Category Archives: criminal law

The Trial (And Appeal) of Marvel Boy

This post was inspired by an email from Rebecca, who writes: “In The New Warriors comic [Vol1. No. 20-26], Vance Astrovik [aka Marvel Boy] accidentally killed his abusive father using his telekinetic powers.  He was tried for first degree murder and negligent homicide; he was acquitted of the former and convicted of the latter. Vance did not appeal the conviction, but do you think he would have been successful if he did?”

This is a great question.  Not only can we look at some important issues in criminal law and procedure, but this also gives us a chance to look at how appeals work.  The most important thing to understand about an appeal is that it is not a do-over before a higher court; there are important and often severe limitations on what issues and evidence can be presented on appeal, and the appeals court is itself limited in what it can do and on what basis it can do it.  Since the case occurred in New York in 1992 we will try to analyze it from that point of view.  But let’s start with the facts of the case.

I. The Facts

In case you don’t remember the details of this 18-year-old storyline, the facts are basically these: Vance Astrovik had been physically abused by his father, Arnold, for four years.  Arnold was evidently motivated by hatred of Vance’s mutant status and his tendency to hang out with other mutants.  The one time his mother, Norma, attempted to intervene, Arnold struck her as well.  On at least one occasion, Vance used his telekinetic powers to resist an attack from Arnold without harming him.

After being severely injured in fights with Terrax and Gideon, Vance is attacked by his father, who punches him to the floor and approaches him menacingly, saying “You are a freak!  It’s going to stop–if I have to pound it out of you…”  At that point, Vance unleashes a telekinetic blast, pushing his father through two walls, severely injuring him.  Vance flees the scene.

Later, Vance comes to the hospital where his father is being reated.  There he is arrested for “assault with a deadly weapon–your telekinetic powers, to be exact!” (Note that this suggests that, in the Marvel universe, innate offensive powers are considered weapons, which may have significant legal consequences).  After Vance’s arrest, Arnold dies from his injuries, and the charges are upgraded to murder.

So far everything is legally sound.  There is a reasonable theory for treating innate offensive powers as weapons, and while the prosecutor had a wide range of possible charges she could bring, she has discretion to choose among them.  It would also be appropriate to upgrade the charge to murder after the victim died, so long as the defendant’s attack was still the proximate cause of death (and in this case it was).  This brings us to the trial.

II. The Trial

Most of the New Warriors leave town during the trial for a mission.  Firestar stays behind to testify on the theory that testimony from any of the others would be excludable as cumulative.  See People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1981).  That’s a reasonable theory, though it depends on the testimony they had to offer being, in fact, cumulative.  While the testimony the state might want from them could be cumulative (e.g. it’s may be sufficient that only one say that Vance could have stopped his father without resorting to deadly force), the defense would likely want to pile as many positive character witnesses on as it could.  So Vance’s teammates weren’t doing him any favors by taking off.

Vance is represented by Foggy Nelson, a partner in Matt Murdock’s law firm.  Right off the bat, Foggy dismisses two potential jurors who had prior interactions with superheroes.  Presumably their interactions were negative.

The first witness called is an expert on superhuman genetics, Walter Rosen, who was familiar with Vance’s powers.  Rosen testified that Vance had excellent control over his powers and had grown in his abilities over time.  The defense then addressed the witness, who testified that Vance was averse to injuring others, had not injured anyone to the witness’s knowledge, and had tried to save lives and prevent injuries often at risk to himself.  Classic character witness stuff.

The next witness is Firestar, who testifies as Firestar and in her identity-concealing costume, which poses legal issues of its own.  This suggests that either the Marvel universe gives superheroes leeway to testify in costume or that the prosecutor didn’t want to push the issue, lest she lose her witness.  In this case, the defense was also unlikely to object to the witness’s costume and use of an alias.

In any event, Firestar reluctantly testifies that Vance could have stopped his father without resorting to deadly force.  This is curious, since she had no personal knowledge of Vance’s altercation with his father, but the question is not objected to (although Foggy does object to other questions on occasion).  This ends the prosecution’s case in chief.  It’s very strange that the prosecution did not itself call Vance’s mother, the only witness to the actual events that the prosecution could call, since Vance is protected by the Fifth Amendment and the victim is deceased.  But moving on…

The next witness is Ben Grimm, who testifies to Vance’s good character but also his ability to use his powers to prevent people from getting hurt.  After that, the defense calls Vance’s mother, who testifies about Arnold’s history of abuse.  On cross-examination she testifies that Vance had stopped his father once with his powers and that he could’ve stopped his father without killing him.  This ends the defense’s case.

During closing arguments, the defense emphasizes Vance’s good and caring nature and argues that Vance acted in self-defense.  The prosecution argues that Vance had the ability to stop his father without harming him.  To prove the point, the prosecutor pulls out a pistol, aims it at Vance, and fires it.  Vance uses his powers to capture not only the pistol (revealed to be a cap gun) but even the very smoke from the cap gun.  The defense demands a mistrial, and the judge denies the motion but hints that grounds for an appeal exist.  This is not completely unreasonable; despite the prosecution’s antics, judges are loathe to declare a mistrial, especially so close to the end of the trial, since it means an enormous waste of resources.

Curiously, the judge does not give the jury any instructions, which is odd because those are ordinarily an essential part of the trial, but we’re willing to give the comic book authors a pass on this, since jury instructions are usually very, very boring and technical. We’ll assume appropriate jury instructions were given.

In the end, the jury finds Vance not guilty of first degree murder but guilty of negligent homicide.  He is sentenced to fourteen months to three years in The Vault.  Curiously, Foggy suggests an appeal but not post-trial motions such as a motion to vacate the judgment or to set aside the sentence.  Vance declines to appeal and resigns himself to his sentence, but what if he had followed Foggy’s advice and appealed his conviction?

III.  A Little Appellate Procedure

Now some background on how appeals work. (Note: this is a little dry, so if you want to gloss over the legal details and get to the good part, skip to Section IV, or just check Wikipedia on the subject).

There are a lot of issues we’re going to gloss over (e.g., appellate jurisdiction, waiver, harmless vs. reversible error), but we’re going to go into a little detail about the idea of standard of review.  That is, even if an appeals court will consider an alleged error, how bad does it have to be in order for the court to reverse it?  In general, appeals courts are reluctant to address issues that were waived or forfeited, and they are also reluctant to disturb jury verdicts.  In New York, where this case took place, there is a two part test for overturning a jury verdict: legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence.

Legal sufficiency is defined in New York thus: “For a court to conclude…that a jury verdict is supported by sufficient evidence, the court must determine whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burden requirements for every element of the crime charged. If that is satisfied, then the verdict will be upheld by the intermediate appellate court on that review basis.” People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1987).

And weight of the evidence is defined thus: “the appellate court must, like the trier of fact below, weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony. If it appears that the trier of fact has failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded, then the appellate court may set aside the verdict. Empowered with this unique factual review, intermediate appellate courts have been careful not to substitute themselves for the jury. Great deference is accorded to the factfinder’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony and observe demeanor.” Id.

IV. The (Hypothetical) Appeal

With all of this background in mind, how might the appeal have gone?  Well, assuming the issues were property preserved, here’s what Foggy might have argued.

First, there was insufficient evidence to convict Vance of negligent homicide.  New York defines criminally negligent homicide thus: “A  person  is  guilty  of  criminally  negligent  homicide  when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person.”  N.Y. Penal Law § 125.10. Not very helpful on its own; we need the definition of criminal negligence:

A person acts with criminal negligence  with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an  offense  when  he  fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance  exists.  The  risk  must  be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes  a  gross  deviation  from  the  standard  of  care  that  a reasonable person would observe in the situation.

N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05.  The key here is the second sentence.  The prosecution offered essentially no evidence that Vance’s telekinetic blast was a “gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation,” given that the situation was one of a heavily injured young adult being beaten by a grown man with no help in sight.  Vance’s blast may have been more than strictly necessary to end the confrontation, but there was no evidence that it was a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would have done in the heat of the moment.

But failing that, there is the issue of self-defense.  The prosecution focused heavily on whether Vance could have used less force to stop his father.  This makes a certain amount of sense because New York defines self-defense thus:

A  person  may,  subject to the provisions of subdivision two, use physical force upon another person when and to the  extent he or she
reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself, herself or a third  person  from  what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person

N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(1).  Here the issue is whether Vance reasonably believed his violent telekinetic blast was necessary, which basically means whether the jury thought it was reasonable.  And the prosecution argued that no, it was not, since he could have used less force.  But there are special rules for the use of deadly force in self-defense:

A  person  may  not  use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless:
(a) The actor reasonably believes that such other person is  using  or about  to use  deadly  physical  force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she  knows  that  with complete  personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating; except that the actor is  under  no duty to retreat if he or she is:
(i) in his or her dwelling and not the initial aggressor

N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2).  In this case, Vance was in his house and he was not the initial aggressor, so he had no duty to retreat.  Thus, he could use deadly force if he reasonably believed that his father was about to use deadly physical force, even if he could also have used less force.  There is a good argument to be made that such a belief would have been reasonable: Vance was already severely injured, his father had struck him quite forcefully already, his father had him pinned, his father had announced his extremely violent intentions, and there was no help in sight.  That’s pretty compelling stuff.

The problem here, however, is that Foggy didn’t really develop these issues at trial, apart from an oblique mention of self-defense in his closing argument.  The jury would likely have been given instructions related to self-defense, but without solid testimony or other evidence to support it, the jury could reasonably conclude that the weight of the evidence favored the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.  The appellate court is under no obligation to make up for the defense’s mistakes.

V. Conclusion

It’s hard to say for sure what an appellate court would make of this case.  The prosecution’s case was a little weak, and there were strong arguments for self-defense.  Unfortunately, Foggy didn’t do such a hot job as Vance’s defense attorney, so the case wasn’t set up for appeal very well.  However, it’s a comic book, and we could just as easily assume that Foggy actually filled in all the gaps but the writers omitted the minutiae for the sake of storytelling.  Still, the Marvel universe is somewhat hostile to mutants, and appellate court judges are not immune to bias.  Ultimately, Vance likely had decent chances on appeal, probably better than most criminal defendants.

(And in case we sound a bit down on the writers, we should add that the legal elements are on par with a typical episode of Law & Order.  They didn’t do a perfect job, but it could have been much worse.)

Supervillains and the Insanity Defense

The fact that it is possible to defeat a criminal charge by pleading insanity, even temporary insanity, is a permanent fixture of American crime storytelling, and comic books are no exception. The Joker, the Riddler, Poison Ivy, Two-Face, all have spent time in the Elizabeth Arkham Asylum for the Criminally Insane.

But is that really how it works? Actually… no. The insanity defense is fairly well-defined, and depending on the jurisdiction it seems like that a lot of supervillains would not actually count as “insane” in a way which would prevent their convictions.

Note that what we are talking about here is only whether a person can avoid conviction by virtue of insanity, not whether they are competent to stand trial. That requires a different analysis and one for another time.

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The Green Hornet

The new Green Hornet movie came out this weekend, and it’s… just okay? Something like that. Again, not reviewing this as a film critic as much as a legal critic, and it’s surprising how much this movie gets both right and wrong, sometimes on the very same issue. This time we’re going to focus mostly on two legal issues which explicitly show up in the film: sexual harassment in the workplace and a peculiar little wrinkle related to self-defense.

As always, spoilers follow.

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Law and the Multiverse Mailbag III

Today we take a look at reader questions involving the Patriot Act, Bruce Wayne’s funding of Batman, and revealing superhero costumes.  As always, if you have questions or post suggestions, please send them to james@lawandthemultiverse.com and ryan@lawandthemultiverse.com or leave them in the comments.

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Superpowered Minors, Part One

One topic that we’ve been asked about by several people is the issue of superpowered minors, whether acting as superheroes or supervillains.  There are many examples, such as the Teen Titans, young mutants like Kitty Pryde, and Spider-Man (in his younger days). This post, the first in a series, is about the minors themselves and their criminal liability.  Future posts will cover torts and contracts.  The legal issues involving their parents, guardians (like Bruce Wayne), and school teachers (like Professor X) will also be addressed in future installments.

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Law and the Multiverse Mailbag II

In this week’s mailbag we look at three questions from our email that touch on alternate universes, jurisdiction over crimes committed in the Phantom Zone, and contracts.  As always, if you have questions or post suggestions, please send them to james@lawandthemultiverse.com and ryan@lawandthemultiverse.com.

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Tron: Legacy

When we watch movies, we necessarily engage in at least some suspension of disbelief. That’s why we’re there. But when you’re an expert in a particular field, and Hollywood plays free and loose with the rules of that field–or occasionally gets them right!–you tend to notice. Physicists have been reviewing movies for their scientific accuracy for a while now. This is the first in a series of posts where we analyze the legal content of movies likely to appeal to comic book fans.

Tron: Legacy, sequel to the classic, raises a few interesting legal points. This is not intended to be a review of the movie but rather a quick brief on some of these issues. There are some spoilers though, so you have been warned.

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Mind Control Made Me Do It

Some supervillains (e.g., Gorilla Grodd, The Puppeteer) have the ability to control others through mental powers, hypno-rays, or the like.  But if they forced you to commit a crime, would you still be liable?  And would you have any claim against them?  The short answers are no and yes, respectively.

[Note: ‘No and yes’ were reversed when this first went up.  Law and the Multiverse regrets the error.]

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Supers and the Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows:

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

The last phrase, “cruel and unusual punishment,” has a long jurisprudence extending back even before ratification of the Constitution. The phrase appears in the English Bill of Rights which was a key legal step in effecting the Glorious Revolution, and the Eighth Amendment in particular has been a major cause of the gradual reduction in the physical severity of judicial punishments in American history. Today, no state inflicts direct corporal punishment other than capital punishment, whereas as recently as the twentieth century, states were sentencing convicts to hard labor.

All of this may be interesting in its own right, but we’re only talking about it because we want to know whether it would be “cruel and unusual” to, say, sentence an immortal being like Apocalypse to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).

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The Law and the Multiverse Holiday Special

You might not know it, but Santa Claus has been a character in both the DC and Marvel universes, which makes him fair game for our blog.  In this post we take a look at Santa and the law.

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