Author Archives: James Daily

The Man of Steel Confesses

I know I said the post on Lois Lane’s employment contract would probably be our last post on Man of Steel, but we got a great question from Neal that I couldn’t resist writing up.  Neal—who is a rabbi in New York—writes:

You may remember that Clark Kent goes into a church and confesses to the priest (let’s assume he’s a Catholic priest, for the sake of argument, though to be clear different religions handle “confession” and counseling relationships differently) that he’s the guy everybody is looking for. Now, in NY, that priest can’t be compelled to testify or reveal information obtained while performing the duties of a clergy- penitent or clergy-congregant relationship (as I broadly understand it) but there ARE mandated reporting laws, e.g. regarding child and elder abuse.

So could the Feds or the state government have compelled the priest to testify given that:

1) An alien might not be presumed to be a member of the church, especially if he just showed up and had no prior relationship to this denomination or its clergy,

and

2) the stakes are just so damn high, like planetary destruction. If there is a mandated reporting law for child abuse- and to be clear I am not 100 percent sure even that overrides the legal protection of the clergy relationship in all instances- wouldn’t it apply on a vastly larger scale with something like this?

These questions raise several issues related to the confessional privilege.

I. The Confessional Privilege in Kansas

At common law there was little or no legal protection for statements made to a member of the clergy in confession or otherwise while seeking religious advice or counsel.  Instead, the privilege is largely derived from statutes.  Generally speaking it is weaker than, for example, the attorney-client privilege, but in some states the confessional privilege can be pretty broad.

I believe that the confessional scene takes place in Smallville, which is located in Kansas.  In Kansas the privilege is defined in the Kansas Rules of Evidence, specifically K.S.A. 60-429(b):

A person, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness from disclosing a communication if he or she claims the privilege and the judge finds that (1) the communication was a penitential communication and (2) the witness is the penitent or the minister, and (3) the claimant is the penitent, or the minister making the claim on behalf of an absent penitent.

So in other words, Clark (if he’s present) or the priest (if Clark is absent) could claim the privilege (become the claimant) in order to prevent the priest from disclosing what Clark told the priest, or in order to prevent Clark from disclosing the same.

Now, there are a lot of specialized terms in that definition, including “penitent” and “penitential communication” (we’ll assume the priest is a regular or duly ordained minister).  Those terms are defined in 60-429(a):

“penitent” means a person who recognizes the existence and the authority of God and who seeks or receives from a regular or duly ordained minister of religion advice or assistance in determining or discharging his or her moral obligations, or in obtaining God’s mercy or forgiveness for past culpable conduct

“penitential communication” means any communication between a penitent and a regular or duly ordained minister of religion which the penitent intends shall be kept secret and confidential and which pertains to advice or assistance in determining or discharging the penitent’s moral obligations, or to obtaining God’s mercy or forgiveness for past culpable conduct.

So right off the bat we can see the answer to one of the issues: there’s no requirement that Clark have been a member of the church in question or otherwise have had a pre-existing confessional relationship with the priest.  As long as he “recognizes the existence and the authority of God and … seeks or receives from a regular or duly ordained minister of religion advice or assistance in determining or discharging [his] moral obligations”, that’s sufficient.  And honestly I’m not too sure about the “recognizes the existence and the authority of God” part, but it doesn’t appear to have been put to the First Amendment test, at least in Kansas.

In this case, Clark is at least seeking advice or assistance in determining his moral obligations (i.e. whether to reveal himself as Superman and try to do good in the world with his powers).  And it appears that he intended the communication to be confidential.  He and the priest were alone in the church, and I don’t recall him telling the priest it was okay to tell anyone else.  There was a strong implication that it was a confidential conversation, and that Clark told the priest what he did precisely because he believed it was confidential.

II. Any Exceptions?

The Kansas statute, like many such statutes, does not contain much in the way of exceptions.  It sets a relatively high bar to accessing the privilege in the first place, but once it’s reached, that’s pretty much it.  Many states do provide an exception for child abuse reporting, particularly if members of the clergy are mandatory reporters, but the issue does not appear to have come up in Kansas.  Certainly there is no broad exception for the public good or public safety.  And that makes a certain amount of policy sense.  The confessional privilege would be largely pointless if those confessing the possibility of endangering themselves or others (e.g. by committing a violent crime) were not protected by it.

III. But Wait, What About the Feds?

It’s all well and good that the privilege would apply in state court in Kansas, but what about federal court?  After all, it’s not exactly the local sheriff that’s looking for Clark.  Would the priest still be able to keep quiet if there was some kind of federal proceeding?

Maybe, maybe not.  There is no federal confessional privilege statute.  One was proposed as part of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but it was not approved by Congress.  Over the years a federal common law privilege has developed, and it appears to be recognized in Kansas. U.S. v. Dillard, 2013 WL 875230 (D.Kan. Mar. 7, 2013) (“Plaintiff does not take issue in this case with the general existence of the [confessional] privilege. Neither does this Court.”).

I have yet to see a federal case that describes the contours of the privilege clearly, so I will take this summary from a treatise on the subject:

The communication by a spiritual communicant is privileged if it is made to an ordained or otherwise duly accredited functionary of a religious organization in his capacity as such. … The communication must have been made for the purpose of obtaining spiritual aid or religious or other counsel, advice, solace, absolution, or ministration. It must also have been made in confidence.

Paul F. Rothstein & Susan W. Crump, Federal Testimonial Privileges § 10:3.

In this case, the federal privilege would also appear to apply.

IV. Conclusion

The state law confessional privilege probably applied in this case and there probably wasn’t an exception.  The same is likely true of the federal privilege, bearing in mind that it exists on somewhat shaky ground, having never been formally approved by the Supreme Court or even (as far as I can tell) the 10th Circuit, in which Kansas is located.

 

Lawyer2Lawyer Podcast

[Spoiler Alert for The Dark Knight Rises.  If you haven’t seen it yet, you should.]

Last month I was invited onto Lawyer2Lawyer to discuss legal issues raised by the end of The Dark Knight Rises, as originally discussed in this guest post by Mike Lee. Lawyer2Lawyer is a podcast that analyzes contemporary news topics from a legal perspective on the Legal Talk Network. Normally they cover serious news stories, but this time the question was “is Batman legally dead?”  I was joined on the show by Michael Baroni, General Counsel at Palace Entertainment and a long-time Batman fan.

Listen here: Is Batman Legally Dead?

The Avengers and Campaign Finance

Thanks to Adam for alerting us to this article at The Daily Caller comparing the effects of campaign finance laws on Bruce Banner and Tony Stark.  The article is an opinion piece and definitely has an editorial slant that we at Law and the Multiverse express no opinion of our own about, but the legal analysis is great.  We only wish we’d thought of it ourselves, actually.

Comic-Con Panel Tomorrow!

Not Guilty Due to Zombification? Law and Forensic Psychiatry in a Zombie Apocalypse is at Comic-Con tomorrow, Thursday July 18th from 8pm-9:30pm in Room 7AB.  So far 610 people have marked themselves down as attending on the scheduling website, so it looks like we’ll have a pretty good crowd.  We hope to see you all there!

Superman and the Duty to Rescue on Bloomberg Law

Bloomberg Law has produced a short video about my piece on Wired.com about Superman and the duty to rescue in Man of Steel.  Check it out!

Lois Lane’s Employment Contract

This will probably be our last post on Man of Steel.  No spoiler warning on this one, as I can set up the issue without giving anything of consequence away.

In Man of Steel, Lois Lane works as a reporter for the Daily Planet (no surprise there).  At one point in the movie, she has a disagreement with her boss, Perry White, over whether to run a certain story, and she threatens to quit.  White tells her that she can’t do that because she’s under contract, and Lois concedes the argument.

Wait, what?

I. Employment Contracts

How can Lane’s employment contract prevent her from quitting her job?  Surely the Planet can’t literally force her to work.  Doesn’t the Thirteenth Amendment have something to say about that?

And it does.  The Planet can’t force Lane to work, and a court can’t order her to work if she breaches her employment contract.  But that doesn’t mean an employment contract is completely toothless from the employer’s point of view.  There are two major techniques that the Planet might have used when drafting the contract to make it in Lane’s best interest to keep working for the Planet rather than quit: damages and a non-compete agreement.

II. Damages

Ordinarily in a breach of employment contract case it’s the employee who seeks damages from the employer, typically arguing that the employer owes them whatever they were due under the contract in the form of salary or other compensation.  Of course, that only works if it’s the employer that broke the contract.  If it’s the employee that reneged on the deal, then things could go the other way.

In cases where the employee is the breaching party, employers don’t often sue for damages because a) employees usually don’t have a lot of money and b) it’s difficult to say how much the employee’s work would have been worth.  This is different from the reverse situation, where the employer typically has deep pockets and it’s very clear what the employee was owed in terms of salary.

One possible solution to this problem is a liquidated damages clause, which says something like “if Lane breaches the contract then she must pay the Planet $X.”  Basically it’s an upfront agreement regarding the damages in the event of a breach of contract.  There are some limits and restrictions on such clauses, but they are, in principle, allowed in employment contracts as long as they are reasonable and not punitive.  See, e.g., Kozlik v. Emelco, Inc., 240 Neb. 525 (1992).

Faced with the prospect of having to pay the Planet the approximate value of her services to them, Lane would probably conclude that it was better to keep working.

III. Non-Compete Agreements

As the name suggests, these clauses bar the employee from competing with the employer after they quit working for the employer.  Usually this means that the employee can’t work for a competitor or in the same industry for a certain period of time, typically no more than a few years.  The agreement may also be limited geographically (e.g. only apply to the city where the employee was working).

Some states strongly disfavor non-compete agreements, whereas others are generally okay with them as long as they are reasonably narrow in scope.  We don’t know where Metropolis is, but it’s likely that it’s in a state that accepts non-compete agreements.  If Lois Lane was subject to a non-compete, then quitting the Planet would mean quitting being a journalist, at least in the Metropolis area.  That’s a powerful incentive not to quit.

IV. Conclusion

Although the Planet might not have literally been able to force Lane to keep working, her employment contract may have effectively done so anyway.

And Now a Shameless Plug

Pardon the slightly off-topic post (I promise we’ll be back with more superheroes and supervillains soon), but an article I co-wrote with F. Scott Kieff was just published in the Emory Law Journal: James E. Daily & F. Scott Kieff, Anything Under the Sun Made by Humans: Patent Law Doctrines as Endogenous Institutions for Commercializing Innovation, 62 Emory L.J. 967 (2013).  You can find the full article for free here.  Scott and I wrote the article as part of our work with the Stanford University Hoover Institution’s Project on Commercializing Innovation.  To give you an idea of what it’s about, here’s the abstract:

This Essay outlines a comparative institutional analysis among various doctrines in patent law to show how they can have different impacts on the way inventions are commercialized. It builds on a prior body of work about the positive role that property rights in patents can play in commercializing innovation to show how recent shifts in approaches to the particular legal doctrine known as patentable subject matter can be expected to have different effects on the commercialization of inventions than prior approaches. It concludes that, to the extent society wants to increase the overall rate of invention commercialization and increase overall competition as reflected in diversity in firm size among participants in the markets for commercializing innovation, society should consider reversing course on the law of patentable subject matter and return to an approach that is closer to the “anything under the sun made by man” view that was championed by the Supreme Court in the 1980s and by Congress through most of the second half of the twentieth century, updating only its gender biased language.

As you might guess, it’s a little denser reading than our usual material, but I thought some of our readers might be interested.

Comics University at Star Clipper

My local comic book store, Star Clipper, is putting on a series of free lectures and movie screenings this summer called Comics University.  Attendees can earn coupons, gift cards, and other prizes, and the course list looks like a lot of fun—and not just because I’m teaching a class on The Law of Superheroes on Wednesday, July 31st.  Like the other Comics U classes, it will run from 7pm to 9pm.  If you’re in the St. Louis area I hope to see you there!

(NB: There will always be standing room, but to reserve a seat for a class, send an email to comicsu@starclipper.com the day after a class to register for the following class.  For example, to register for The Law of Superheroes, send an email on Thursday, July 25th.)

“Holy Secret Recipe, Batman!”: Superheroes, the Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, and Economic Espionage

(This guest post was written by T. Stephen Jenkins, an associate in the Commercial Litigation Practice Group of Pepper Hamilton LLP.)

While Law and the Multiverse has featured several posts on various forms of intellectual property law (e.g. patent, copyright, and trademark), it has yet to discuss trade secrets . . . until now.  Trade secrets commonly appear in comic books, and given the recent concern with computer security and the alleged theft of trade secrets by domestic and international hackers, theft of trade secrets is a worthwhile topic to discuss.  (Warning:  minor spoilers ahead)

 

I. What IS a Trade Secret?

A person or company holding a trade secret, as its name suggests, seeks to safeguard information that is known by the person or company that is not readily known by anyone in the public.  Trade secrets can overlap with other forms of intellectual property, such as non-patentable inventions, trade dress, and “know-how.”  However, unlike many other forms of intellectual property where recovery of damages might be limited by lack of federal registration (disclosure) of the intellectual property (e.g. copyrights and patents), generally speaking, a trade secret holder may be able to recover damages if he or she maintained a reasonable level of protection to prevent non-disclosure of the trade secret.  The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”), which 48 of 50 states have adopted (or introduced) in some form, defines a trade secret as

(1) information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that (2) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (3) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

Uniform Trade Secrets Act §1, ¶ 4.

Trade secrets are common—and even famous—in the real world.  One of the most famous examples is the Coca-Cola secret recipe, which, for years has been guarded and has been the subject of threats of economic espionage.  Other examples of famous trade secrets include KFC’s “11 herbs and spices” and Google’s search algorithm.  Even less apparent examples of trade secrets have gained fame including the methodology for creating the New York Times Best Sellers’ list and Starwood Hotels’ (the owner of Westin hotel chain) luxury ambience.  Each of the above satisfies the three elements of the UTSA definition of a trade secret.

First, each example easily satisfies the information prong.  See  1-1 Milgrim on Trade Secrets § 1.01 (“The classic definition of trade secrets is stated at § 757, comment b, of the 1939 Restatement of Torts. . . . It covers any information (which can be embodied in a physical thing . . .”).  Second, because some have attempted to either unlawfully misappropriate and/or reverse-engineer the above trade secrets, it is probably safe to assume each trade secret has independent economic value in not being generally known.  Third, all are highly protected (though safeguarding all the details that create a Starwood Hotel’s luxury ambience is undoubtedly challenging).

Given the broad definition of a trade secret under UTSA, one can see how patterns, formulas, or devices in the Multiverse likely qualify as trade secrets.  The challenge is demonstrating whether these secrets have economic value.

The most famous comic book trade secret may be the Super Soldier Serum that created Captain America (and other characters), which many have tried to misappropriate (e.g. the Red Skull) and reverse engineer (e.g. the Green Goblin).  Though the Super Solider Serum was the product of government military research, there is a strong case that is has economic value.  Many villains and fictional enemies of the United States have tried to misappropriate the secret formula and use it either to gain a military advantage or to create a steady supply of mercenaries for hire.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the Super Soldier Serum could meet the trade secret requirements.

Other examples might include:

  • Devices:  Spider-Man’s webshooters and Batman’s gadgets;
  • Programs/Patterns:  X-men Danger Room (depending on whether or not it is sentient) and Cerebro/Cerebra;
  • Methods/Techniques/Processes:  The method to access the Speed Force and the process of joining adamantium to Wolverine’s skeleton;
  • Formula: Vibranium and its derivative uses including Captain America’s shield, the Super Solider Serum, and the Anti-Life Equation;
  • Information/Compilations:  S.H.I.E.L.D.’s database on superheroes and villains and Justice League’s/X-Men’s/Avengers team-up database.

A superhero’s secret identity (within the Multiverse) may also be a trade secret, though not as easily established as the above.  See the Law and the Multiverse’s post on secret identities and privacy for an analogous argument.  For public superheroes such as those registered under the Marvel Universe’s Superhuman Registration Act, their secret identities may not enjoy trade secret protection.  However, other superheroes have had to protect their secret identities against those trying to kill them or sell their secret (e.g. Spider-Man).  They have also obtained benefits in their non-superhero professions from keeping their superhero identities secret (e.g. Peter Parker (photographer) / Spider-Man, Clark Kent (journalist) / Superman, and Matt Murdock (attorney) / Daredevil)).  Thus, for these superheroes, a secret identify might qualify as a trade secret.

 

II. What Laws Protect Trade Secrets?

In contrast to patents, copyrights, and trademarks, which federal law either establishes and/or strongly protects, trade secrets’ protection mostly arises from state law, though recently, international and federal protection of trade secrets has increased.  Most states have adopted UTSA in some form, which provides for civil actions for injunctive relief and damages within three years after misappropriation is discovered.  Two U.S.-signed treaties, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) also provide some protection.

Recently, the federal Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831 et seq.,  and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq., have become enforcement tools against criminal misfeasors.  Both the EEA and the CFAA provide harsh civil and criminal penalties for the trade secret theft. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831 et seq. (providing for fines up to $10 million and/or 15 years imprisonment for economic espionage or trade secret theft); 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq. providing for unspecified fines and/or up  to 20 years imprisonment).

 

III. Who in the Multiverse Has Violated the EEA or the CFAA?

Though there are several examples of potential violations of the EEA and the CFAA in the Multiverse, a favorite comes from Marvel Entertainment’s popular Iron Man “Armor Wars” storyline (for a DC Comics example, see the mini-series aptly named The Hacker Files).

 

A. The Facts

“Armor Wars” is an Iron Man story arc that has appeared in many of Marvel’s comic book series.  In addition, it was featured in the second season of the Iron Man:  Armored Adventures televised cartoon.  In the Iron Man:  Armored Adventures version, Tony Stark is a teenager balancing being a superhero and a high school student.  Tony’s main antagonist is Obadiah Stane, who ousted Tony from the family company Stark International.

Stane, then Chair of the Board of Stark International, enlists Ghost to steal the Iron Man armor specifications.  Ghost goes to Tony’s hideout to steal the specs from Tony’s computer.  Stane also makes a deal with Doctor Doom, handing over the armor specs to Dr. Doom in exchange for help with creating a version of the armor for Stane.  Using Tony’s armor specs, Stane creates his own version of the Iron Man armor, becoming Iron Monger but is exposed as being involved with Ghost.  Ghost also sells the Iron Man armor specs to Justin Hammer (in this version a 21-year old spoiled rich kid), who creates his own version of the Iron Man armor, becoming Titanium Man.

 

B. Is There a Cause of Action Under the EEA or the CFAA?

While the cartoon takes a different approach to resolve the problem, consider whether a prosecutor or Tony could bring a claim under the EEA or the CFAA against (1) Ghost, (2) Stane, (3) Dr. Doom, and (4) Hammer (collectively, the “Misfeasors”).

 

1. Economic Espionage Act

Under the EEA, a prosecutor or Tony could bring claims of both theft of trade secrets (42 U.S.C. § 1832) and economic espionage (42 U.S.C.§ 1831).  The EEA makes it unlawful for a person to steal a trade secret and transmit it to a person who knows he or she is not authorized to possess it.  The EEA also makes it unlawful for a person to steal a trade secret with the purpose or knowledge that the delivery of the trade secret will benefit a foreign government (economic espionage).

The Misfeasors are all potentially liable for theft of trade secrets.  The EEA provides that “[w]hoever, with intent to convert a trade secret . . . steals, or without authorization,” or “appropriates . . . information” or “receives, buys, or possesses such information” or “attempts . . . or conspires . . . to commit any offense” described above shall be subjected to fines and/or imprisonment.  First, the Iron Man armor specs, at least in this storyline, are trade secrets  because they meet all the requirements under UTSA (see above Captain America/Super Soldier Serum analysis).  Moreover, the reason Stane and Hammer pay Ghost to steal the specs is because they want to derive economic value.  Second, the Misfeasors were involved in a conspiracy to misappropriate the specs:  Ghost stole the specs; Stane and Hammer bought the stolen specs, and Dr. Doom received the stolen specs.

However, not all of the Misfeasors are clearly liable for economic espionage under the EEA.  The EEA’s economic espionage provision is conceptually the same as its theft of trade secret provision, but requires that a misfeasor transmit a trade secret “intending or knowing that the offense will benefit” a foreign government or agent.  Here, the foreign government or agent is Latveria or Dr. Doom, respectively.

Hammer is likely not liable for economic espionage because it would be difficult to prove that he intended or knew that Dr. Doom would gain the armor specs.  In contrast, Stane and Dr. Doom are likely liable because they conspired for Dr. Doom to obtain the specs.  But the trickier case is Ghost who was happy to sell the specs to highest bidder.  Because it was Stane and not Ghost who gave the specs to Dr. Doom, Ghost can argue that he did not intend or know that his theft would benefit Dr. Doom.  However, given that “a conspiracy can exist even if each participant does not know the identity of the others or does not participate in all the events,” cf. United States v. Monroe, 73 F.3d 129, 131 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted), Ghost’s argument may fail.

 

2. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

The Misfeasors are also likely liable under the CFAA, which provides that “[w]hoever . . . knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding authorization . . . obtain[s] information that has been determined by [U.S. law] to require protection against unauthorized disclosure . . . [and] transmits . . . or conspires [to transmit]. . . to any person not entitled to receive it” will be subject to fines and/or imprisonment.  18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)–(c).  The analysis under the CFAA is similar to the theft of trade secret analysis but requires that the information be obtained from a “protected computer.”  Under the CFAA a protected computer is either (1) a computer “exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Government, ”18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(A), or (2) a computer used in “interstate or foreign commerce or communication,” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B).  The latter requirement is a low standard to meet

Tony’s computer is a protected computer because it was used in interstate communication.  Thus, the Misfeasors could be facing years of imprisonment or at least hefty fines.  Dr. Doom may escape penalty given that, as the sovereign of his own country, he will likely not extradite himself for prosecution.  And if the U.S. government came after Dr. Doom or any of the Misfeasors, it would likely take years to reach a resolution, which is probably why the story arc’s writers resolved the issue in a much swifter way.

Using the EEA and the CFAA to pursue real-world misfeasors may increase in the coming years.  The EEA and the CFAA give federal prosecutors—and to a lesser extent civil litigants—broad power to prosecute alleged misfeasors, making even attempts to misappropriate trade secrets actionable.  “The Department of Justice has made the investigation and prosecution of corporate and state sponsored trade secret theft a top priority. . . . The FBI is also expanding its efforts to fight computer intrusions that involve the theft of trade secrets by individual, corporate, and nation-state cyber hackers.”  See Office of the President, Admin. Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets at 7.

While there are many proponents and opponents of their use, there is no doubt that the Economic Espionage Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act have had profound effects.  Of course, you can always come to Law and the Multiverse to see how the EEA and the CFAA continue to affect super powered individuals—and Pepper Hamilton LLP if you ever need real-world advice.

Law and the Multiverse Retcon #6: Genetiks and Human Gene Patents

This is the sixth post in our Law and the Multiverse Retcons series, in which we discuss changes in the law (or corrections to our analysis) that affect older posts.

Today I have a quick post about a recent Supreme Court case that was under consideration when I wrote this post about the graphic novel Genetiks.  As mentioned in the post, the Supreme Court had recently heard the case of  Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., which was intended to answer the question “are human genes patentable?”  Since then the Court has handed down its decision, which many news outlets summarized as “no.”  The truth is a little more nuanced than that*, but in any event the Court’s decision doesn’t change the ultimate conclusion in my original post, which was that what the company in Genetiks was portrayed as doing would not be possible under US law.  If anything the Myriad decision has only cemented that.

Relatedly, I’ve gotten some questions from readers about the series Orphan Black, which apparently deals with some similar issues as Genetiks.  I’ve heard good things about the series and intend to review it at some point in the future.

* Tempted as I am to delve into the minutiae of patent law, since that’s my area of interest, I will limit myself to a brief(-ish) summary.

Essentially, the Court held that DNA molecules cannot be patented if they are the same as a DNA molecule (or part of one) that occurs naturally in the human body, even if the patent claims only isolated, purified DNA molecules, which do not occur naturally.  The Court based its decision on the fact that isolation and purification do not change the information content of the genetic sequence, which was the actual invention as far as it was concerned rather than the DNA molecule in a chemical sense.

However, the Court also held that cDNA molecules can be patented, even if the cDNA molecule is nothing more than an unpatentable DNA molecule run through a standard biotech process.  According to the Court, that process takes an unpatentable product of nature and makes it into a patentable manufacture or composition of matter in a way that isolation and purification do not.  This is evidently true even though the information content of the DNA molecule and its corresponding cDNA molecule are the same.  It is difficult to reconcile these results on their face.

It is worth noting that the Patent Act itself says nothing about products of nature.  The list of “inventions patentable” contains no exceptions at all, only an affirmative list.  The Court arrived at its conclusion by reading in / creating an exception that is not at all present in the statute but is instead derived only from prior Supreme Court cases.

The practical upshot of all this is that Myriad will lose its right to exclude others from performing clinical testing for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations.  More broadly, single-gene testing is now anybody’s game.  But Myriad and other biotech companies will retain other, less-valuable patent rights associated with human genes.

That’s about all I can say without getting too soapboxy.  For more on this kind of thing, see my forthcoming paper, James E. Daily & F. Scott Kieff, Anything Under The Sun Made By Humans: Patent Law Doctrines As Endogenous Institutions For Commercializing Innovation, 62 Emory L.J. (forthcoming July 3, 2013).