Author Archives: James Daily

Looper

Looper is a pretty great movie.  The story, acting, music, and effects are all top notch.  While watching it this weekend, a couple of legal issues came to mind.  This post ran a little long, so there will be a second Looper post later this week.  There are some spoilers ahead, but I’ve tried to self-censor the most significant ones.

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I Married a Skrull!

Today’s post is about Johnny Storm (aka the Human Torch) and his marriage to Alicia Masters (actually the Skrull Lyja posing as Masters).  Ken wrote in to ask “Was Johnny Storm’s marriage to Lyja valid?”

This isn’t the only time that this scenario has occurred in comics.  Ken also asked about the marriage between Namor the Sub-Mariner and Dorma (actually Llyra in disguise).  In that case a quirk of Atlantean law came to the rescue: because Namor thought he was marrying Dorma, his marriage was to her and not Llyra, even though Dorma was not present at the ceremony.  I’m not sure what that says about the nature of consent in Atlantean law, but we’ll stick with the Johnny Storm/Lyja case, since New York law is a bit easier to research.

I. Void and Voidable Marriages

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the answer is that their marriage would be voidable.  N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 7 states

A marriage is void from the time its nullity is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction if either party thereto: … 4. Consent[ed] to such marriage by reason of force, duress or fraud

There’s a distinction between a marriage (or other contract) that is voidable and one that is void.  A void marriage (defined in §§ 5-6) is one that never exists at all, typically in cases if incest or bigamy.  A voidable marriage is a marriage until a court declares it void, and so can theoretically remain a legitimate marriage if the parties want it to be.  So in this case if Johnny Storm and Lyja agreed that they really did love each other after all (certainly Lyja claims to), then they could stay married, though there would be a lot of paperwork to correct.

Alas, love does not conquer all here, and Johnny wants none of it.  So could he prove a case of fraud?

II. Fraud

New York law treats the kind of fraud sufficient to void a marriage as similar to that which would void a contract.  “Marriage is a civil contract, and the courts will annul such a marriage like other contracts, where the consent of a party to it has been procured by fraud or the misrepresentation of a material fact.”  Lembo v. Lembo, 193 Misc. 1055, 1057 (Sup. Ct. 1949).  Further:

Where the ground relied upon for dissolution is fraud, the fraud contemplated by the statute must be of a nature and import so serious that it destroys the essence of the marriage contract and of a magnitude that the person asserting the fraud as a ground for dissolution would not have entered the marriage contract, if, in advance thereof, the misrepresentations had been revealed.

Di Pillo v. Di Pillo, 17 Misc.2d 673, 675 (Sup. Ct. 1959).  It seems pretty clear that lying about one’s identity as an alien at war with the human race and impersonating another person already known to the other party are sufficient.  Johnny would not have married Lyja had she been honest about her identity.  Indeed, he likely would have attacked her on sight.

III. An Alternate Approach

Another approach would be to argue that the marriage was void from the beginning (as opposed to voidable) because human/Skrull marriage is not legally recognized in New York.  Our prior post about this was a bit controversial, but our conclusion there was that interspecies marriages (e.g. Clark Kent and Lois Lane) may not be legal under current law.  Since the Storm/Lyja marriage occurred in 1987, long before even same sex marriage was legalized anywhere in the United States, we feel even more comfortable asserting that a human/Skrull marriage would not be legal (again, assuming that the marriage laws on Earth 616 were the same in 1987 as they were in the real world).

IV. Conclusion

Whether because a human/Skrull marriage is legally impossible or simply because Storm was tricked into marrying Lyja, Johnny would have no trouble getting out of the marriage.  There might still be legal consequences, however.  A question for any tax attorneys or accountants in the audience: if Johnny had filed his tax return as married/filing jointly and claimed the standard deduction, would he have to repay any tax if the marriage was later declared void?  If so, could he seek compensation from Lyja?

Graphic Justice

Dr. Thomas Giddens, a Lecturer in Law at St. Mary’s University College in the UK, has informed us of a new research project called Graphic Justice, centered on the crossover between comics/graphic fiction and the concerns of law and justice.  We think this may be of interest to our academic readers.  Here is some additional information from Dr. Giddens:

Themes of public protection, justice, and punishment are widespread in mainstream superhero narratives (think Justice League of AmericaSuperman, or Spider-Man), but there is also a wealth of graphic literature beyond the spandex-wearing mainstream that, like other artistic media, deals with all walks of human life (the work of the Hernandez Brothers, for instance, or Ghost World, or the Pulitzer prize winning Maus).  Indeed, from the mainstream western comics that inspire Hollywood films, to the diverse and multi-layered world of Japanese manga, or the rich history of French-language bandes dessinées, comics have permeated our global culture (consider the huge cultural impact, for example, of Batman or Tintin).  Moreover, the blending of words and images in the very form of the comics medium itself may pose important questions about the limitations and interpretation of textual language—fundamental issues for the highly text-dependent discipline of law.  Add to all this the complex intellectual property issues involved in this collaborative and methodologically varied medium, and the lack of interest seems clearly to be one that is in need of a remedy.

The remedy is this: Graphic Justice.

Whether you work in legal studies, philosophy, cultural studies, penology, law enforcement, art, criminology, sociology, imprisonment/corrections, or literary studies, if you’re interested in comics and the concerns of justice—this call is for you.  An international and collaborative space has been set up where interested parties can submit ideas and post articles, where contacts can be made and networks built up, understanding can be nurtured, and the intersection of comics and justice can be mined, examined, questioned, and developed.  Depending upon levels of interest, the project may include seminars or dedicated conference streams, or even a full Graphic Justice conference.  The aim is to gather together academics and practitioners, interested parties and artists, and to promote discourse and engagement on this expansive and under-researched area.

The international and collaborative space can be found at graphicjustice.blogspot.com, and you can contact Graphic Justice via the comments sections on that website, or via email to thomas.giddens@smuc.ac.uk.

Daredevil #18

The most recent issue of Daredevil raises some interesting legal questions, though unfortunately we may have to wait until the next issue to get all the details.  Nonetheless, let’s see what we can figure out from what we know already.

(As usual, there are spoilers ahead, but you really should be reading Mark Waid’s Daredevil run.  It’s available digitally via Comixology or in print at your friendly local comic book store, so go get a copy and come back.)

I. Accessory to Murder

The “client of the month” in this issue is the brother of Adele Santiago, a nurse working for drug kingpin Victor Hierra.  Adele was charged with being an accessory to Hierra’s murder.  The only problem is that he and she were in a locked room when Hierra was killed, drained of his blood without leaving a trace of evidence.  Presumably lacking enough evidence to charge her with the murder directly, the prosecutor charged her with being an accessory.  Under N.Y. Penal Law § 20.00, acting as an accessory to a crime carries the same criminal liability as the underlying crime:

When one person engages in conduct which constitutes an offense, another person is criminally liable for such conduct when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct.

We can probably eliminate the “solicits, requests, commands, [or] importunes” part, leaving “intentionally aids.”  I suspect the prosecutor’s theory will be that Adele helped the murderer enter and leave, presumably taking Hierra’s blood with him.

Now, you might think, “wait, how can Adele be charged with being an accessory to murder if the prosecutor can’t prove who killed the victim?”  It turns out that it doesn’t matter:

In any prosecution for an offense in which the criminal liability of the defendant is based upon the conduct of another person pursuant to section 20.00, it is no defense that: … 2. Such other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense based upon the conduct in question

N.Y. Penal Law § 20.05.  Thus, it’s enough that the prosecution can prove that Hierra was murdered (which should be easy: draining someone’s blood without leaving any evidence doesn’t exactly happen by accident) and that Adele helped.  The evidence is all circumstantial, but that can be enough if there’s no reasonable doubt.

II. The New Business Model, Redux

So that’s what Adele is charged with, but she isn’t the one who came to see Foggy at the former Nelson & Murdock (now just Nelson) law office.  Rather, Adele’s brother (first name not given) showed up, asking about Nelson & Murdock’s services assisting clients in representing themselves.  We’ve written about that before and concluded that, while difficult to do well, it is theoretically ethically sound, at least in New York.  That makes this exchange between Adele’s brother and Foggy kind of weird:

AB: [Adele’s corrupt public defender] barely makes an effort.  You must teach me what I need to know.

Foggy: *Sigh* Mr. Santiago, this isn’t a dispute over a neighbor’s fence.  This is way above your pay grade.  I can’t teach you.

It’s just as well that Foggy ultimately decides to take the case as Adele’s lawyer, since Adele’s brother couldn’t represent her himself.  (Basically) anyone can represent themselves, but only a lawyer can represent another person, at least in the US.

Similarly, since Adele’s brother isn’t a lawyer, Foggy couldn’t ethically teach him to teach Adele, for at least two reasons.  First, attorney-client privilege would go out the window because everything would be going through a third party.  Second, it’s hard enough to do a reasonable job of teaching someone to represent themselves; teaching a person to teach another would be much more difficult.  So while Foggy came to a correct result (representing Adele directly), the alternatives he seemed to be considering made no sense.

III. Conclusion

Several more legal questions came up in this issue, but we’ll have to wait and see what happens before we can comment on them fully.  We may also revisit Adele’s case and Foggy’s representation.  It will be interesting to see where Waid goes with both.

New York Comic Con Update

Just a reminder: Ryan and I will be speaking at New York Comic Con next week, Friday October 12 from 5pm-5:45pm with a book signing to follow from 6:15-7:15.  Copies of the book will be available for purchase at the convention.  Three and four-day passes are all sold out, but tickets for Friday are still available as of this writing.  In the last two years all of the tickets have sold out before the event, so don’t wait!

Hendrix College

I’m happy to announce that I will be giving a talk about Law and the Multiverse and our upcoming book, The Law of Superheroes, at my undergraduate alma mater, Hendrix College, on November 13 at 4:10pm at Mills Library.  The event is open to the public and will be followed by a book signing.

The Duty to Rescue, Again

(Note from May 8, 2020: Subculture for the Cultured is no longer online, so the links in this post have been changed to use the Internet Archive Wayback Machine.)

Our latest monthly column at Subculture for the Cultured is up. It was inspired by this question from Joe:

I have a question about Avengers Academy #37, which just came out.

It’s the final battle with supervillain Jeremy Briggs, whose transmutation powers are overpowering the team. He takes out X-23 by turning her sweat to acid, which is clearly killing her, so she stabs him in an artery [Ed. note: actually, Finesse pushes X-23’s claws into him]. He begins to bleed to death, which breaks his concentration enough that he can’t use his powers.

Teammate Finesse, who has powers similar to Taskmaster and therefore an expert knowledge of the human body, begins to tie off his wounds. But he begins gloating that he will just come back and try again, and so she drops the cord and let’s him die.

Nobody sees this as her teammates were distracted (it’s not exactly clear with what, but they have clear reaction shots showing they didn’t witness the conversation), so as far as anyone knows after X-23 stabbed him there was no way to save him. Later a police officer taking statements says it looks like self-defence and he doubts there would be charges.

1. Finesse’s action does seem like clear self-defense. But could Finesse be charged with anything if it comes out that she had a chance to render medical assistance and did not?
2. Does it make a difference that she started to render medical aid and then withdrew it?
3. Finally, does Finesse’s knowledge of anatomy and first aid skills give her an extra obligation to help someone who is dying, compared to someone had only a vague idea of what to do?

We’ve talked about the duty to rescue twice before, but this is a really great fact pattern.  Any of our law student readers who are currently in a torts class should find this particularly interesting.  Check it out!

The Scarlet Witch and Insanity

Christopher writes:

In fairly recent issues of Avengers, the Scarlet Witch has returned from being in hiding (of a sort) for years. Her last real interaction with her old team and mutant kind was not a pleasant one. She went mad and attacked the Avengers, leading to the deaths of Ant-Man in an explosion and her own husband, the Vision, at the hands of a berserk She-Hulk, and Hawkeye  was lost to a Kree warship as her reality warping powers basically engineered the worst day ever for the team. Not long after that an event called House of M happened and it ended with her essentially depowering thousands of mutants, many of whom were killed in the aftermath by religious terrorists.
My question is: once the Avengers vs. X-Men crisis is over, could any of those people affected actually seek legal action against her? I’m sure that the Avengers will forgive her, since they tend to take a lot in stride and be really forgiving even when they should be still rather angry, but isn’t it on the shoulders of the government to prosecute for deaths anyway? And not to mention thousands of mutants who have lost their powers who might not have wanted it, and the families of those killed in the aftermath? Frankly, how can she possibly actually remain a hero and not stuck in jail for the next millenium?
The Scarlet Witch’s madness is a great example of comic book writers’ (understandable) tendency to overlook the consequences of their larger-than-life plots.  So would Wanda be on the hook either criminally or civilly?  Or would she have a viable insanity defense?
I. Insanity
We’ve talked about the insanity defense a few times before (here, for example), usually concluding that it doesn’t apply.  This may be one of the cases in which it does.  The Scarlet Witch’s madness may have been caused by some sort of possession or it may have been a more common sort of mental illness, perhaps related to the deaths of her children.  Psychic possession could be a kind of insanity or it could simply eliminate the mental state required to commit a crime; either way, that would be an effective defense.  But what if the Scarlet Witch wasn’t being actively controlled but was merely ‘ordinarily’ mentally ill?
Unlike many supervillains, Wanda may actually be legally insane.  As Dr. Strange describes her in Avengers #503: “Reality controls her. … Reality, eventually, as she knows it, starts to slip away. Elude her.  Blur.  … She loses herself, her reason. … [Y]ou’d say to yourself, this sounds like a person who has lost control of themselves on a deep psychological level.  You’d say this sounds like a disturbed person.”  That sounds a lot like it would satisfy the most common insanity test, the M’Naghten test: whether “the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.”
II. Liability
But supposing Wanda wasn’t insane, she could face both civil and criminal liability.  However, in the US system the government is not strictly required to prosecute any particular crime, and you can imagine how it might be reluctant to try to go after someone as powerful as the Scarlet Witch.  Even so, the depowered mutants, Ant-Man’s survivors, and Hawkeye’s survivors could probably all sue her in civil court.  The nice thing about a civil case is that if the Scarlet Witch doesn’t show up after appropriate efforts are made to serve her with process, then the plaintiffs could get a default judgment.  I don’t know if she has bank accounts or other assets that could be seized to satisfy a default judgment, but if she does then that could provide some relief to the injured parties without having to actually get her to show up in court.
III. Conclusion
The Scarlet Witch has a plausible insanity defense.  However, while she might not be guilty of a crime or liable for any torts, I’m not sure that makes Captain America’s decision to offer her a spot in the Avengers more sensible than it would if she had committed the crimes in a sane state (although she declined the offer).

Hancock and Defense of Others

Today we have a follow up to our post about the movie Hancock.  (Moderate spoilers below!)

In one scene, Hancock foils a bank robbery.  The lead robber was holding a dead man’s switch that would set off explosives, killing bystanders, so naturally Hancock solved the problem by amputating the robber’s hand.  After our review, Heiki watched the film and wrote in with a question about that scene:

How do the facts of Hancock being a state actor (he was called in by the police), his ability to retreat, and his seeming ability to simply move so fast that the robber would not be able to act and being able to squeeze his hand shut without amputating it bear on the legality of the amputation manoeuvre?

As Heiki indicates, there are a few different issues here, but we’re going to focus on whether the amputation was possibly legal under the circumstances.  Hancock is set in Los Angeles, so we can refer to California law.

I. Defense of Others and the Reasonable Person

Presumably Hancock himself would not have been harmed by the blast (or he could have left the scene), so we’ll assume Hancock was acting in defense of the bystanders and police.  California defines self-defense and defense of others by statute, Cal. Penal Code § 197:

Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person in any of the following cases: …  1. When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any person; or … 3. When committed in the lawful defense of such person … when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great bodily injury, and imminent danger of such design being accomplished

NB: the “commit a felony” part has been constrained by the courts to refer to the kinds of felonies that allowed lethal self-defense at common law, not all felonies.  People v. Ceballos, 12 Cal.3d 470, 478 (1974).  The felony must be “some atrocious crime attempted to be committed by force.”  Id.  But threatening to blow up a bank with people inside it seems to qualify in any case.  It would also likely count as “a design to … do some great bodily injury,” and there was imminent danger of the design being accomplished.

So, Hancock may have been justified in killing the robber outright.  Does that include cutting off his hand?  Yes.  “Since a homicide is justifiable under the circumstances specified in section 197, a fortiori an attempt to commit a violent injury upon another under those circumstances is justifiable.” Ceballos, 12 Cal.3d at 477.

But the analysis does not stop there.  Although it is not directly apparent from the statute, California requires that the use of deadly force must have been reasonably necessary under the circumstances.

For killing to be in self-defense, the defendant must actually and reasonably believe in the need to defend.  If the belief subjectively exists but is objectively unreasonable, there is “imperfect self-defense,” i.e., “the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and cannot be convicted of murder,” but can be convicted of manslaughter.  To constitute “perfect self-defense,” i.e., to exonerate the person completely, the belief must also be objectively reasonable.

People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 (1996).  As is often the case, the “objectively reasonable” standard is determined by the ordinary person.  “California law expresses the criterion for this evaluation in the objective terms of whether a reasonable person, as opposed to the defendant, would have believed and acted as the defendant did.” People v. Aris, 215 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1196 (4th Dist. 1989) (emphasis in original).  Specifically:

a jury must consider what would appear to be necessary to a reasonable person in a similar situation and with similar knowledge. It judges reasonableness from the point of view of a reasonable person in the position of defendant. To do this, it must consider all the facts and circumstances … in determining whether the defendant acted in a manner in which a reasonable man would act in protecting his own life or bodily safety.

Humphrey, 13 Cal.4th at 1082-83.

Unfortunately, it is not completely clear whether this objective standard also takes into account the defendant’s physical abilities, but I think it does.  Those abilities are part of the “situation” and “all the facts and circumstances.”  So, would a reasonable person, knowing what Hancock knew and with Hancock’s abilities, have done what Hancock did in that situation?  I don’t know.  I think a reasonable person might have chosen the amputation route.  It did avoid killing the robber, and it was successful.  Maybe Hancock was unsure if, fast as he was, he could disable the robber in time any other way.

2. Imperfect Defense of Others and Mayhem

But what if Hancock didn’t act reasonably? Could he claim imperfect self-defense and try for a reduced charge, perhaps some kind of battery or even a mere assault?  Alas, no.  The crime Hancock may have committed is not murder (since the robber didn’t die) but rather mayhem:

Every person who unlawfully and maliciously deprives a human being of a member of his body … is guilty of mayhem.

Cal. Penal Code § 203.  The California courts have held that imperfect self-defense is not a general-purpose defense and applies only to murder. “Imperfect self-defense is not an affirmative defense, but a description of one type of voluntary manslaughter.”  People v. Michaels, 28 Cal.4th 486, 529 (2002).  Further, they have also held that it does not apply to mayhem.  People v. Quintero, 37 Cal. Rptr.3d 884, 894-97 (4th Dist. 2006).  It is also unclear whether California even recognizes “imperfect defense of others” as opposed to imperfect self-defense.  People v. Michaels, 28 Cal.4th 486 (2002).

Now, you might be thinking, how can it be fair that Hancock is stuck with mayhem if he was acting unreasonably, but he would have gotten a reduced charge if he outright killed the robber?  The answer is that mayhem is already a less serious crime than voluntary manslaughter (the typical result of imperfect self-defense).  It carries a sentence of 2-8 years, whereas voluntary manslaughter is 3-11 years.  That’s a pretty slim difference in punishment for a pretty huge difference in outcome for the victim, if you ask me, but that’s the wisdom of the legislature for you.

III. Conclusion

It’s hard to say for certain whether Hancock acted reasonably and so was justified in doing what he did, but it’s certainly possible.  Since nobody (other than the robber) seemed to complain, I guess the LA district attorney’s office felt it was reasonable, or at least close enough.

Amicus Curiae Comic

At Law and the Multiverse we mainly talk about how the law is portrayed in comics.  Well here is a very literal example: an amicus curiae brief / comic filed in the ebook price-fixing case, U.S. v. Apple et al.  The brief was illustrated by Julia Alekseyeva and written by Bob Kohn, who is the co-author of Kohn on Music Licensing and knows a thing or two about copyright law.  We take no position on the case itself or the merits of the brief, but it’s easy to read and very entertaining.  There have been illustrated court filings before (here’s the sad backstory to that one), but this is the first full-blown comic we’ve seen.

Thanks to Len for forwarding the brief to us.