Category Archives: movies

The Dark Knight: Embezzlement

On Friday we talked about legal ethics in The Dark Knight. Now we’re going to take a look at an issue with consequences beyond the movie’s version of Batman. Specifically: does being the CEO or majority shareholder of a corporation give you the right to use corporate assets for personal projects? In the movie, Bruce Wayne (majority shareholder) goes to Lucius Fox (CEO) whenever he needs another cool toy, and Coleman Reese’s discoveries suggest that he’s not just buying them from the company but is actually using corporate resources to develop and manufacture his stuff. Is this okay?

I. Wayne Enterprises in The Dark Knight

In the Christopher Nolan movies, Wayne Enterprises is portrayed as a publicly traded company. It’s got a board of directors. It’s got institutional and private shareholders. Bruce Wayne has a controlling interest and therefore gets to call a lot of the shots, but the corporation is not, in fact, his personal plaything.

Though you wouldn’t know it from the way he treats it. Turns out that Fox has probably committed what amounts to embezzlement, i.e., the fraudulent conversion of the property of another over which one had lawful possession. It’s also often a felony, particularly when it involves large amounts of money.

Here’s the deal. Fox, as the CEO of Wayne Enterprises, has lawful possession of all of Wayne Enterprises’ assets by dint of the fact that he has lawful control over those assets.  Note that possession is separate from ownership; Fox controls the assets but he does not own them.  Generally speaking, the CEO of any given company is just that: the chief executive officer.  He or she has complete and inherent authority to commit corporate assets to any lawful purpose for the benefit of the corporation, except as limited by the corporate charter. For example, if Lucius decides one day that Wayne Enterprises isn’t going to sell X-type widgets anymore, he can sell off or shut down that division of the company overnight, unless the Wayne Enterprises charter requires a more complex procedure, such as a vote by the board of directors.

But if he’s acting against the orders of the board or without the board’s permission, he exposes himself to a charge of embezzlement. CEOs of major corporations have disputes about business strategy with their respective boards of directors all the time, and while it frequently leads to people getting fired (either the CEO or the board, depending on who does better with the shareholders), it isn’t generally criminal. But using corporate assets for personal purposes is something else entirely. Coleman Reese discovers that the R&D department is “burning through cash” on a project purported to be “cell phones for the Army.” If such a contract had actually existed, Fox could commit the company to it. But it doesn’t. It’s a pretext for fitting out Bruce Wayne with a really cool if ethically and legally problematic surveillance system. Fox doesn’t have the authority to divert corporate assets for those sorts of personal projects. So he is fraudulently converting the property of the company over which he has lawful possession to his own use, namely, giving it to Wayne.

Why? Because the fact that Bruce Wayne is the majority shareholder doesn’t actually give him an ownership interest in any corporate assets in particular. He can’t walk up and say “Hey, I own half of the company, so I get to use the corporate jet half the time.” That’s not how that works. The business owns its assets, and an interest in the company does not transfer to an interest in the company’s assets as such. The distinction gets a bit blurrier in closely-held corporations, particularly when there is only one owner—as is frequently the case in small businesses—but the mingling of corporate and personal assets is a pretty big no-no in the area of corporate law, and one of the things that courts look to when they consider piercing the corporate veil. We actually talked about that here.

Wayne himself wouldn’t be guilty of embezzlement, as he never had lawful possession of the property, but he would be guilty of conspiracy to commit embezzlement—as would Fox—which is almost as bad. Conspiracy is distinct from the underlying crime, and one can be guilty of conspiracy even if one does not or could not commit the underlying crime. Even if Fox turned him down, Wayne would still be guilty of solicitation for even asking. Also, being in possession of the goods probably counts as receiving stolen property. This is just bad all around.

II. Billionaire industrialists generally

Note that things would be different if Bruce Wayne were using his own assets to fund his projects. Wayne is independently wealthy, and much of this income is presumably in the form of dividends on his Wayne Enterprises stock. This is money he can use for absolutely anything he wants (within the ordinary bounds of the law, of course). Compare this to the way Tony Stark is portrayed in Iron Man. Stark, too, is the CEO of a company he mostly owns, in this case Stark Industries. But Stark develops the Iron Man technology entirely on his own and doesn’t use corporate assets to develop or manufacture it. He has a lab and fabrication equipment in his mansion. He may then have Stark Industries use some of this technology for other purposes, e.g., developing the Arc reactor for commercial and industrial power generation, but as far as the movie goes, no corporate assets are devoted to his activities as Iron Man.

This is entirely okay, at least as far as corporate law is concerned. Stark is free to use his own fortune in any way he wants. So is Bruce Wayne. So in a sense, the way the comic books portray Batman is actually a bit more realistic than the way the movies do. In the comic books, Wayne has a situation far closer to Stark’s position in the movies, i.e., the billionaire industrialist who has a superhero alter ego but who mostly uses his own inventions, manufactured by himself, financed by his personal fortune. Ironically, in the comic books, Stark is generally portrayed as mixing his corporate and Iron Man activities in much the same way as Bruce Wayne does in the movies. Quite the reversal.

III. Alternatives

Still, Wayne is a very rich man. Why couldn’t Wayne simply buy anything he needed from Wayne Enterprises? Fox is certainly capable of authorizing such a transaction. Wayne could even enter into a contract with Wayne Enterprises wherein the latter could be paid by Wayne personally to develop and manufacture Batman gear for Wayne’s use. That would be okay. If done right it could even result in a profit for the company. The problem is that for such a setup to be legally okay, some bits would need to be public, or at least known to the board of directors and its accountants and auditors.  It would be very hard to keep something like that secret.

Similarly, why couldn’t Fox arrange things such that Wayne simply received his Batman gear as part of some kind of compensation package? Two reasons. For one thing, Wayne isn’t portrayed as an employee of the company in The Dark Knight. He’s a shareholder, but not an employee or officer. So there isn’t really any obvious way he could get any compensation apart from regular dividends. And setting up some kind of cushy straw position wouldn’t necessarily work either. The Batman gear is presumably ludicrously expensive. Receiving that as compensation would almost certainly make Wayne one of the most highly-compensated people in the company. Not only would the board of directors need to approve that, but it would probably need to be filed with the SEC. So the choice would either be completely blowing the secrecy angle or violating a lot of laws about corporate filings, executive compensation, and taxes. Again, no good.

And obfuscating things to try to disguise Wayne’s Batman activities is also no good, as it would involve falsifying all sorts of official corporate documents. Part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a corporate reform law passed in 2002, imposes personal, individual responsibility for corporate filings upon both executives and directors, so as soon as anyone figures out that there’s funny business going on—and if there’s one thing about the movie that is accurate, it’s that a halfway-decent auditor will figure things out eventually—Fox and Wayne are going to be in huge trouble.

IV. Conclusion

So really, as far as corporate law goes, the version of Batman/Bruce Wayne depicted in The Dark Knight trilogy is actually quite problematic. Fox is likely guilty of embezzlement, and Wayne would be guilty of conspiracy and receiving stolen property. Further, the most obvious ways of “fixing” the problem are themselves problematic, mostly because they’d make Wayne’s identity as Batman that much closer to public knowledge. Tony Stark has a much better way of going about this: use one’s personal fortune, founded upon but distinct from the corporation, to finance his toys (though he also has the benefit of not worrying about a secret identity). Considering that this is generally how it’s depicted in the comic books, and that in those stories Batman frequently invents most of his own gear, the way things are written in The Dark Night trilogy is surprisingly bad, if unintentional, or puts Wayne in a very grey area, if it’s intentional.

The Dark Knight: Legal Ethics

So The Dark Knight Rises comes out next week. In preparation, we’re taking a look at one of the issues from The Dark Knight. Specifically… isn’t Coleman Reese violating the rules of professional ethics? (Spoilers below!)

I. The Setup

Coleman Reese is an attorney hired by Wayne Enterprises to assist with the pending merger with LSI Holdings. While “running the numbers,” Reese discovers some irregularities and goes on a fishing expedition. He finds blueprints of the Batmobile (aka the Tumbler) and—correctly!—concludes that Bruce Wayne is Batman. One of the funnier moments in the movie is here, where Reese attempts to blackmail Wayne Enterprises by confronting Lucius Fox about this discovery. Suffice it to say that he hadn’t crunched all of the relevant numbers.

Later, Reese goes public, or at least tries to. This is after the Joker threatens to kill people if Batman doesn’t come forward. Things don’t go as planned, and the Joker changes his mind, but that’s the basic idea.

II. The Blackmail

Clearly, blackmail is a bad idea. Blackmailing Batman is a worse one. But apart from the blackmail, Reese was right to go to Fox about his discoveries. ABA Model Rule 1.13, Organization as Client, reads, in part, as follows:

(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.

Bruce Wayne is certainly a “person associated with the organization,” and he’s definitely acting in a manner related to the representation—spending Wayne Enterprises’ money, if nothing else—which is probably a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, i.e., not wasting shareholder dollars or using corporate assets for personal projects. That’s called “embezzlement”. It’s also “likely to result in substantial injury to the organization,” as that cellphone surveillance project wasn’t exactly free. Not to mention any negative press or damage to the corporation should Batman’s identity be discovered. And the right thing to do if a lawyer for a corporation discovers something like that is to go to the CEO. Which Reese did. And if he’d simply said “Mr. Fox, we’ve got a problem here,” he’d have been entirely in the clear. Unfortunately, he got greedy, with hilarious results.

III. The Media Interview

But when the Joker threatens mayhem should Batman not step forward, Reese decides to go to the media. This time, he’s actually in the clear, completely. ABA Model Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, reads, in part:

(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;

It doesn’t say that the client will be causing the death or injury, just that revealing the information is reasonably necessary to prevent such. So if a lawyer has information about a client, and the lawyer reasonably believes that revealing it will save someone’s life, they can reveal it (NB they don’t have to, but they may). That’s what Reese decided to do. The Joker threatened to kill people unless he got this information, and Reese reasonably concluded that revealing that information might save people.

Of course, the Joker changed his mind, at which point revealing that information would not be reasonably calculated to save anyone’s life. So if he had revealed the information after the Joker changed the terms, he’d have violated the rules of ethics.

III. Conclusion

So while Reese trying to blackmail Wayne was a problem, going to Fox wasn’t. And going public when the Joker threatened Gotham City was actually fine. We’ll have another post about the potential embezzlement issue next week as we prepare for the release of The Dark Knight Rises!

The Amazing Spider-Man: Warrants and Assault

As we discussed in our background post, most of the issues in The Amazing Spider-Man aren’t new, but there are two stand-outs.  There are some  minor spoilers ahead for anyone who hasn’t seen the trailers, and a couple of very minor spoilers for anyone who hasn’t seen the film.

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The Amazing Spider-Man: Background

So The Amazing Spider-Man came out last weekend. This is a “reboot” of the Spider-Man cinematic franchise. Rumor has it that Sony’s rights to the franchise would expire if they didn’t release a film every so often, so when Raimi withdrew from the planned Spider-Man 4, the studio opted for a full-on reboot. Given the choice between an arguably too-soon reboot—Spider-Man was only ten years ago and Spider-Man 3 came out in 2007—and letting to of what was almost guaranteed to be a multi-million dollar cash cow, the choice seems pretty obvious.

This post is actually more of a reminder about things we’ve already discussed rather than an exploration of new ground. We’ve already talked about a lot of the legal issues raised by Spider-Man, and The Amazing Spider-Man doesn’t exactly break much new ground here. The following touches on most of the more obvious issues in the movie. We’ll follow this up with some new material on Friday.  In the meanwhile, if you have any questions, feel free to mention them in the comments or email us!

Just last month we talked about Spider-Man and likeness rights, something related to two guest posts on the right of publicity generally.

This one isn’t immediately relevant to the new movie, as Parker’s connection with The Daily Bugle hasn’t been established yet, but we did look at the possibility liability Parker has for not being entirely honest with the Bugle about his relationship with Spider-Man.

We took a brief look at a story from Ultimate Spider-Man # 6 back in February.

Spider-Man isn’t a journalist in this movie—now he just takes pictures for the school newspaper and yearbook, etc.—but he is in a lot of the comics, and we looked at that here.

In April 2011 we examined whether patents might be a problem for Parker given that he’s arguably making off with sensitive data. We then revisited the issue last September, considering the passage of the America Invents Act on our earlier discussion.

A bit earlier we did a two post series on superpowered minors, and while we don’t talk about Spider-Man directly, it’s possibly relevant, although we don’t know exactly how old Peter is in this version.

One thing that is more directly relevant is the issue of costumes and the confrontation clause, something that this version of Spider-Man might well have to deal with given the way he drops off criminals for the cops. We don’t specifically mention Spider-Man in that post, but he does wind up testifying in costume in an early She-Hulk comic, so it’s definitely an issue.

Related to costumes, we discussed the issue of superhero merchandising (part two), something which actually comes into play in the movie. We see a guy wearing a Spider-Man t-shirt, for example.

Then there’s the duty to rescue, an issue always raised in any discussion of Uncle Ben’s death, but thrown in sharp relief here given the way it’s portrayed this time.

Very early on we did a four-part series (one, two, three, four) on superheroes and privacy rights. This issue is touched on rather explicitly by the film, as the dangers Parker’s activities as Spider-Man will pose to his loved ones are discussed.

Cerebro and Privacy Laws

The X-Men movies feature Professor X’s Cerebro device, which amplifies the power of telepathic mutants, allowing them to find other mutants anywhere in the world.  In X-Men: First Class, Professor X and Magneto collaborate with the US government to assemble a team of mutants.  Although the movie is set in the early 1960s, Cerebro (nowadays called Cerebra) is also used in stories set in the modern day.  What’s more, it’s used to collect information on mutants around the world.  This caught the attention of Law and the Multiverse reader Mathias Ullrich, who wrote a great guest post on the subject using First Class as an example:

A data-protection consideration of Prof. Xavier’s recruiting methods according to German law

When reading the article about the responsibility of Prof. Xavier as the principal of a full time school some weeks ago, I started wondering about Prof. Xavier’s way of recruiting. As a data protection officer in Germany, my attention turns to data protection concerns.

As I’m not so familiar with the X-Men, I’ll stick to the movie X-Men: First Class. To analyze the whole process, I divide it into the different relevant steps:

1) data acquisition by telepathy

2) merging the data with another database (e.g. the CIA database) in order to get real addresses

3) offering specific services

4) deletion / blocking of the personal data

Some basics about the German data protection law: The German implementation of the European Data Protection Directive (“Directive 95/46/EC”) is one of the strictest implementations in Europe and is probably the strictest data protection law in the world. It’s called the “Bundesdatenschutzgesetz” or BDSG in short. In general it says that data processing of personal data is forbidden, unless there is an authorization of it in either the BDSG or other laws. So every data acquisition and processing needs an authorization.

Is German law applicable?

The first question we need to answer is if German law applies, when somebody in the world is acquiring customer data. The answer is quite simple: if there is an acquisition of personal data from German citizens, then German law can be used. This is similar to the discussions regarding Google Analytics or Facebook.

What kind of organization are the X-Men?

As stated in a recent blog post, Xavier’s School is a private school.

Step 1: the acquisition

When Professor Xavier searches for mutants, he is gathering data about the health status and some other information about potential students. Health status is one of the so-called “special kinds” or sensitive kinds of personal data according to §3 Abs. 9 BDSG, alongside racial and ethnic origin, political or religious belief and some more.

Acquiring and processing these kinds of personal data has some special rules. As said before, the German data protection law forbids unauthorized data processing, so we need to find permission.

From the reaction of the mutants visited by Magneto and Professor X, I assume none of them gave permission for acquiring the data. So I would also say that Professor X did not inform the people concerned about the concrete use of the data. This is mandatory. It is illegal to acquire data without the knowledge of the person concerned (§33 Abs. 1 BDSG).

Let’s go back to the acquisition. In §28 Abs. 6f and 9 BDSG we find the exceptions.

It’s possible to acquire these data without an explicit permission, if

– it is vital to the person concerned and he / she is not able to give the permission (§28 Abs 6, Nr. 1 BDSG)

– the data is has been made public by the person concerned (§28 Abs 6, Nr. 2 BDSG)

– the data is necessary for a legal transaction (§28 Abs 6, Nr. 3 BDSG)

– the data is necessary for medical research, if this research cannot be done without (§28 Abs 6, Nr. 4 BDSG)

– the data is necessary for medical care, if the acquisition is made by a doctor or somebody else with an obligationtoconfidentiality (§28 Abs 7 BDSG)

– the acquisition is made by a political, philosophic or religious organization without financial interest, but only for their members or associated people.

I do not think any of these exceptions apply. That means that the acquisition of the health status of the possible new students is illegal according to German law.

Step 2: the merging

After acquiring the data, I assume Professor X needs to get information about the new students, he wants to visit. Therefore, he merges the data with some database, according to the movie, it might be a CIA database. Here we have the exact same circumstance as in step 1. With just one exception more.

§28 Abs. 8 BDSG says, that the proceeding or transmitting sensitive data is allowed, if it is needed for defense of public safety.

Of course, thinking about maniacs who try to take over the world, the merging sounds legit, but the merging did not fight a concrete danger. It is more a “long term” investment. Unfortunately the acquisition of the data is still illegal and where did the CIA get data about European citizens? But that is another question, which will not be answered here 😉

So, the merging might be legal, because of the exception for defense of public safety.

Quick note: §28 Abs. 8 BDSG only allows the processing or transmitting of data, not its acquisition.

Step 3: the offering

The last step is the personal visit to the possible new student in order to offer a personal service, in this case a place in Professor X’s private school.

As this is just again data processing, the same legislation applies as in step 2. So, maybe it’s legal because of the defense exception, but that need be discussed.

Step 4: blocking and / or deletion of data?

 In German data protection law, no data should be stored forever. As soon as the purpose of the data has expired, the data needs to be deleted (§35 Abs. 2 BDSG) or at least blocked.

When looking at the reaction by Wolverine, visited by Magneto and Professor X, one can assume that the purpose is expired, as Wolverine seems not to be interested in the offer. As we know, since Wolverine joins the X-Men later, the data may be blocked and not deleted.

Let’s check the terms for blocking instead of deleting, which are stated in §35 Abs 3 BDSG. Blocking data is allowed,

– if there are any laws or other legal issues that prohibit the deletion

– if it can be assumed that a deletion would affect the interests of the person concerned

– if the deletion is not possible or only possible with high effort because of the special way of storing the data

Again I do not think any of the exceptions apply. The data must be deleted, not blocked, at least as far as we are talking about a real database (e.g. the CIA one). If Professor X keeps the information in his mind, this is not affected by German data protection law.

Conclusion

Of course, there are a lot of unanswered questions, which make a final analysis quite difficult. Is telepathy acquisition of personal data and does German law apply here at all? Where is the data stored and how?

Besides that, the conclusion is quite simple. The acquisition was not legal, so every step beyond the first one, such as the uses the data from step 1, was illegal as well. According to §43, Abs. 2 Nr. 1 this is an administrative offense, with a penalty of up to 300,000 Euro in each case.

Translation guide

 Using §1 BDSG as an example:

– ‘§’ or Paragraf means paragraph in English, in this context it is translated to ‘section’.

– ‘Abs.’ is the abbreviation for ‘Absatz’. In this context it is ‘subsection’. In the example an ‘Absatz’ is marked by the brackets.

– The next one is Nr. (‘Nummer’), which means number. It is the next subsection, and in the example it is marked by the normal ‘1.’

– ‘Satz’ means sentence, if referring to a concrete sentence of the text, one uses ‘Satz’.

 

The Avengers and Illegal Orders

We have one more Avengers post for you.  Be warned: there are spoilers!  Today’s post was inspired by a question from John, who writes:

I was interested in the bit near the end where Fury first disobeys a direct order (to nuke Manhattan) and then shoots down one of his own planes (his team building skills must be great because nobody seems all that upset) to prevent someone else from carrying out orders.

1) under what circumstances is an order illegal?
2) when are you expected to simply refuse to co-operate and when do you take active steps to attack your own side?
3) what are those around him supposed to do about this?

And there is an additional question of whether or not military law (i.e. the UCMJ) applies at all.

Here at Law and the Multiverse we often deal with subjects that we aren’t experts in.  In fact, given that our day jobs involve insurance and intellectual property, that’s usually the case.  So in order to write posts we first do research, usually beginning with higher-level secondary sources (e.g. legal encyclopedias, treatises, law review articles) and then moving on to primary sources (e.g. cases, statutes).  With a military law question like this, however, we were a bit stuck, so we turned to our readers for help, and you came through in spades.  We received offers of assistance from multiple current or former military lawyers, and we’re excited to put them together here.

Before we get to that, though, first a disclaimer:  These lawyers are speaking only for themselves; they are not speaking for the military or the Department of Defense.  This is not legal advice, nor does it constitute the formation of an attorney-client relationship.  With that out of the way, on to the show!

I. The Military Law Approach

Nick, a military lawyer, responds:

“So, obviously UCMJ jurisdiction (as you pointed out) is questionable, but perusing the wikipedia article on SHIELD, it appears it might be military (Nick Fury was once identified as a Colonel, plus they have that flying aircraft carrier, so we’ll go with that).

(1) I pulled the Military Judge’s benchbook, which says: “A command is lawful if reasonably necessary to safeguard and protect the morale, discipline, and usefulness of the members of a command and is directly connected with the maintenance of good order in the service” (which is interestingly enough a question of law, not of fact). It’s an accepted proposition that a order to commit a war crime would be illegal.

Now the question is was Fury ordered to commit a war crime? This isn’t clear. The basic Law of Armed Conflict rules are proportionality, discrimination, and military necessity. Now, the law of armed conflict hasn’t really been tested by alien armies, but I think we can easily dispatch with military necessity and discrimination. But proportionality? Fury gets a little closer here, but I still think he fails. Proportionality looks at whether the military objective is proportional to the civilian damage caused. Here we’re looking at the destruction of New York (by seemingly two nuclear bombs, unless Fury blew up the guy taking their mail to shore), with a huge loss of civilian life. However, even when you balance this against the alien army that is setting out to conquer the earth, you probably get there on that point (and I’m not just saying that because I’m a Red Sox fan).

The other piece of analysis would be whether there is a less destructive way to accomplish the military goals. This is probably where Fury could get to “war crime.” His argument would be that the Avengers were the less destructive way to end the threat, and could probably get there.

(2) What is Fury’s duty? This is interesting. He seems to believe that the order is illegal. There isn’t a lot of case law on this that I’m aware of, but some secondary sources (the Medina court martial, primarily) suggest that a commander who has knowledge of one of his own people committing a war crime has a duty to act to stop it. Current regulations that I pulled today only reference a duty to report war crimes, so I think we would call this a customary duty. Under this idea, and under a ‘defense of others’ type defense, it seems like Fury would both have a duty and a legal defense to shooting down his guys.

(3) What should everyone else do? THIS is an interesting question. To a certain point, I guess it depends on how they see this. If they’re in agreement that he is trying to prevent a war crime, I suppose they don’t have to do anything. If they think he is committing murder and/or violating a lawful order, they obviously have a duty to report the crimes, and they most likely would have a duty to try to prevent him from killing people and stopping the mission, though my knowledge for this portion is admittedly a bit thin.”

Jason, Former Captain, U.S. Army JAG Corps, responded:

“Assuming that the S.H.I.E.L.D. members are subject to the UCMJ, the bottom line analysis revolves around [UCMJ] Article 92 – “Failure to obey a lawful order or regulation.”  The central question there revolves around the “lawful” nature of the order itself.  Here is an interesting short essay regarding Article 92 that I found online, while not credited to any one source, it appears to have been written from a military perspective.  There is a difference between a simple illegal order and a patently illegal order. An illegal order can be in violation of general legality, such as orders to commit hazing on troops, orders to abuse trainees, an order to go beyond the speed limit in a military vehicle. A patently or manifestly illegal order applies generally, but not exclusively to the protection of persons (civilians, prisoners, medical personnel and clergy), medical facilities, places of prayer, monuments, etc. The US distinguishes a patently illegal order as one which orders someone to commit a crime.

Some of the most famous cases dealing with someone who should have disobeyed an order because it was illegal are that of Lieutenant William Calley at the My Lai massacre in Vietnam (dramatically interpreted by the movie Platoon) and the case of United States v. Keenan, where the accused (Keenan) was found guilty of murder after he obeyed in order to shoot and kill an elderly Vietnamese citizen. The Court of Military Appeals held that “the justification for acts done pursuant to orders does not exist if the order was of such a nature that a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know it to be illegal.” (Interestingly, the soldier who gave Keenan the order, Corporal Luczko, was acquitted by reason of insanity).

However, soldiers have to be careful what orders they choose to disobey, lest they suffer the fate of Specialist Michael New – In 1995, Spec-4 Michael New was serving in Schweinfurt, Germany. When assigned as part of a multi-national peacekeeping mission about to be deployed to Macedonia, Specialist New and the other soldiers in his unit were ordered to wear United Nations (U.N.) Helmets and arm bands. New refused the order, contending that it was an illegal order. New’s superiors disagreed. Ultimately, so did the court-martial panel. New was found guilty of disobeying a lawful order and sentenced to a bad conduct discharge. The Army Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the conviction, as did the Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces.

My gut reaction in this situation would be that Nick Fury acted appropriately in disobeying the Council’s directive as his actions were taken to protect the millions of innocent civilians.  I hope this helps!”

So both of our guest authors concluded that, assuming the UCMJ applies, Fury was probably in the right when he acted to prevent the nuclear strike on Manhattan, despite the order being given from higher up.

II. Civilian Law

If the UCMJ didn’t apply, then the situation would probably fall under regular civilian law, and Fury could invoke a defense of others argument.  You might wonder how Fury could justify that, since in theory the Council was likewise acting in defense of others by ordering the strike in the first place.  The problem is the risk to innocent bystanders.  A person acting in self-defense (or defense of others) who accidentally injures or kills a third party is ordinarily not liable.  However, if the person acts recklessly then he or she would be liable.

Of course, the situation may be such that A ought not to shoot at B in self-defense, etc., because of the presence of bystanders like C whom A might hit instead. If there is a high degree of risk to people like C involved in A’s shooting at B, A’s killing of C will amount to manslaughter, Henwood v. People, 54 Colo. 188, 129 P. 1010 (1913); Annot., 18 A.L.R. 917, 928 (1922); if a substantial certainty, to murder.

Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12, at 402 n. 53 (1986); see also Reyes v. State, 783 So.2d 1129 (Fla. App. 2001).  An intentional killing of an innocent third person in order to save oneself (or, presumably, another) may negate the defense completely. State v. Soine, 348 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. App. 1984).

The Council could argue necessity, but necessity is a “lesser of two evils” defense, and letting the Avengers handle the situation was even less of an evil than the nuclear strike.  Although the Avengers were not certain to stop the Chitauri, neither was the nuclear strike (and indeed it would not have worked, as the bulk of the Chitauri forces had not even arrived yet).

Thus, under civilian law, there’s a strong argument that Fury was acting to defend innocent bystanders from the unjustified actions of the Council.

III. Conclusion

No matter how you slice it, Fury’s actions were probably justified.  Thanks again to Nick and Jason for their help with this post!

Prometheus

[amazon_link id=”B005LAIHXQ” target=”_blank” container=”” container_class=”” ]Prometheus[/amazon_link] came out last weekend. It’s… ambitious. Reviews are mixed. But, as always, we’re not here to talk about the merits of the movie as such, but rather about legal issues raised by the movie. The most obvious one here is the issue of private space exploration and travel. The premise of the movie is that in the late 21st century, Weyland Corporation spends $1 trillion on a project to send a research team to a moon orbiting a gas giant in the Gliese 86 system. Can a private corporation decide to just do this? Continue reading

Law and the Multiverse Holiday Special: Memorial Day

Today is Memorial Day in the United States, which originated as a day of remembrance for Union soldiers who died in the American Civil War.  (It’s also a federal holiday, so please excuse the late post!)  Not too many comic book characters go back to the Civil War, but there is at least one character who participated in it, namely Wolverine.  While the mainstream continuity version of Wolverine was born in the late 1880s, the film version—as shown in X-Men Origins: Wolverine—was born in 1845 and fought in the Civil War on the side of the Union.

Naturally, Wolverine didn’t die in the Civil War, so he doesn’t quite fit the bill for Memorial Day.  But his Civil War veteran status raises an interesting question: could he qualify for a pension?

The Civil War marked a major expansion in military pensions with the passage of a new military pension act on July 14, 1862.  However, pensions were initially only available to soldiers who had been injured or disabled in the line of duty.  17 Stat. 566-69 (1863).  Given his healing factor, Wolverine wouldn’t qualify.  The Dependent and Disability Pension Act of 1890 removed the battlefield injury requirement but still limited pensions to veterans who had become unable to perform manual labor.  Once again, Wolverine is out of luck.

Finally, in 1907, the McCumber bill expanded pensions to include all Civil War veterans who served at least 90 days and were at least 62 years old.  34 Stat. 879 (1907).  Born in 1845, Wolverine would qualify beginning the same year the bill was passed.  Under the new law, he would collect $12/month at 62, $15/month at 70, and $20/month at 75.  That $20 would be $462 in today’s money, or $5500/year.  Later laws increased the pension amounts somewhat but they were never indexed to inflation.

So could Wolverine have collected that pension in perpetuity?  He probably could have.  The government continued to pay pensions to Civil War veterans and their families long after the war ended.  Gertrude Janeway, a widow of a Civil War veteran, collected a widow’s pension until she died in 2003.  As of 2009 there were still two children of Civil War veterans drawing veterans’ benefits.

On the other hand, a few hundred dollars a year hardly seems worth exposing his immortal status over, not to mention that attracting the attention of the military is probably pretty low on his list of priorities.  Still, it’s nice to know that, as a veteran, Wolverine would continue to be supported for his service to the US government.

The Avengers: Declarations of War

Our last post, discussing the issue of compensation for the property damage that resulted from the battle over Midtown Manhattan, delved into whether or not the battle counts as an “act of war” or even just a “war” or whether it counts as “terrorism” or something else. This is as good a time as any to discuss what it means to be “at war” and what “war” means as a legal concept. Continue reading

The Avengers: Who’s Gonna Pay for That?

As some have already noted, the damage done to Midtown Manhattan in The Avengers could easily top $160 billion, all told (here’s the original source of that estimate).

That’s a lot of money. By comparison, as the link notes, the total impact of the September 11th attacks was about $83 billion and Hurricane Katrina cost about $90 billion. This is about as much as the two of those put together.

So… who’s gonna pay for all that?

Well, we talked about this subject generally back in December 2010, and the analysis has changed little since then. But The Avengers gives us a chance to apply those general principles to a particular set of facts. Continue reading