Category Archives: estate law

Futurama: Future Stock

This guest post was written by Craig Messing, an attorney from New York, who contacted us with this excellent idea for a post.  If you are a legal professional (e.g. an attorney, judge, or law professor) or a comic book professional (e.g. an author, editor, or illustrator) and  you have an idea for a post that would be a good fit for Law and the Multiverse, feel free to contact us!  

Introduction

Future Stock is the 21st episode of the third season of Futurama.  While somewhat outside this blog’s normal purview of comic-related media (even if there are Futurama comics), the episode touches on some unique, obscure, and even speculative issues of corporate governance and probate law.  As most of the series takes place in “New New York,” we will assume New York law applies, albeit 1000 years into the future.  It should go without saying, but spoilers to follow.

I. Background

In the episode, a shareholder meeting of Planet Express leads to an “80′s guy” (referred to throughout the episode only as “That Guy”) being named chairman of the corporation.  This eventually leads to That Guy trying to sell the company and gut it for profit, and a shareholder vote over the sale.  That Guy wins the shareholder vote, but then dies (fairly gruesomely) before the transaction is concluded.  Control of his shares passes to Fry, as vice-chairman of Planet Express, who votes down the sale.  (This ignores the fact that the vote had already been cast and approved by both companies, and thus should be binding, even after That Guy’s death.)  The issues here are multiple, but we will look at two.  First, we will examine what recourse the other shareholders of Planet Express might have had to block the sale, and the likelihood of success of those efforts.  Second, we will look at whether control of That Guy’s shares should have passed to Fry, and the potential consequences if they had not.

II. Oppressed Shareholders

In the episode, That Guy purchases 51 percent of the voting rights from Zoidberg (“The shares were worthless, and he kept asking for toilet paper!”), and imposes his will on the other shareholders, all of whom vote against the sale.  The remaining shareholders are outraged, but are powerless to affect the situation.  At face value, this would seem to be textbook shareholder oppression, in which the majority shareholder(s) imposes his will, to the detriment of the other minority shareholders.  Oppression can be especially prevalent in close corporations, where there are only a limited number of shareholders – as appears to be the case with Planet Express.  (Note: after the sale is completed, all outstanding shares of Planet Express are said to be purchased “at the current market price.”  But as a close corporation, there would not be a “market” price.  This is likely an oversight of convenience by the writers, however.) 

Oppressed minority shareholders may sue to prevent the oppressive actions of majority shareholder(s).  However, New York courts have defined “oppression” as “conduct that substantially defeats the reasonable expectations held by minority shareholders in committing their capital to the particular enterprise,” and held that oppression exists “only when the majority conduct substantially defeats expectations that, objectively viewed, were both reasonable under the circumstances and were central to the petitioner’s decision to join the venture.”  In re Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) (internal quotations omitted).   In other words, shareholder oppression will be found only if a “reasonable person” in the shareholders’ situation would be unhappy.

In this case, a “reasonable” Planet Express shareholder would likely be ecstatic at the results of the sale.  In the initial shareholder meeting, where That Guy is named chairman of Planet Express, the company’s dismal financial state is firmly established: a pie chart is shown, illustrating the company’s revenues; a minority of the pie accounts for revenue from business operations, while the majority is made up by “an eight-dollar bank error in our favor.”  After the vote on the sale is finalized, however, the market (“purchase”) price of Planet Express is given as $107.  It would be very difficult to argue that a “reasonable” minority shareholder would disapprove of a transaction that so drastically increased shareholder value, and thus the oppression argument would likely fail.

III. Descendability, Intestacy, and Escheat

Almost immediately after the vote approving the sale, That Guy dies, Fry takes control of his voting shares as vice-chairman, and negates the sale.  However, the corporation could only assert control of these shares if there was some sort of repurchase agreement with Planet Express, under which it could buy back the shares upon That Guy’s death.  Further, even if such an agreement did exist, That Guy’s shares would be either retired or turned into treasury stock; in either case, the shares would no longer have any voting rights, and if the sale of Planet Express had not already been finalized, the minority shareholder votes against the deal would carry the day without Fry’s last-minute heroics.  However, there is no mention of such an agreement in the episode, and thus there is no reason why That Guy’s shares couldn’t pass under his will, or failing that, under the law of intestacy … except that, again, there is no mention of That Guy having a will, nor any heirs, – nor is there any indication of That Guy having a family in the 1980s that might have propagated and survived into the year 3000.

More importantly, New York law might not allow for such distant relations to inherit through intestacy, even if they did exist.  Article 4 of the New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPT) governs intestate estates, and section 4-1.1 of the EPT enumerates the various classes of individuals who can take under New York law, allowing only for the decedent’s spouse, issue, parents, “issue of parents” (i.e. brothers and sisters of the decedent), grandparents (as well as “the issue of grandparents,” i.e. aunts and uncles), and “great-grandchildren of grandparents” (i.e. nieces and nephews) to take.  There is no provision for an individual outside of that closed list to take under intestacy, and as such, even if an heir does exist, it would be a very distant relation, well outside the purview of the EPT.  Apparently, New York has yet to account for time-travel and cryogenics (both of which appear to be fairly common in the future) in its probate code.  Quite the oversight.

Presuming that New New York law has not yet corrected this oversight, then That Guy’s apparent lack of both a will and eligible intestate heirs would cause the doctrine of escheat to come into effect.  Under escheat, a state acts as a sort of heir of last resort, and may take property if no other heir can be ascertained, or if property is abandoned.  See, e.g. N.Y. ABP § 102 (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state … to utilize escheated lands and unclaimed property for the benefit of all the people of the state, and this chapter shall be liberally construed to accomplish such purpose”).  It is not unheard of for a state to take corporate stock under escheat; in fact, such an action was expressly upheld in Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951).

Escheat in New York is governed by the New York Abandoned Property Law; escheat of securities is specifically addressed in Article 5.  However, for a security to be “abandoned” – which was an implicit requirement under the Standard Oil case –  payments due to the security holder have been unclaimed by, and no written communication received from, the rightful holder, for a period of three years.  N.Y. ABP § 501(2)(a).  Only after the security has been found to be abandoned is it to be delivered to the state.  N.Y. ABP § 502.  Therefore, for purposes of the sale of Planet Express, it would seem that the 51 percent shares owned by That Guy would be in limbo for a three year period, while eligible heirs were searched for (likely in vain).  During this time, as they could not be voted, the minority shareholders would have been able to defeat the merger of their own accord.

IV. Escheat of a Majority Stake, and the Public Policy of the Future

Unfortunately, even THIS is not the end of the matter, because if escheat is exercised in this case, it would effectively transfer a majority interest in a private corporation to the state of New New York, as That Guy controlled 51 percent of Planet Express’s stock.  While seizure and nationalization of private businesses by the federal government is not unheard of, seizure is usually predicated on great turmoil, such as a World War – though even war is not always sufficient cause for nationalization, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which held that President Truman’s attempted nationalization of the steel industry during the Korean War, by executive order, was authorized neither by the Constitution, nor by Congress, and was thus illegal – but no such circumstance is present here.  There is precedent of the nationalization of a private business due to severe financial hardship (most recently General Motors), and it is undisputed that there were severe hardships facing Planet Express; however, it would be very difficult to argue (despite the many dealings the company has had with the President of Earth), that Planet Express was such a vital cog in the economy as compared with GM.

For fairly obvious reasons – it is rare for any individual to die both intestate and without any heirs to take under intestacy, and it is borderline inconceivable that an individual who is intellectually capable of obtaining majority control of a company would also die intestate – there is no precedent for a state obtaining a majority share of a company via escheat.  As such, any analysis here will be speculative.  However, I believe that the guidance of the Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube, and Standard Oil v. New Jersey, allows us a fairly clear indication as to the public policy rationale that might guide a New New York court in rendering a decision in this matter.  Youngstown provides that nationalization (or, in a more general sense, public takeover of a private business) can occur only when expressly provided for, either by the Constitution or under the law, and Standard Oil allows for corporate stock to be taken by the state under escheat, but provides only for the delivery of the securities, and for the payment of moneys due the holder of the securities.  Similarly, Article 5 of the ABP appears more concerned with obtaining payments due under the securities than with voting rights, and in fact no mention is made in the law of the state’s exercise of voting rights.  Moreover, much like the federal government under Youngstown, it would appear that a state can only take control of a private company under specific conditions provided for under the law, such as a state banking regulator taking control of a struggling bank.  Therefore, I believe that New New York would be able to take possession of That Guy’s 51 percent stake in Planet Express under escheat, but only for purposes of taking any dividends due (or, in the event the sale did go through, its share of the proceeds from the sale).  However, as no law expressly allows the exercise of voting control on securities taken under escheat, an attempt to do so would be illegal.

V. Conclusion

While “Future Stock” does not address the option of minority shareholders to enjoin a majority action, the episode does address the reasonableness standard fairly well.  When the minority shareholders realize how much their shares have appreciated due to the impending sale, each of them (except Fry) immediately voice happiness over their being overruled, thus acting “reasonably” and defeating any notion of an oppression suit.  The episode handles the issue of That Guy’s estate (namely his 51 percent stake in Planet Express) less well.  The episode ignores both the securities and estates law on point, instead assuming that control of the shares would pass from chairman to vice-chairman.  Even if the shares were repurchased by Planet Express, regardless of how the corporation chose to treat them, they would not be voting shares unless and until they were re-issued by the corporation.  And if they passed into That Guy’s estate … as discussed at length above, that opens up a considerable can of worms, to say the least.

That said, while this particular episode might not have handled the law exceptionally well, there are at least two instances from Futurama’s current run where the show has addressed novel legal implications of its futuristic setting, in a serious, thought-provoking manner.  And besides, Futurama is a spectacular show.  You should watch it.  The hypnotoad commands youAll glory to the hypnotoad.

Arrow: “Honor Thy Father”

This is the second episode of Arrow, and it contains two excellent legal issues for your consideration. First, the legal procedure of coming back from the dead. Second, whether the “evidence” Queen provides against Martin Sohmers would be admissible. Continue reading

The Uniques II: Judicial Trusts and Minors

We’re returning to our discussion of The Uniques (one, two), and this time we’re looking at a set of topics sort of implicit in the premise of the series but raised directly in a few places. Specifically, we’re looking at the way the series treats minors, both in general and in terms of inheritance. Continue reading

A Grimm Case of Intestate Succession

Today’s episode of Grimm (“Happily Ever Aftermath“) involves a murder apparently motivated by money, specifically an inheritance.  But, as any law student who has taken a trusts & estates course can tell you, the devil is in the details.  Spoilers ahead!

Continue reading

John Carter

John Carter is Disney’s adaptation of Edgar Rice Burroughs’ Barsoom works, drawing mostly from the first book, A Princess of Mars. Actually, it’s really Andrew Stanton’s adaptation, he of WALL-E fame, because it doesn’t seem like Disney had any actual input, into the film or its marketing. The result is… problematic. But lo and behold, they’ve got a lawyer character who winds up touching on a bit of estate law. So we’ll take a look at that. Some pretty significant spoilers follow. Continue reading

Dollhouse: Haunted

We’ve written generally about the TV series Dollhouse before, but this is our first look at the legal issues raised by a particular episode from season one.  The show was recent enough that we’ll give a spoiler warning.

Continue reading

Superman Returns

Superman Returns was a pretty good movie (though hopefully the Man of Steel reboot will be an improvement).  The legal issues the movie raises are quite a bit different from our usual crime & torts fare, which is a nice change of pace.  Spoilers inside:

Continue reading

Smallville III: Doppelgängers and Direct Democracy

This marks the third post in our series on Smallville (1, 2), which ended its run a week ago. This time we’re looking at two plot elements in Season Ten: Lionel Luthor’s reappearance and the vote to overturn the Vigilante Registration Act. Spoilers, as always, follow.

I. Dopplegängers

Early in Season Ten, Clark accidentally activates a “Mirror Box,” which transports him to Earth-2, an alternate universe where Lionel Luthor, not Jonathan and Martha Kent, discover Clark the day of the meteor shower. The world is a rather bleak and terrifying place, and the alternate version of Clark is really quite a monster. Of interest for us is that the alternate version of Lionel manages to cross back into the “real” world when Clark returns. Of course, the “real” Lionel died several seasons ago, so Evil Lionel represents something of a surprise for our heroes.

Lionel goes about reclaiming the assets and property disbursed upon “his” death several years before. We talked about resurrection and probate law a while ago, and this winds up being pretty much the same analysis. The key here is that Evil Lionel is passing himself off as Real Lionel, and no one has any reason to suspect otherwise. The only way to really prove that he’s a doppelgänger is to have Real Lionel make an appearance, and that’s not going to happen. Even exhuming the body wouldn’t be conclusive proof, given the apparent state of cloning technology in the Smallville universe. Remember Lana faking her own death a few seasons ago? Using a clone. Lionel could have done the same thing here, and it’d be very, very difficult to prove otherwise. And really, a court is going to have a much easier time believing that someone like Lionel faked his own death than it will believing that he’s from an alternate reality.

Furthermore, other than Tess and Oliver, most of the LuthorCorp execs, i.e. the people with the most vested interest in Lionel’s status, are probably pretty excited to have him back, seeing as the business always seemed to do better when he was in charge. Lex did okay, but he’s still dead, and the Oliver/Tess administration seems to be mostly a series of disappointing quarterly reports and inconveniently fatal explosions. A return to the old guard would plausibly be welcomed.

So ultimately, while it may take some explaining, the mere fact of Evil Lionel’s presence will probably speak for itself, and it’s entirely possible that after some months, he could wind up getting most of his assets back. Particularly as the estate seems to still be winding down, given the continuing discovery of artifacts like the Mirror Box. Assets still in the estate would be his merely for the asking.

II. Direct Democracy and the VRA

A fairly serious plot arc in season ten is the Vigilante Registration Act, which seems to be pretty similar to the Superhuman Registration Act we’ve been discussing over here. This Act is even less worked out than the SHRA, but the show spends a lot less time playing with the details, so this winds up being less of a problem than it is in the Marvel Universe, particularly as the act seems to have been in force only for a few months, and with only a few dozen targets. But the same kind of constitutional issues are present, and the analysis is basically the same, so we won’t duplicate that discussion here.

The new wrinkle is that midway through the season, there is a popular vote to overturn or repeal the VRA. While Law and the Multiverse has, we hope, demonstrated itself as having a charitable eye for Acceptable Breaks from Reality where getting the law right would make for bad television, we are here coming to an exception: this portrayal of the legislative process is spectacularly, unforgivably wrong.

Why? Because there is absolutely no mechanism, constitutional or otherwise, for direct democratic referendum on any piece of federal legislation. Never has been, and unless the Constitution is amended, there never will be. The Constitution explicitly and self-consciously creates a system of representation and permits no direct participation of the people in the legislative process.

The federal constitutional amendment process, for example, is initiated by either Congress or the state legislatures.  Unlike many states, the people are never directly consulted about amendments.  Even more, despite the massive hype surrounding the Presidential election, direct election of the President is actually a myth: the fact that the popular vote matters at all is a feature of political custom and state law, not constitutional law. The Constitution provides that the President shall be elected by the Electoral College, not by the popular vote, and though states may determine their own means for choosing their Electors–including popular vote–Electors are under no constitutional obligation to vote the way their state’s popular vote goes, and state laws attempting to punish “faithless electors” have yet to be ruled on by the Supreme Court (probably because it’s never made a difference). So for starters, the federal government of the United States is way less democratic than most people probably think.

Getting the mechanics of the Presidential or congressional elections wrong is one thing, and probably excusable. Not everyone is a policy wonk. And in other cases, we’ve been pretty forgiving about authors and editors who don’t have the details of administrative law figured out. A lot of lawyers are pretty fuzzy there too. But making up an entirely new, unprecedented, and quite probably unconstitutional political form goes beyond the pale. This is high school civics stuff, not high-level political theory. Citizens of the United States have absolutely no opportunity to vote upon federal legislation. None. Zero. Nada. So a vote to “repeal” the VRA is completely meaningless.

Okay, theoretically, it’s possible for a repeal bill to be written that has as its trigger the results of the popular vote.  Triggers are a common feature of legislation, but they are usually based on either time or a future action of the legislature (e.g. a declaration of war).  Using a popular vote as a trigger would likely be so politically and legally controversial that the debate over the legitimacy of the procedure would probably overwhelm the debate over the underlying issue.  And of course the repeal bill would still have to be passed by Congress and signed by the President.

It’s also not clear under which enumerated power of Congress the popular vote could be taken under.  Remember, regular federal elections are handled by the states, though somewhat regulated by the federal government through laws like HAVA.  It’s quite possible that Congress would have to ask or bribe the states to handle the voting.  If any state abstained from participating in the vote that would call into question the legitimacy of the whole process.  The whole thing is, at best, a giant mess.)

If the writers wanted to come up with a high-stakes vote on the legislation, they could have. Witness the drama and wrangling that went into getting the ACA passed last year. It did come down to a few key votes, some of which were late at night or right down to the wire, and the drama dominated the news cycle for weeks at a time. But it was all representatives and senators doing the voting, responding to pressure from the public, not citizens voting on their own behalf. This would have made Martha Kent’s role even bigger, as instead of simply giving a stump speech here and there, she’d have been actively involved in the process. Of course, that would have meant paying Annette O’Toole more, and while that’s no bad thing for the episodes she’s been in, it may not have been possible for budgetary or logistical reasons.

Still, shame on the writers for not finding a way to do this even within the bounds of the Hollywoodland legal system. Even if they’d fudged the process of actually getting a bill through Congress, that’d have been okay. Congressional procedure is notoriously arcane, and in the light of the ACA last year, any writer worth his salt should be intimidated by the thought of getting that right. Any TV show that gets bicameralism and presentment down gets a free pass on legislative procedure as far as we’re concerned, as that’s the about as much legislative procedure as adult Americans can be expected to know. But this? Bad writers! No biscuit!

III: Conclusion

So with this post we’ve got one thing the authors get basically right, i.e. Evil Lionel can probably claim Real Lionel’s assets without too much difficulty, and one outrageously wrong, i.e. there is absolutely no provision in the American political system for direct popular referenda on federal legislation. There’s plenty more to look at in this series, so we’ll probably return to it at least once or twice more.

Immortals and Compound Interest

A number of people have asked, both in comments and in emails, why compound interest isn’t the solution to all of our immortals’ money problems. It’s not a bad question, and it’s shown up in a number of places.

It turns out that this isn’t nearly as workable a solution in practice as it is on paper. There are two main reasons for this. The first is historical, and the second economic, but together they conspire to make living off your interest a little harder than it sounds.

Continue reading

Tron: Legacy

When we watch movies, we necessarily engage in at least some suspension of disbelief. That’s why we’re there. But when you’re an expert in a particular field, and Hollywood plays free and loose with the rules of that field–or occasionally gets them right!–you tend to notice. Physicists have been reviewing movies for their scientific accuracy for a while now. This is the first in a series of posts where we analyze the legal content of movies likely to appeal to comic book fans.

Tron: Legacy, sequel to the classic, raises a few interesting legal points. This is not intended to be a review of the movie but rather a quick brief on some of these issues. There are some spoilers though, so you have been warned.

Continue reading