. 4th 170 (2d Dist. 2000).  Vampires seem mentally capable of understanding what they are doing, and they can distinguish right from wrong.  It’s pretty hard to revel in doing evil acts if you don’t understand that they’re morally wrong.

II. Insanity

For pretty much the same reason, it’s hard to argue that vampires are insane, at least under California’s M’Naghten test, which is defined by statute.  Cal. Penal Code § 25(b).  Under a different test, such as the irresistible impulse test, they might be found insane, but California does not recognize that test. People v. Severance, 138 Cal.App.4th 305, 324 (3d Dist. 2006).  The Severance case is actually surprisingly applicable: “The gist of defendant’s claim of insanity was that after he was hit on the head in January 2000, Satan took control of his mind and body and he did things he does not normally do—namely, rob two stores. In the words Flip Wilson playing Geraldine, “the Devil made him do it.” In essence, defendant’s claim of insanity was a claim he acted under an “irresistible impulse.” The irresistible impulse test, however, has long been discredited in California as a test for legal insanity.”  Severance, 138 Cal.App.4th at 324.

III. The Special Case of Angel

The character of Angel is (almost) unique among vampires.  Through various means throughout Buffy and Angel, his human soul is restored, lost, and restored again.  In his human-souled state, he is called Angel; his demonic form is called Angelus.  Angel feels remorse for the terrible deeds of Angelus and works to set things right.  Does this change anything?  From a legal perspective, I think not.  Essentially, he is akin to a person with a recurring mental illness that doesn’t quite rise to the level of insanity.

One might argue that Angel shouldn’t be punished for Angelus’s crimes.  After all, it’s not like Angel is likely to commit any of the same crimes.  But actually, incarcerating Angel would serve the function of incapacitation (i.e. preventing Angel from turning into Angelus and wreaking havoc).  So it wouldn’t solely be an exercise in (mostly pointless) retribution.  And arguably it would also serve a deterrent function for other vampires by showing that they can be caught and punished by humans.  They may be evil, but they’re not stupid.  Well, mostly.

IV. A Side-Note About Blood

Since the vampires in the Buffyverse can survive on animal blood, they can’t claim the defense of necessity for drinking human blood, at least non-consensually.  Angel generally drinks animal blood, so that’s not a problem for him, and California allows animal blood to be sold for human consumption. 3 CCR § 904.17.

V. Conclusion

Assuming the vampires are considered human (and thus capable of committing crimes in the first place), then their vampirism probably won’t save them from criminal liability.  In Angel’s case, that means he’s potentially liable for a couple centuries’ worth of killing, since there is no statute of limitations on murder.  The animal blood is probably legit, though, so I’m sure that’s a certain comfort.

Breaking Bad: Landlord-Tenant Law

Breaking Bad is the award-winning AMC show about a high school chemistry teacher who, after being diagnosed with Stage III lung cancer, decides to provide for his family by cooking meth. Turns out he’s pretty damn good at the cooking part, but the rest of it is where the drama kicks in and why the show is now headed into its fifth season. Obviously, the core of the show involves doing things which are spectacularly illegal, and the show makes no bones about that. But in Episode 4 of the second season, “Down,” there’s a bit of landlord-tenant law that bears examining. Spoilers to follow. Continue reading

Preacher: Salvation

We already had one fairly popular post on Preacher, exploring the legal ramifications of Jesse’s use of The Word. Here we’re going to talk about something a little more down-to-earth: Jesse’s installation as the sheriff of Salvation, Texas. Or possibly his assumption of said office. The legality of the job is one of the things at issue in the story itself. This time we’re going to be looking at the implications of improper inauguration for the state actor doctrine. Continue reading

Getting Rich with Superpowers, Part 1: Insider Trading

We’ve previously talked about how immortal beings might find it difficult to amass significant wealth simply by virtue of living a long time.  This post marks the first in a series on how other common superpowers might be used to make money in the short term.

One way to make (or lose) a lot of money is via the stock market, and several superpowers lend themselves to taking advantage of the market: telepathy, enhanced senses, invisibility, and time travel, just to name a view.  Each of these could be used to come across valuable information without necessarily breaking any other laws (e.g. without trespassing).  For example, someone with Superman-level enhanced hearing could easily overhear a boardroom conversation, and an invisible person could similarly overhear sensitive conversations in public places. The question, then, is whether using any of this information would run afoul of insider trading laws.

(Note: do not try any of this at home, at least without consulting a competent attorney in your jurisdiction.)

I. Insider Trading

There are three major theories of insider trading liability.  First, one cannot trade on material, nonpublic information if one owes a fiduciary duty  to other traders in the marketplace. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).  This covers the most common types of insider trading: corporate insiders who trade on confidential information or who give confidential information to an outsider in breach of a fiduciary duty.  See also Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983).

The second theory is “misappropriation.”  “The misappropriation theory holds that a person commits fraud “in connection with” a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information.”  United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).  This, then, covers the case in which the source of the information is a patsy rather than complicit.  It still requires that the misappropriator owe the source a fiduciary duty, however.

The first two theories are based on applying common law theories of fraud to the SEC rule against fraudulent trading.  The third theory is based on Rule 14e-3, which specifically forbids a certain type of insider trading.  “Rule 14e-3 prohibits any person who is in possession of material nonpublic information relating to the commencement of a tender offer, acquired directly or indirectly from either the bidder or the target company, from trading in target company securities. It also makes unlawful passing on any such information where it is reasonably forseeable that the recipient will trade.”  Donald C. Langevoort, 18 Insider Trading Regulation, Enforcement, and Prevention § 1:10.  On the one hand 14e-3 is broad because there is no requirement of a fiduciary duty, but on the other hand it is narrow because it only applies to tender offers (e.g. mergers and acquisitions).

So, now that we have a rough idea of what constitutes insider trading, let’s see if any common superpowers can allow someone to acquire material, nonpublic information without running afoul of any of these theories.

II. Superpowered Reconnaissance

The first thing to do is to forget about using insider information to take advantage of a potential merger or acquisition.  Rule 14e-3 would almost certainly apply, so our hero (or villain) will have to stick to other kinds of valuable information (e.g. an R&D breakthrough or a pending product recall), and that’s the context we’ll assume for the rest of the post.

In general, merely overhearing something (e.g. a conversation between company employees) in a public space is not a violation under the first two theories because there is no fiduciary duty being broken: the recipient owes the company and its shareholders no duty, and the employees aren’t improperly tipping off the recipient.  So enhanced senses and invisibility would seem to be a good fit.

Telepathy is more problematic.  As we’ve discussed before, telepathy may run afoul of a person’s right to privacy.  Would discovering information about a company be highly offensive to a reasonable person?  Would it matter if the victim was a regular employee of a giant company or an emotionally-invested founder of a small business?  It’s hard to say how a jury would react.  It is not clear to me whether this kind of privacy violation would be sufficient to trigger insider trading laws, however.  The law prohibits the use of deception to acquire insider information, and telepathy could qualify, though it seems a bit strained. S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that computer hacking to obtain insider information may be “deceptive device or contrivance” prohibited by Rule 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5).

Time travel seems to be the cleanest of all: the superpowered schemer could simply wait until the information was public, then travel back in time and use it profitably.  This suggests the scheme in Primer might have been legal.

The previously mentioned prohibition against deception suggests that shapeshifting, psychic manipulation, and other forms of trickery wouldn’t work.

III. Conclusion

With the right superpowers and a little luck it may be possible to profit from the stock market without running afoul of insider trading laws.  Has this ever been tried in the comics?

Legal Responsibility for Insane Robots

Insane robots that turn against their creators or try to destroy humanity are a pretty common theme in lots of media, not just comics.  Of course, this is a blog primarily about comic books, so we’ll take an example from there, as inspired by a question from TechyDad, who asks about Henry Pym (aka Ant-Man) and his potential liability for the creation of the robot Ultron, which in its various incarnations has done all kinds of terrible things, including attempting to destroy the world.

I. The Setup

The first thing to consider is whether an intelligent robot could be criminally or civilly liable for its own actions.  As with all other intelligent non-humans, the answer seems to be no unless Congress explicitly allows for it.  Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004).  Since Congress doesn’t seem to have done so in the comics, we must now consider whether any of the liability falls to Pym, and for that we need the facts of a particular case.

The example TechyDad wanted to know about comes from the TV series The Avengers: Earth’s Mightiest Heroes, specifically the episode The Ultron Imperative.  In the episode, Ultron nearly destroys the entire world by launching S.H.I.E.L.D.’s nuclear arsenal.  Ultimately, Pym stops Ultron at the last second, but Pym is blamed for the incident, since a) he created Ultron and b) infused it with his own mental patterns, although it may have been corrupted by Kang the Conqueror and was definitely weaponized by Stark Industries, albeit with Pym’s help.  Pym accepts the blame and admits that it was his fault.

So, then, who is liable here and for what?  We’ll start with torts.

II. Tort Liability

There are three major bases for tort liability: intentional misconduct, negligence (and its close cousin, recklessness), and strict liability.  We can definitely weed out intentional misconduct, since Pym neither intended nor had knowledge to a substantial certainty that Ultron would turn violent and try to destroy the world.

Next we consider negligence.  The key question (although not the only question) is whether Pym used reasonable care in the design and deployment of Ultron (i.e. whether the cost of avoiding the incident was more or less than the expected value of the harm caused by the incident).  This is a complicated question.  On the one hand, Pym is a genius and seems to have tried very hard to make Ultron a force for good.  And before Ultron 6 showed up Pym was in the process of destroying every last Ultron component he had previously created.  On the other hand, the potential for serious harm caused by a nigh-indestructible, highly intelligent, weaponized robot is so high that it’s possible that even that level of care was not enough.  In fact, the potential for harm is so high that it might even fall under strict liability.

Strict liability (i.e. liability without regard to the level of care or fault) is rare in torts.  There are two main cases where strict liability is applied: abnormally dangerous activities (aka ultrahazardous activities) and some kinds of products liability.  Since Ultron wasn’t a product, that leaves abnormally dangerous activities.  Examples of abnormally dangerous activities include transporting gasoline, dynamite blasting, and the ownership of wild animals.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines abnormally dangerous activities thus:

In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.

It seems that the creation and weaponization of Ultron meet all of these criteria.  There’s a high degree of risk of harm because robots are unpredictable.  The likelihood that the harm will be great because it was equipped with powerful weapons.  Pym couldn’t eliminate the risk despite (in the comics) decades of trying.  Such robots definitely aren’t common.  Ultron was meant to protect people, which necessarily means he would be close to bystanders, which doesn’t seem appropriate.  Ultron’s value to the community seems to have been pretty low since existing superheroes were capable of handling the threats Ultron was meant to help with.

So then, it may not matter whether Pym was blameworthy or not.  If strict liability applies then the rule is “you makes your insane robot and you takes your chances.”

III. Criminal Liability

Luckily for Pym, strict liability is even less common in the criminal law.  In fact, it’s usually only found when the stakes are very low (e.g. speeding), although there are exceptions (e.g. statutory rape).  It doesn’t apply to anything Ultron did, in any case.  Another thing we can say is that Pym wouldn’t be guilty of attempted murder (or attempted anything, for that matter) because attempt requires intent, and Pym clearly didn’t intend for Ultron to attempt to kill anybody.

That doesn’t clear Pym of wrongdoing, however.  There’s still criminal negligence (which is a higher standard than ordinary tort negligence).  For example, in New  York, criminal negligence is defined by N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05(4) this way:

A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.

So, in New York criminal negligence requires a “gross deviation” from reasonable care.  Since Pym seemed to try very hard to avoid harm, he might escape criminal liability unless a reasonable person would say “there is no way to make this safe, so I won’t even try to make a robot like Ultron.”

IV. What About Other Defendants?

So that’s Pym’s potential liability, but what about the other people involved?  After all, it was Tony Stark and his company that weaponized Ultron in the first place, and Stark says that he is “just as responsible.”  That probably doesn’t take Pym off the hook, however, since Pym was involved with that work.  It might make Stark and Stark Industries liable, however.

V. Evidentiary Issues

Finally, we’ll note that Pym’s admission of responsibility could be used against him in court.  Ordinarily one cannot testify as to something someone else said out of court—that’s basically the definition of hearsay.  But a statement offered against the opposing party (i.e. Pym, as the defendant) that was made by that party is specifically excluded from the definition of hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically Rule 801(d)(2)(A), and many states have similar rules.  So Pym probably should have kept quiet until he talked to a lawyer; his invention did nearly destroy the entire world, after all.

VI. Conclusion

Creators and owners of robots, even intelligent autonomous ones, are (generally) responsible for injuries caused by those robots.  Between that legal rule and robots’ terrible track record of violent rebellion, it’s kind of surprising that so many comic book inventors keep making them.  Maybe Matt Murdock can lead a class action suit against Stark Industries for all the trouble Ultron has caused over the years, although the statute of limitations has probably run on some of the older stuff, since he first appeared in the late 1960s.