Author Archives: James Daily

Law and the Multiverse Mailbag XI

This week we have a question about No Ordinary Family and reckless endangerment.  As always, if you have questions or post suggestions, please send them to james@lawandthemultiverse.com and ryan@lawandthemultiverse.com or leave them in the comments.

James asks “The ABC show No Ordinary Family aired a recent episode where the character Jim, who is invulnerable, deflects a bullet which ricochets off of a number of metal objects and winds up striking a teen bystander. … Jim feels responsible for what happens to the young man, especially in that he chose to confront the man whom he knew was armed.  How much responsibility would he truly bear? Does he have a duty to take this fight into a secluded area (which he did – the bystander was inside a nearby building)? Could he be charged with reckless endangerment, even though he didn’t know the boy was there, since he does seem to be showing off in front of the criminal?”

Although No Ordinary Family isn’t based on a comic book, it does feature a lot of superhero comic book tropes and—most importantly for us—it’s set in a world that shares our legal system.  This particular question is also interesting because it’s the kind of collateral damage that shows up in many comics.

So is Jim guilty of anything here?  Or perhaps liable in tort for the teenager’s injuries?  The first question we have to ask is “what law applies?”  When talking about Gotham or Metropolis there’s not always a definite answer for that, but in this case we know the show is set in a fictional town in California, so we’ll apply California law.  First, the criminal law.

I. Was It a Crime?

As it turns out, like many states California does not have a general offense of reckless endangerment.  California does have reckless endangerment-like laws regarding the discharge of firearms, but those don’t apply here since Jim wasn’t the one pulling the trigger.  But maybe a different offense fits.  Let’s consider the most generic one: simple battery, which is defined in Cal. Penal Code § 242 as “any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.”

As you can probably guess, the analysis here depends on what exactly “willful” means.  In California, the mental state or intent required for battery is the same as for assault because an assault is simply an attempted battery.  People v. Hayes, 142 Cal.App.4th 175, 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).  “Assault does not require a specific intent to cause injury or a subjective awareness of the risk that an injury might occur. Rather, assault only requires an intentional act and actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the act by its nature will probably and directly result in the application of physical force against another.”  People v. Williams, 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 (2001).  Since Jim did not know that the bystander was there and since ricochets are highly unpredictable, Jim couldn’t have known that his actions would “probably and directly result in the application of physical force against another.”  So we don’t think Jim committed a crime in this case.

II. Was It a Tort?

If Jim isn’t criminally liable, what about a tort suit by the victim?  Here we can turn to the law of negligence.  In California the elements of negligence are a legal duty of due care and a breach of that duty that is the proximate (i.e. legally responsible) cause of the resulting injury.  This is also known as “duty, breach, causation, and damages.”  Conroy v. Regents, 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1250 (2009).  Here the damages are clear (the dude got shot), so let’s consider the first three elements.

A. Duty

As a general rule in California, everyone has a duty to use ordinary care to avoid injuring others.  Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a).  However, this only extends to injuries that were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant at the time.  Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 739 (1968).  The analysis, however, is generalized to “whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party.” Lawson v. Safeway Inc., 191 Cal.App.4th 400, 409 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).  “Sufficiently likely” means “likely enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful [person] would take account of it in guiding practical conduct.”  Friedman v. Merck & Co., 107 Cal.App.4th 454, 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).

So would a reasonably thoughtful person take into account the possibility of ricocheting bullets striking an unknown person?  Certainly many superheroes are concerned with the possibility of their actions harming bystanders (including bystanders that may not be readily apparent), and many go out of their way to avoid or prevent such harm.  On the other hand, ricochets are unpredictable, and we’re not sure the reasonably thoughtful person would spend much time contemplating physics while getting shot at.  We could see a court going either way with this, but let’s assume the court says there’s a duty here so we can continue the analysis.

B. Breach

In general, a duty has been breached when the defendant has displayed less than ordinary, reasonable care or prudence.  See Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal.2d 213 (1945).  So how do we judge that?  California, like many states, follows the Learned Hand formula of negligence, named for the famous Judge Learned Hand.  Crane v. Smith, 23 Cal.2d 288, 298-99 (1943).  Basically, you multiply the likelihood of the harm by the magnitude of the harm, then compare the result to the cost of preventing the harm.  If the cost to prevent the harm is less than the average cost of the harm, then not preventing it is unreasonable.  In other words, spending a $1 to prevent $2 worth of harm is reasonable, but spending $2 to prevent $1 worth of harm is not.  It’s a kind of reductive view of rationality, but the law is like that sometimes.

In this case it’s hard to put a number to either the harm or the cost.  Instead, we can simply consider the circumstances and ask what a normal person would do if someone pointed a gun at their face.  Most normal people would do exactly what Jim did: throw a hand up in a—for most people futile—effort at self-defense.   And the ricochet might have occurred even if it had been an ordinary person; bullets can ricochet off of rings, watches, and even bones.

In fact, it was actually self-defense in Jim’s case, since a high-powered bullet fired at close range is capable of hurting him, so he tends to deflect bullets with his hands rather than his face.  Since an ordinary person would probably have done exactly what Jim did under the circumstances, we don’t think there was a breach of duty here.  There’s no negligence without a breach, and so Jim wouldn’t be liable and the analysis ends there.  Thus, we don’t actually have to consider causation (although if people are interested we think there’s a sort of flimsy argument to be made there as well).

(NB: The fact that it was a lawful act of self-defense is not itself a defense to negligence.  “No purpose, however benevolent, excuses negligence.”  Woodhead v. Wilkinson, 181 Cal. 599, 602 (1919).  What matters is that an ordinary person would have done the same thing under the circumstances.)

III. Conclusion

We don’t think Jim is criminally or civilly liable for the victim’s injury.  By contrast, the attacker is at a minimum guilty of attempted murder (of Jim) and grossly negligent discharge of a weapon.  He would also be liable in tort.

That’s all for this week!  Keep your questions and post suggestions coming in!

Superpowered Minors, Part Four

This is a continuation of our earlier series on superpowered minors.  The first three parts of the series dealt with the criminal, contract, and tort liability of young superheroes and supervillains.  Now we come to the legal issues facing the parents, legal guardians, and adult team members of those precocious crime-fighters and ne’er-do-wells, which many of our readers and commenters have asked about.

There are three major areas of concern.  First, child welfare laws.  Second, employment and child labor laws.  Third, vicarious liability for the minors’ crimes and torts.  We’ll look at the first two areas today and the third in a future post.

I. Is Robin a Victim of Child Endangerment?

All states have laws against child abuse, although the specifics vary.  In the case of superheroes we are not terribly concerned with laws against intentionally or willfully harming children.  See, e.g., Cal.Penal Code § 273d.  As far as we know, intentional child abuse by superhero parents and guardians is rare to non-existent.  Nor are we concerned with child superheroes who keep their activities a secret from their parents.  As long as those parents aren’t neglectful  or turning a blind eye, they’re probably in the clear.  Instead, we are concerned with child endangerment or indirect abuse.

Consider, for example, Cal.Penal Code § 273a(a): “Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death … willfully causes or permits [a] child to be placed in a situation where his or her person or health is endangered, shall be punished by imprisonment….”  Cal.Penal Code § 273(a)(b) covers the same thing except without the “great bodily harm or death” part, which makes it a misdemeanor.

Note that “likely to produce great bodily harm or death” does not mean “more likely than not.”  Instead, it means a substantial danger or a serious and well-founded risk. People v. Wilson, 138 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).  So just because Batman and Robin usually escape without harm does not mean that great bodily harm or death is not likely for purposes of the law.

California courts have held that in cases of indirect abuse (i.e. where the child is not harmed by the caretaker directly) criminal negligence on the part of the caretaker is required.  People v. Valdez, 27 Cal.4th 778, 789-90 (2002).  California defines criminal negligence as “‘aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless … conduct … [that is] such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent or careful [person] under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human life.”  Id. at 783.  So now we come to the crux of the issue: is taking Robin along to fight crime such a departure from the conduct of an ordinarily careful person under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human life?  We think the answer may be “no” for two reasons.

The first reason is the crucial phrase “under the same circumstances.”  In the case of Batman and Robin, the circumstances are a highly trained, highly equipped, highly experienced guardian working with a highly trained, highly equipped, and (eventually) highly experienced assistant.  Fighting crime under those circumstances does not seem incompatible with a proper regard for human life.  Batman has also demonstrated care for Robin by preventing him from working with him on numerous occasions when the circumstances have been too dangerous, eventually stopping his collaboration with the first Robin (Dick Grayson) altogether after Robin was shot in the shoulder by the Joker.

The second reason is that indirect abuse is usually characterized as a crime of “extreme neglect.”  Id. at 784.  Batman is a lot of things but neglectful is not one of them.  He is in many ways a very active and engaged guardian to Robin. This simply doesn’t seem to be the kind of behavior the statute is meant to address.  One might compare this to other dangerous activities undertaken by parents and children, including driving, which injures about 250,000 children each year and kills about 2,000.

So at least in the case of Batman and Robin, child endangerment does not seem to be an issue.  Not all parent-child superhero teams fit their mold, however. For example, Big Daddy and Hit Girl in Kick-Ass would probably run afoul of child endangerment laws.  The evidence against Big Daddy would include the much greater degree of danger and (consistent with traditional neglect) Big Daddy giving Hit Girl cocaine, even if it is ‘only for emergencies.’

II. Should Robin At Least Be Getting Paid?

Also of concern are child labor laws.  There are both federal and state child labor laws.  The main federal child labor law is a part of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which prohibits “oppressive child labor.” 29 USC 212(c).  The definition of oppressive child labor given in 29 USC 203(l) is a little complicated, but we’ll try to break it down:

  1. As a general rule, no employees under 16 are allowed
    1. except a child employed by a parent or guardian (subject to part B, below)
      1. except if the occupation is manufacturing, mining, or an occupation found by the Secretary of Labor to be particularly hazardous for 16-18 year olds or detrimental to their health or well-being
    2. except if the Secretary of Labor says that it’s okay for 14-16 year olds so long as it’s confined to periods which will not interfere with their schooling or their health and well-being
      1. except mining and manufacturing are still out
  2. As a general rule, employees from 16-18 are allowed
    1. except if the Secretary of Labor has declared the occupation to be particularly hazardous for 16-18 year olds or detrimental to their health or well-being

Whew.  Got all that?  So we can see that the rules depend a bit on the child superhero’s age and their relationship to their adult superhero-supervisor.  In Robin’s case it looks like he’s in the clear to work with Batman so long as the Secretary of Labor doesn’t declare “crime-fighting” to be a particularly hazardous occupation.  However, many state child labor laws have “catch-all” provisions that prohibit employing children in dangerous occupations of any kind, no special pronouncement from the Secretary of Labor required.  If Gotham is in such a state, then things could get a bit dicier.

Of course, none of this matters if the superhero kid isn’t considered to be working in the first place.  You might think “well, they aren’t getting paid, so it must not be work, right?”  That can’t be the only thing to consider, though, otherwise it would be a great incentive not to pay one’s child employees.  As a result, many states have laws that make the presence of a child in a business presumptive evidence that the child is employed there.  See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. 294.100; La. Rev. Stat. § 23:233.  But the Batcave doesn’t seem to be a place of business, so that’s not an issue.  All things considered, Robin and most other sidekicks are probably not employees.

So are there any cases where a child superhero might be considered an employee?  We think it would probably require an adult superhero who was in it for the money (e.g. collecting rewards or working as a mercenary or professional government agent).  Such superheroes definitely exist, but they don’t tend to have teenage sidekicks.  If any of our readers can think of an example, please let us know!

III. Conclusion

Child endangerment laws should be a concern for any superhero with a minor sidekick.  Absent pretty extraordinary (e.g. Batman-level) evidence of competence, safety measures, and general carefulness, fighting violent crime is probably dangerous enough to qualify as endangerment.  We suppose sidekicks could stick to fighting white collar crime, but “The Adventures of Securities Regulations Enforcement Boy” are unlikely to make for a very gripping read.

On the other hand, child labor laws are probably not a big issue, particularly for superheroes who act out of altruism and take care of their sidekicks.  But if a superhero is in it for the money, then giving a sidekick a cut is probably called for.

Pro Bono Radio Redux

Law and the Multiverse has inspired another episode of Pro Bono Radio, a program of CFRC, the radio station of Queen’s University.  The episode can be downloaded here.  Interspersed between law-themed superhero radio show parodies, the hosts discuss mind control, the necessity defense, and indestructibility and factual impossibility.  We think you’ll enjoy hearing about the Canadian perspective on these issues.  The radio show parodies are pretty funny, too.

Bonus: Canadian superhero team Alpha Flight gets a mention this time around, particularly Murmur.

Abnormal Use Interview

Attorney Jim Dedman, co-author of the Abnormal Use law blog, interviewed us about Law and the Multiverse. We think you’ll enjoy the interview, and thanks to Jim for talking with us.

Of interest to our readers: in addition to being a blog about products liability litigation, Abnormal Use also features legally-themed comic books covers on its Friday posts as well as interviews with law-related pop culture personalities such as Fairly Legal creator and show-runner Michael Sardo.

Superheroes and Citizen’s Arrest

This post is about a fundamental issue for superheroes: when can they arrest the bad guys?    The answer is clear enough in some situations: a superhero working for the police can arrest someone whenever a police officer can, and when a villain is threatening a superhero or another person with physical harm then the superhero can act in his or her own defense or in defense of the third person.  But what about regular superheroes who see a non-violent crime being committed or know it’s about to happen?  For example, in the movie Batman Begins, Batman uncovers local mobsters receiving a shipment of drugs in a cargo container.  Can he arrest them and leave them for the police to find?

Before we go into detail, we should say that by “arrest” we mean to restrain or confine; this is the arrest of “false arrest” and doesn’t include things like reading the suspect his or her rights.  Those are issues for the police, not private individuals acting as superheroes.  It’s one of the many benefits of not being a state actor.

I. The Law of Citizen’s Arrest

At common law, both police officers and private individuals could arrest someone without a warrant for a felony or breach of the peace committed in their presence (i.e. they had to actually see it happen).  However, police arrests and private arrests differed if it turned out no crime had been committed.  As long as the police officer was acting reasonably, he or she was protected, but a private individual acted at his or her own risk (e.g. there might be a false arrest claim).

These days, citizen’s arrest is typically addressed by statute rather than common law rules.  Many states essentially codified the common law approach, but other states have broadened the law a bit, such as New York’s statute, N.Y. Penal Law §35.30(4) :

A private person acting on his or her own account may use physical force, other than deadly physical force, upon another person when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to effect an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of a person whom he or she reasonably believes to have committed an offense and who in fact has committed such offense; and may use deadly physical force for such purpose when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to:

(a) Defend himself, herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force; or

(b) Effect the arrest of a person who has committed  murder, manslaughter in the first degree, robbery, forcible rape or forcible criminal sexual act and who is in immediate flight therefrom.

There’s a lot going on here, so let’s break it down a bit.

The general rule in New York is that a private person may use reasonable non-deadly force to arrest someone that the person reasonably believes has committed an offense and who has in fact committed that offense.  It might seem strange to require both reasonable belief and actual commission of the offense, but this belt-and-suspenders approach covers the case of someone falsely arresting a person who, by sheer happenstance, has committed an offense.  In other words, lucky coincidence is not a defense to false arrest.

Note, though, that reasonable belief is required, not that the private person  witnessed the crime being committed.  This is a significant difference from the common law.  However, actual commission is still required, so if the private actor gets it wrong, they’re on the hook.

The statute also gives two exceptions allowing the use of deadly force when reasonably necessary.  First, self-defense and the defense of others while carrying out the arrest, which is sensible enough.  Second, to arrest someone who is in immediate flight from the commission of a serious violent crime: murder, manslaughter in the first degree, robbery, forcible rape or a forcible criminal sexual act.

II. How Does This Work For Superheroes?

Right off the bat it’s apparent that superheroes had better know their criminal law.  Since they’re risking criminal and civil liability if they arrest someone who hasn’t actually committed a crime, they need to be sure of the situation before swinging into action.  And this is probably a good thing; we wouldn’t want superheroes smashing heads or tying people up in webs on a hunch.

What’s more, superheroes need to know what kind of crime has been committed, what evidence is required, and what kind of force they can use.  The New York law is very broad, covering all offenses (i.e. anything punishable by imprisonment or a fine), but other states only allow citizen’s arrest in cases of a felony.  See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-3-3.  Some states (e.g. Colorado) require, like the common law, that the crime actually be committed in the arresting person’s presence. C.R.S.A. § 18-1-707.  The rules for the use of deadly force also vary from state to state.

Practically speaking, citizen’s arrest isn’t very practical in the real world because it’s so dangerous to try, criminals aren’t likely to respect a private individual’s attempt to arrest them, and because the police and the courts generally frown on ‘self-help.’  The first two issues aren’t problems for superheroes: they can handle themselves and criminals will respect them one way or the other.  But staying on the good side of the police and courts is important for most superheroes.  That’s another reason it’s so important for superheroes to get it right when they arrest people: too many screw-ups and the police will be after them instead.

Of course, most of this only applies when superheroes are dealing with more-or-less regular criminals.  When Doomsday or Darkseid come to town, all bets are off.

As for the Batman example from the beginning of the post: Falcone and his men were clearly in the middle of committing numerous felonies, so Batman was justified in using non-deadly force to arrest them.  Since this meets the restrictive common law standard, it would work in just about any state.

III. Conclusion

Citizen’s arrest is an effective legal justification for a lot of what superheroes do, but it has some important limitations that often vary from state to state and superheroes should definitely think before they arrest.  This is one area where the legally-educated superheroes like Daredevil, She-Hulk, and Manhunter are at a distinct advantage.

Law and the Multiverse Mailbag X

In today’s mailbag we have questions about ‘Batman, Prosecuting Attorney’ and supervillain jury tampering.  As always, if you have questions or post suggestions, please send them to james@lawandthemultiverse.com and ryan@lawandthemultiverse.com or leave them in the comments.

I. Batman, Prosecuting Attorney?

Christopher writes with two questions.  First: “I was watching the 60’s Batman episode ‘The Joke’s on Catwoman.’ … Batman captures the Joker, Catwoman, and her henchmen. Presumably he arrests them, as he seems to act as a law enforcement officer in this show. Then he acts as prosecutor at their trial (no doubt he is a member of the bar). Seems pretty strange, but is this actually allowed? I started wondering whether the sheriff in a Wild West town might do this if there were no one else around to prosecute the case.”

There are three main problems with this arrangement.  First off, it’s pretty unlikely that Batman is an admitted member of the bar because he would have to be admitted as Batman, not Bruce Wayne lest he give away his secret identity. While attending law school is not a necessary prerequisite of becoming an attorney in some states (actually, quite a few states didn’t require this in the 1960s), it is doubtful that Batman found the time to “read law,” i.e. work as an apprentice in a law firm for a few years before taking the bar exam.  While a frontier town might have employed a non-lawyer as a prosecutor out of necessity, the frontier era also preceded the relatively modern era of professionalization and standardization in legal education and licensing.  And the exigent circumstances of a frontier town hardly apply to Gotham City.

Further evidence that Batman wasn’t admitted is found in his questionable conduct of the trial (e.g. asking witnesses to testify regarding ultimate issues of guilt).  Of course, the defense attorney didn’t object, and some judges are happy to let such things slide if there’s no objection, so we won’t go into detail on that except to say that, were they found guilty, the defendants might have an ineffective assistance of counsel argument on appeal.  Normally such arguments are long shots, but this was pretty bad.

Second, Batman would be unable to serve as prosecutor because generally an attorney cannot be an advocate in the same case in which he or she is likely to be a necessary witness.  Since the defense could call Batman as a witness even if the prosecution did not, this is a problem.  ABA Model Rule 3.7, which has been adopted in almost every state, provides:

(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless:

(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;

(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.

Presumably the defendants would contest the issues that Batman’s testimony relates to, so exception (1) is out.  And I have a hard time believing that the government couldn’t come up with a competent substitute prosecutor, so there goes exception (3).  The second exception, which deals with testifying about the value of legal services, is inapplicable here.

(For the pedants in the audience: the episode long predates the Model Rules and even the predecessor Model Code, but a rule against lawyer-witnesses was a part of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, which dates to 1908.  The result under the Canons would have been much the same.)

Third, Batman could have been disqualified because of his clear conflict of interest in the case.  There is a “broader consideration of whether on the facts of a particular case, the adversarial nature of the judicial process has resulted in such enmity toward the defendant on the part of the prosecutor that it will overbear his professional judgment in seeking fairly and impartially to see justice done.”  Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107 (2004).  Batman’s long and acrimonious history with the Joker and Catwoman likely rises to that level.

Thus we can fairly safely conclude that Batman should not have acted as prosecutor, and in fact the defense attorney could have successfully challenged Batman’s appointment for cause.  That he didn’t shouldn’t be too surprising, however, since he knew the case was a lock because he tampered with the jury, which brings us to the second question.

II. Supervillain Jury Tampering

Christopher also asks “At the end of the trial, it is absolutely obvious to the judge and everyone else that the defendants have been proven guilty, but the jury returns a verdict of not guilty, leading everyone to suspect the jury has somehow been tampered with. The judge can’t do anything but make a statement upbraiding the jury for their outrageous behavior. What would actually be done at this point? Later, it is discovered that the defendants managed to infiltrate the jury with accomplices. What would the law do at that point?”

Here the law is pretty clear.  “A judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by a reversal.”  United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978).  This is a core part of the prohibition against double jeopardy, and it is an absolute bar, even if the jury was clearly acting contrary to the law and the facts.

So what’s to be done in a case like this?  The answer is that the State (as represented by Batman) had a full opportunity to challenge potential members of the jury during voir dire (i.e. jury selection).  The prosecution could even have moved for a mistrial when the jury refused to retire for deliberation; that should have been a sure sign something was up.  But if the State falls down on its job and a guilty defendant goes free, them’s the breaks.  The Constitution does not allow the State to try again until it gets it right.

All is not lost, however.  The jurors are probably guilty of perjury or the like, since during voir dire they were almost certainly asked if they knew any of the defendants.  So the jurors at least could be punished for their part in the scheme.

As for the defendants, as is so often the case their own foolishness lead to their downfall.  After Batman tried to move for a new trial they started a courtroom brawl and were recaptured, so they would at least face charges of assault and probably conspiracy to commit murder (the jury foreman pulled a gun on Batman at Catwoman’s order).  But if they had stayed quiet they would’ve gotten away it.  Maybe they should have gotten a better attorney than “Lucky” Pierre.

Note that this is not the case in civil trials. The right against double jeopardy only applies in the criminal context; judges routinely order new trials in civil matters when there has been some uncorrectable foul-up. They don’t like doing it, because it’s viewed as a waste of time and resources by just about everyone, but they will do it if necessary. In addition, judges are not so strictly bound to jury verdicts in civil cases and are entirely capable of entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict, known as a “JNOV” if the jury refuses to return a verdict consistent with the evidence. So just because the Joker could have objected to the above trial doesn’t mean he couldn’t be sued on civil charges, and as new trials are possible in civil cases, jury tampering isn’t nearly as effective a device as it is in criminal cases.

Bonus: One of the charges against the defendants was “mayhem.”  Mayhem is a felony descended from the common law, and a typical modern definition is “unlawfully and maliciously depriving a human being of a member of his body, or disabling, disfiguring, or rendering it useless, or cutting or disabling the tongue, or putting out an eye, or slitting the nose, ear, or lip.”  Cal. Pen. Code § 203.  A bit gruesome for an Adam West Batman villain!

That’s all for today!  Keep your questions and ideas coming in!

Mother Jones Interview

We were recently interviewed by Mother Jones magazine.  Many thanks to our interviewer, Tim Murphy, who came up with a lot of very interesting questions and scenarios to explore.  We think you’ll really enjoy reading it.

A Little Bit of Legal Ethics

As many of our readers know, She-Hulk‘s alter-ego, Jennifer Walters, is an attorney, and many issues of that comic feature courtroom and law firm scenes.  I was reading She-Hulk (2005) #1 and was struck by a scene that gives us a chance to talk about something a little unusual: legal ethics.  Since there are relatively few comic book characters who are lawyers, this topic doesn’t come up very often, but it’s an issue that is near and dear to many lawyers’ hearts (or at least their pocketbooks).

I. The Facts

In the comic, Walters is out for a jog when she encounters a woman being assaulted by two men.  Although she is unable to transform into She-Hulk, she dispatches the assailants with martial arts.  It is then revealed that Spider-Woman and Captain America were on the scene, but did not intend to intervene unless Walters needed assistance.  So far, so good: nothing wrong with an attorney engaging in a bit of defense of others.

But then Walters commits a significant ethical lapse.  She tells the rescued woman “Miss, I should inform you that I’m an attorney.  And I’d be more than happy to represent you if you feel that these ‘heroes’ and their delayed response has in any way caused you emotional distress.”  You may be wondering what’s wrong about this.  Isn’t that what an attorney would do?  Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is ‘no.’

(NB: We’re aware that Walters was mostly just good-naturedly ribbing the Avengers, but ethical principles shouldn’t be breached even for the sake of a joke.  Also, as an aside, the ’emotional distress’ claim is nonsense in this case as the Avengers owed the woman no particular duty to rescue her.  See this post for more.)

So what did Walters do wrong?  She solicited a potential client in person.  What’s worse, she did so immediately after the potential client had been assaulted and, allegedly, emotionally distressed.  So how is an attorney supposed to know what (not) to do?  And how can non-attorneys know when an attorney is breaking the rules?  For that we turn to the “law of lawyering,” a term we assure you we did not just make up.

II. The Law of Lawyering

The legal profession is primarily regulated at the state level, so the ethical rules that bind attorneys vary from state to state, but 49 of the 50 states have adopted some variation on the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  Most states have basically adopted the Model Rules wholesale.  New York, where the events of the comic took place, was one of the last states to adopt the Model Rules (as the New York Rules of Professional Conduct), and in fact it was still using the old New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility at the time the comic was written.  However, as it turns out the result is the same under either set of rules.

The current New York Rules of Professional Conduct have this to say about solicitation under Rule 7.3:

(a) A lawyer shall not engage in solicitation:

(1) by in-person or telephone contact … unless the recipient is a close friend, relative, former client or existing client; or

(2) by any form of communication if: …

(iv) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the age or the physical, emotional or mental state of the recipient makes it unlikely that the recipient will be able to exercise reasonable judgment in retaining a lawyer

So this kind of in-person solicitation is prohibited in New York (and the rules are similar in most states), and even if the woman fell into one of the exceptions, Walters still should have known that the woman’s emotional state made it unlikely that she could exercise reasonable judgment so soon after being the victim of a crime.  And in fact there are special rules about that kind of thing, per Rule 7.3(e):

(e) No solicitation relating to a specific incident involving potential claims for personal injury or wrongful death shall be disseminated before the 30th day after the date of the incident, unless a filing must be made within 30 days of the incident as a legal prerequisite to the particular claim, in which case no unsolicited communication shall be made before the 15th day after the date of the incident.

So even if the woman fell into one of the exceptions and her judgment wasn’t impaired, Walters still should have waited.

There is, by the way, a long history of prohibiting this kind of in-person solicitation, which is also called “barratry.”  In fact, it’s still a crime in some jurisdictions, including New York where it’s a misdemeanor.  N.Y. Judiciary Law § 479, 485; See also Tex. Penal Code § 38.12.  The Supreme Court has held that these kinds of rules are a permissible regulation of commercial speech.  Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).

It’s worth pointing out that these rules are not arbitrary. People who are solicited for business while they are experiencing acute distress are less likely to be able to make an informed decision about who would be best to retain.  Even if you aren’t distressed it can be hard to make a fully-informed, free decision about representation while a fast-talking attorney is trying to talk you into choosing them.

People being solicited are also less likely to make a good decision about whether or not they want to retain counsel at all. What could seem like an absolutely terrible accident at the scene can turn out to be not that big of a deal. And what someone wants to do while in the throes of anger or fear may be very different from what they want to do a few days later. But once the legal process is started it can be difficult and expensive to stop. It’s a lot better for everyone if suit is never filed in the first place if it isn’t going to go anywhere. So there is a compelling social reason for prohibiting the solicitation of legal business in the immediate aftermath of an accident: we want people to make calm, rational decisions about whether or not they want to sue and who they want to be represented by.

III. The Consequences

Cases of attorney misconduct are handled by the state disciplinary authority, in this case the discipline and grievance committees appointed by the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court.  Although victims of attorney misconduct may file complaints, the purpose of a disciplinary hearing is to punish misconduct, not to compensate victims.  However, the victim may have a separate civil claim against the attorney, as in a legal malpractice case.

In New York, attorney discipline includes caution, admonishment, reprimand, censure, suspension, and disbarment. How bad does it look for Walters?  As far as we know this is her first disciplinary offense, and solicitation is far from the worst thing an attorney can do (e.g. lying, stealing from clients, and jury & witness tampering are all much worse).  New York disciplinary decisions are not the easiest thing to research, but our guess is that she would likely receive a letter of caution, an admonition, or possibly a reprimand.  Attorneys have received worse punishments for solicitation in New York, but it’s usually in conjunction with misrepresentation or other aggravating circumstances.

A letter of caution is an informal, confidential notice of disapproval.  It goes in the attorney’s file but it’s not public.  It’s basically a warning.  An admonition is a formal disciplinary action but it’s still confidential.  A reprimand is similar to an admonition except the matter may also be referred to the court for further action.

As mentioned above, Walters may also be guilty of a misdemeanor.  The woman Walters solicited probably wouldn’t have a civil claim against her, though, so that’s a small consolation.

IV. Conclusion

Attorney discipline and malpractice are serious issues.  A few hundred attorneys are disbarred and a few billion dollars in legal malpractice damages are awarded every year.  All attorneys should take care to uphold the highest ethical standards, and superhero attorneys are no exception.

Law and the Multiverse Mailbag IX

In today’s mailbag we have a question about Superman, diamonds, and taxes.  As always, if you have questions or post suggestions, please send them to james@lawandthemultiverse.com and ryan@lawandthemultiverse.com or leave them in the comments.

Martin asks “if Superman crushes carbon and makes diamonds, is that taxable income?  I would think if he made it into a ring and gave it to Lois the government might want a percentage.”

There are two questions here.  First, are the diamonds taxable income for Superman (or Clark Kent) and second, are they taxable income for a recipient such as Lois Lane?

The answer to the first question is “probably not.”  A traditional, almost fundamental principle of income tax is that a gain in value must be realized before it can be taxed, although the definition of “realized” has expanded over the years, somewhat eroding the principle.  The Internal Revenue Code provides that one example of income is “gains derived from dealings in property.” 26 USC 61(a)(3).  ‘Dealings’ are not defined in the statute, but § 1001(a) defines the computation of “the gain from the sale or other disposition of property.”  It seems clear that improving the value of the carbon is not such a taxable event, since there is neither a sale nor disposition of the property of any kind.  An analogy might be made to a painting that appreciates in value; the increase in value is not taxed until the painting is sold, given away, etc.

If the diamonds are given to Lois Lane, however, that is obviously a gift, which has its own set of special rules.  In the US, gifts are generally not taxable income for the recipient.  26 USC 102(a).  But there is a gift tax that is ordinarily paid by the giver.  26 USC 2501(a)(1) and 26 USC 2502(c).  However, there is a significant exclusion for gifts that currently stands at $13,000 per-recipient per-year.  Thus the question is, presuming the diamonds were given as a gift today, would they exceed the exclusion?

Obviously this depends on the size and quality of the diamond and the state of the diamond market, but for example the diamond given to Lana Lang in Superman III appears to be about 3.5 to 4 carats and of very good quality.  Looking at stones for sale on Blue Nile, a similar diamond would cost somewhere between $150,000 and $400,000, depending on the particulars, which is far beyond the gift exclusion.  So how much would Superman be on the hook for?  The answer is “a lot.”  For example, if the ring were valued between $150,000 and $250,000, then the gift tax would be $38,800 plus 32% of the excess beyond $150,000, so potentially as much as $70,800.

But is the fair market value of the diamond simply that of an ordinary diamond of like size and quality?   The general rule for computing the value of gift of property is given in 26 C.F.R. § 25.2512-1: “The value of the property is the price at which such property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell, and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.”  The unusual origin of the diamond is almost certainly a relevant fact, and if diamonds created by Superman are rare, which seems to be the case, then this particular diamond would command a significant premium, and the tax would be correspondingly higher.

This is a problem, since Clark Kent probably doesn’t make enough money to pay the tax, and Superman probably doesn’t want to get tangled up with the IRS.  It is possible to perform a “net gift” for which the recipient pays the tax, but it is unlikely that Lana has the money for that either.  She could sell the ring to pay the tax, of course, but that would defeat the purpose of the gift.  Alternatively, Superman could give her several diamonds with the intention that she keep one as a ring and sell the others to pay the taxes on all of the diamonds.  As complicated as that would be, it might be the only way to keep things above-board.

Note: No discussion of gift tax is complete without mentioning the unified credit of 26 USC 2505. It may not solve the problem here, however.  First, the value of the diamond may easily exceed the credit, especially if Superman gives them out on a regular basis.  Second, Superman may have made other gifts that already used up the credit; he has certainly been around long enough to have done so.

That’s all for this week!  Keep your questions coming in!

Time Travel, Suspended Animation, and the Statute of Limitations

Several readers have asked about the interaction between things like time travel and suspended animation with the statute of limitations.  For example, if a character commits a crime, is frozen for the duration of the statute of limitations, then thawed out, are they still culpable?  Or what about a character that commits a crime with a 10 year statute of limitations in 2000 then travels forward in time to 2010?  At first it might seem like these are solid (if somewhat unfair) ways to cheat justice, but let’s take a closer look.

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