Author Archives: James Daily

Interview at The Beat

James and Ryan were interviewed for The Beat, the News Blog of Comics Culture.  Our interviewer, Jen Vaughn, also created our superhero portraits, which are featured in the interview and on our About page.

The Trial (And Appeal) of Marvel Boy

This post was inspired by an email from Rebecca, who writes: “In The New Warriors comic [Vol1. No. 20-26], Vance Astrovik [aka Marvel Boy] accidentally killed his abusive father using his telekinetic powers.  He was tried for first degree murder and negligent homicide; he was acquitted of the former and convicted of the latter. Vance did not appeal the conviction, but do you think he would have been successful if he did?”

This is a great question.  Not only can we look at some important issues in criminal law and procedure, but this also gives us a chance to look at how appeals work.  The most important thing to understand about an appeal is that it is not a do-over before a higher court; there are important and often severe limitations on what issues and evidence can be presented on appeal, and the appeals court is itself limited in what it can do and on what basis it can do it.  Since the case occurred in New York in 1992 we will try to analyze it from that point of view.  But let’s start with the facts of the case.

I. The Facts

In case you don’t remember the details of this 18-year-old storyline, the facts are basically these: Vance Astrovik had been physically abused by his father, Arnold, for four years.  Arnold was evidently motivated by hatred of Vance’s mutant status and his tendency to hang out with other mutants.  The one time his mother, Norma, attempted to intervene, Arnold struck her as well.  On at least one occasion, Vance used his telekinetic powers to resist an attack from Arnold without harming him.

After being severely injured in fights with Terrax and Gideon, Vance is attacked by his father, who punches him to the floor and approaches him menacingly, saying “You are a freak!  It’s going to stop–if I have to pound it out of you…”  At that point, Vance unleashes a telekinetic blast, pushing his father through two walls, severely injuring him.  Vance flees the scene.

Later, Vance comes to the hospital where his father is being reated.  There he is arrested for “assault with a deadly weapon–your telekinetic powers, to be exact!” (Note that this suggests that, in the Marvel universe, innate offensive powers are considered weapons, which may have significant legal consequences).  After Vance’s arrest, Arnold dies from his injuries, and the charges are upgraded to murder.

So far everything is legally sound.  There is a reasonable theory for treating innate offensive powers as weapons, and while the prosecutor had a wide range of possible charges she could bring, she has discretion to choose among them.  It would also be appropriate to upgrade the charge to murder after the victim died, so long as the defendant’s attack was still the proximate cause of death (and in this case it was).  This brings us to the trial.

II. The Trial

Most of the New Warriors leave town during the trial for a mission.  Firestar stays behind to testify on the theory that testimony from any of the others would be excludable as cumulative.  See People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1981).  That’s a reasonable theory, though it depends on the testimony they had to offer being, in fact, cumulative.  While the testimony the state might want from them could be cumulative (e.g. it’s may be sufficient that only one say that Vance could have stopped his father without resorting to deadly force), the defense would likely want to pile as many positive character witnesses on as it could.  So Vance’s teammates weren’t doing him any favors by taking off.

Vance is represented by Foggy Nelson, a partner in Matt Murdock’s law firm.  Right off the bat, Foggy dismisses two potential jurors who had prior interactions with superheroes.  Presumably their interactions were negative.

The first witness called is an expert on superhuman genetics, Walter Rosen, who was familiar with Vance’s powers.  Rosen testified that Vance had excellent control over his powers and had grown in his abilities over time.  The defense then addressed the witness, who testified that Vance was averse to injuring others, had not injured anyone to the witness’s knowledge, and had tried to save lives and prevent injuries often at risk to himself.  Classic character witness stuff.

The next witness is Firestar, who testifies as Firestar and in her identity-concealing costume, which poses legal issues of its own.  This suggests that either the Marvel universe gives superheroes leeway to testify in costume or that the prosecutor didn’t want to push the issue, lest she lose her witness.  In this case, the defense was also unlikely to object to the witness’s costume and use of an alias.

In any event, Firestar reluctantly testifies that Vance could have stopped his father without resorting to deadly force.  This is curious, since she had no personal knowledge of Vance’s altercation with his father, but the question is not objected to (although Foggy does object to other questions on occasion).  This ends the prosecution’s case in chief.  It’s very strange that the prosecution did not itself call Vance’s mother, the only witness to the actual events that the prosecution could call, since Vance is protected by the Fifth Amendment and the victim is deceased.  But moving on…

The next witness is Ben Grimm, who testifies to Vance’s good character but also his ability to use his powers to prevent people from getting hurt.  After that, the defense calls Vance’s mother, who testifies about Arnold’s history of abuse.  On cross-examination she testifies that Vance had stopped his father once with his powers and that he could’ve stopped his father without killing him.  This ends the defense’s case.

During closing arguments, the defense emphasizes Vance’s good and caring nature and argues that Vance acted in self-defense.  The prosecution argues that Vance had the ability to stop his father without harming him.  To prove the point, the prosecutor pulls out a pistol, aims it at Vance, and fires it.  Vance uses his powers to capture not only the pistol (revealed to be a cap gun) but even the very smoke from the cap gun.  The defense demands a mistrial, and the judge denies the motion but hints that grounds for an appeal exist.  This is not completely unreasonable; despite the prosecution’s antics, judges are loathe to declare a mistrial, especially so close to the end of the trial, since it means an enormous waste of resources.

Curiously, the judge does not give the jury any instructions, which is odd because those are ordinarily an essential part of the trial, but we’re willing to give the comic book authors a pass on this, since jury instructions are usually very, very boring and technical. We’ll assume appropriate jury instructions were given.

In the end, the jury finds Vance not guilty of first degree murder but guilty of negligent homicide.  He is sentenced to fourteen months to three years in The Vault.  Curiously, Foggy suggests an appeal but not post-trial motions such as a motion to vacate the judgment or to set aside the sentence.  Vance declines to appeal and resigns himself to his sentence, but what if he had followed Foggy’s advice and appealed his conviction?

III.  A Little Appellate Procedure

Now some background on how appeals work. (Note: this is a little dry, so if you want to gloss over the legal details and get to the good part, skip to Section IV, or just check Wikipedia on the subject).

There are a lot of issues we’re going to gloss over (e.g., appellate jurisdiction, waiver, harmless vs. reversible error), but we’re going to go into a little detail about the idea of standard of review.  That is, even if an appeals court will consider an alleged error, how bad does it have to be in order for the court to reverse it?  In general, appeals courts are reluctant to address issues that were waived or forfeited, and they are also reluctant to disturb jury verdicts.  In New York, where this case took place, there is a two part test for overturning a jury verdict: legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence.

Legal sufficiency is defined in New York thus: “For a court to conclude…that a jury verdict is supported by sufficient evidence, the court must determine whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burden requirements for every element of the crime charged. If that is satisfied, then the verdict will be upheld by the intermediate appellate court on that review basis.” People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1987).

And weight of the evidence is defined thus: “the appellate court must, like the trier of fact below, weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony. If it appears that the trier of fact has failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded, then the appellate court may set aside the verdict. Empowered with this unique factual review, intermediate appellate courts have been careful not to substitute themselves for the jury. Great deference is accorded to the factfinder’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony and observe demeanor.” Id.

IV. The (Hypothetical) Appeal

With all of this background in mind, how might the appeal have gone?  Well, assuming the issues were property preserved, here’s what Foggy might have argued.

First, there was insufficient evidence to convict Vance of negligent homicide.  New York defines criminally negligent homicide thus: “A  person  is  guilty  of  criminally  negligent  homicide  when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person.”  N.Y. Penal Law § 125.10. Not very helpful on its own; we need the definition of criminal negligence:

A person acts with criminal negligence  with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an  offense  when  he  fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance  exists.  The  risk  must  be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes  a  gross  deviation  from  the  standard  of  care  that  a reasonable person would observe in the situation.

N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05.  The key here is the second sentence.  The prosecution offered essentially no evidence that Vance’s telekinetic blast was a “gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation,” given that the situation was one of a heavily injured young adult being beaten by a grown man with no help in sight.  Vance’s blast may have been more than strictly necessary to end the confrontation, but there was no evidence that it was a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would have done in the heat of the moment.

But failing that, there is the issue of self-defense.  The prosecution focused heavily on whether Vance could have used less force to stop his father.  This makes a certain amount of sense because New York defines self-defense thus:

A  person  may,  subject to the provisions of subdivision two, use physical force upon another person when and to the  extent he or she
reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself, herself or a third  person  from  what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person

N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(1).  Here the issue is whether Vance reasonably believed his violent telekinetic blast was necessary, which basically means whether the jury thought it was reasonable.  And the prosecution argued that no, it was not, since he could have used less force.  But there are special rules for the use of deadly force in self-defense:

A  person  may  not  use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless:
(a) The actor reasonably believes that such other person is  using  or about  to use  deadly  physical  force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she  knows  that  with complete  personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating; except that the actor is  under  no duty to retreat if he or she is:
(i) in his or her dwelling and not the initial aggressor

N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2).  In this case, Vance was in his house and he was not the initial aggressor, so he had no duty to retreat.  Thus, he could use deadly force if he reasonably believed that his father was about to use deadly physical force, even if he could also have used less force.  There is a good argument to be made that such a belief would have been reasonable: Vance was already severely injured, his father had struck him quite forcefully already, his father had him pinned, his father had announced his extremely violent intentions, and there was no help in sight.  That’s pretty compelling stuff.

The problem here, however, is that Foggy didn’t really develop these issues at trial, apart from an oblique mention of self-defense in his closing argument.  The jury would likely have been given instructions related to self-defense, but without solid testimony or other evidence to support it, the jury could reasonably conclude that the weight of the evidence favored the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.  The appellate court is under no obligation to make up for the defense’s mistakes.

V. Conclusion

It’s hard to say for sure what an appellate court would make of this case.  The prosecution’s case was a little weak, and there were strong arguments for self-defense.  Unfortunately, Foggy didn’t do such a hot job as Vance’s defense attorney, so the case wasn’t set up for appeal very well.  However, it’s a comic book, and we could just as easily assume that Foggy actually filled in all the gaps but the writers omitted the minutiae for the sake of storytelling.  Still, the Marvel universe is somewhat hostile to mutants, and appellate court judges are not immune to bias.  Ultimately, Vance likely had decent chances on appeal, probably better than most criminal defendants.

(And in case we sound a bit down on the writers, we should add that the legal elements are on par with a typical episode of Law & Order.  They didn’t do a perfect job, but it could have been much worse.)

Law and the Multiverse Mailbag III

Today we take a look at reader questions involving the Patriot Act, Bruce Wayne’s funding of Batman, and revealing superhero costumes.  As always, if you have questions or post suggestions, please send them to james@lawandthemultiverse.com and ryan@lawandthemultiverse.com or leave them in the comments.

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Law and the Multiverse on SciFi Surplus

We were featured on the SciFi Surplus podcast with Vince and Casey.  We had a great time doing the interview, and we think you’ll enjoy listening to it.

Superpowered Minors, Part Three

In prior installments of this series, we looked at criminal and contract liability for minors.  Today we look at minors and torts.  The rules here are fairly straightforward, but there are different rules for each theory of liability (e.g. intentional misconduct, negligence).

Although many torts resemble crimes, they are still civil wrongs.  Thus, the aim of tort law is to compensate the plaintiff rather than to punish the defendant, except in egregious cases.  This is why, as we shall see, minors–even very young ones–tend to be more liable for torts than they are for crimes.  It may do no good to punish a five year old for a crime, since the child may not understand the crime or the punishment, but if there has been an injury then it is only just and fair to compensate the victim.  That’s the theory, anyway.

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Superpowered Minors, Part Two

In the previous installment of this series we discussed minor superhero and supervillain criminal liability.  Today we’re going to talk about the contract liability of minors.  Unlike crimes (and, as we shall see, torts), minors are often able to escape contract liability.

I. The General Rule

The common law rule is that “minors have the capacity to contract, at least when of sufficient age to understand what they are doing, but in general, they have the right to repudiate their contracts.”  42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants § 39; See, e.g., Hoblyn v. Johnson, 55 P.3d 1219, 1230 (Sup. Ct. Wy. 2002).  In other words, a minor can enter a contract (and sue for breach), but in general he or she can also get out of the contract if he or she wants to.

Now you might think that this is a bit unfair.  For example, what if an upstart supervillain contracts to buy a freeze ray, receives it, stiffs the seller, then repudiates the contract? The answer is that the supervillain has to give the freeze ray back if he or she wants to avoid the contract.  See, e.g., Nelson v. Browning, 391 S.W.2d 873, 877 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1965)  The law may be stupid sometimes, but it’s not that stupid.

There is, however, a twist.  What if the freeze ray was smashed in an altercation with a superhero?  In that case the seller is out of luck.  “If during infancy he has wasted or squandered the consideration, or has otherwise made away with it so that he is unable to restore it, he may nevertheless repudiate the contract without making a tender.”  Id.

So why not require the kid to pony up the cash equivalent instead of getting away free and clear?  Because “the privilege of repudiating a contract is accorded an infant because of the indiscretion incident to his immaturity, and if he were required to restore the equivalent where he has wasted or squandered the consideration received, the privilege would be of no avail when most needed.”  Id. at 877-78.  In other words, it’s all well and good to demand one’s freeze ray back because in a sense that doesn’t cost the kid anything, but giving back the cash equivalent would essentially be an enforcement of the contract since it would come out of the kid’s own pocket, which kinda defeats the point of the rule.

However, some courts have taken the view that merely selling or exchanging the received goods for something else doesn’t count.  In other words, if our young supervillain exchanges the freeze ray for a heat ray of equal or lesser value, then in some states he might still be liable to return the heat ray (assuming he’s still got it and it hasn’t been smashed up, of course).  See, e.g., Whitman v. Allen, 121 A. 160 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1923).  And some courts depart from the general rule entirely and take the view that the minor is in fact liable for the value of the consideration received, even if the minor has to pay the cash equivalent out of pocket.  See, e.g., Porter v. Wilson, 209 A.2d 730 (Sup. Ct. N.H. 1965).

The upshot of all of this is that entering into contracts with minors isn’t terribly wise most of the time. This why most contracts involving minors require the signature of a parent or legal guardian.

II. Some Exceptions

The major exception, extending back to the common law, is that a minor can be bound for a contract for “necessaries.”  Necessaries are not precisely defined in most jurisdictions, but as a rule of thumb they are things like food and shelter that the minor actually needs and actually uses.  For example, a hotel room is not a necessary when a minor has access to a perfectly good home, but if the minor would otherwise be stranded outside and does indeed use the hotel room, then that’s a necessary.  As you can imagine, this would mostly apply to the practical requirements of a young superhero or supervillain living on his or her own; the rule wouldn’t apply to something like a freeze ray, since nobody really needs one.

Note, however, that the liability for necessaries is generally limited to the reasonable value of the good or service, not the contracted price. See, e.g., Williams v. Baptist Health Systems, Inc., 857 So.2d 149 (Ct. Civ. App. Ala. 2003).  This is because the liability for necessaries is not based on contract but rather quasi-contract, the distinction between which is beyond the scope of this post.

Of course, the common law can be modified by statute, and in many states it has been.  For example, in California a minor cannot make a contract relating to real property (i.e. real estate) or make a contract relating to personal property not under his or her immediate possession or control.  Cal. Civ. Code § 6701 (2009).

Finally, things get especially complicated when you consider cases where a person makes a contract while a minor but then seeks to repudiate it after turning 18.

III. Conclusion

The rule that minors may be liable for their torts, responsible for their crimes, and yet often not liable for their contracts may seem a bit unfair.  The practical conclusion is for adults to be wary of contracting with minors, and indeed this is why many legal actions require a parent or legal guardian to be involved (NB in such cases it is the adult who is bound, not the minor).  But in the right jurisdiction, a wily young supervillain–especially one able to project the appearance of adulthood–might be able to abuse this defense for fun and profit.

Superpowered Minors, Part One

One topic that we’ve been asked about by several people is the issue of superpowered minors, whether acting as superheroes or supervillains.  There are many examples, such as the Teen Titans, young mutants like Kitty Pryde, and Spider-Man (in his younger days). This post, the first in a series, is about the minors themselves and their criminal liability.  Future posts will cover torts and contracts.  The legal issues involving their parents, guardians (like Bruce Wayne), and school teachers (like Professor X) will also be addressed in future installments.

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Superhero Privacy Rights, Part Three

In the first two installments of this series we discussed the invasion of privacy torts of intrusion and disclosure.  This post will address the tort of appropriation and the closely related right of publicity.  Since the two are closely related, let’s begin by distinguishing them.

Here’s how the Nevada Supreme Court distinguished them in PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269 (Sup. Ct. Nev. 1995):

The distinction between these two torts is the interest each seeks to protect. The appropriation tort seeks to protect an individual’s personal interest in privacy; the personal injury is measured in terms of the mental anguish that results from the appropriation of an ordinary individual’s identity. The right to publicity seeks to protect the property interest that a celebrity has in his or her name; the injury is not to personal privacy, it is the economic loss a celebrity suffers when someone else interferes with the property interest that he or she has in his or her name. We consider it critical in deciding this case that recognition be given to the difference between the personal, injured-feelings quality involved in the appropriation privacy tort and the property, commercial value quality involved in the right of publicity tort.

Although damages are measured differently for the two torts, the relief ultimately boils down to the same thing: money damages and (probably) an injunction forbidding future appropriation or violation of the right of publicity.

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Law and the Multiverse Mailbag II

In this week’s mailbag we look at three questions from our email that touch on alternate universes, jurisdiction over crimes committed in the Phantom Zone, and contracts.  As always, if you have questions or post suggestions, please send them to james@lawandthemultiverse.com and ryan@lawandthemultiverse.com.

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Costumes and the Confrontation Clause

One question that we get frequently here on Law and the Multiverse is whether superheroes that wear identity-concealing costumes could wear them in court.  A closely related question is whether a superhero could testify under his or her alias and refuse to answer questions about his or her secret identity.  In the US, these are important issues because of the Confrontation Clause, which is where our analysis will focus. We briefly discussed this issue as part of the alter ego post from Dec. 2010; this is a fuller treatment of the specific question of the legal issues related to testifying while disguised.

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