Category Archives: civil rights

Daredevil #4

In issue 4 of Daredevil, the firm of Murdock & Nelson continues the new business model we discussed in the last Daredevil post: helping their clients represent themselves in court.  Issue 4 introduces us to a few of these clients and includes some great legal issues to talk about.  Spoilers ahead, as usual.

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Torchwood: Miracle Day Episode 4

By this point in the series, it’s pretty clear that the writers are deliberately trying to play with the “legal” consequences of the premise. And you know what? Good for them. Of course, it would have been better if they’d asked someone who knew something about the legal system before they went with it, because things aren’t getting any better on that front. Continue reading

Torchwood: Miracle Day Episode 1

(Update: we have discovered  a case on point for one of the issues raised in the post.  Check out section II of the post for more.)

Torchwood: Miracle Day is the fourth “season” of the British sci-fi series Torchwood, itself a 2006 spin-off of the ever-popular Doctor Who revival. The basic premise is that, all of a sudden, people stop dying. This is not as much fun as it sounds.

Interestingly enough for the purposes of Law and the Multiverse, the series so far has more than its fair share of legal issues. So we’re going to take a look at each episode as it comes out. We’ll leave reviews of the episodes for others, as always, but hope to be your source for legal analysis for the series. Spoilers will follow. You have been warned. Continue reading

Transformers: Dark of the Moon

The Fourth of July weekend is a fitting time for the release of Michael Bay’s latest round of cinematic pyrotechnics, Transformers: Dark of the Moon. It’s better than the first two, though that’s not saying all that much. And like the first two, we’re not breaking any new legal ground here either. In fact, as seemingly befits a movie which is almost entirely derivative… there isn’t a whole lot to say that we haven’t covered already. But in any case, here’s a roundup. Continue reading

X-Men: First Class

There’s a new X-Men movie out, and it’s actually pretty great. But you don’t come here for detailed discussions about the merits of the movie as a movie or about the fidelity or creativity of the adaptation. No, you come here to read about the legal implications of the various plot devices. So let’s get down to it. Given the plot, most of what we’ve got here is going to be international law, with an added civil rights / employment law bonus. As always, we’ve got spoilers.

I. Nazi Gold

In his quest to find the Nazi “doctor” that killed his mother, Erik Lensherr used an ingot of Nazi gold as a pretense to get an appointment with a high-ranking Swiss banker. This has a certain realism to it, as a vast amount of Nazi gold disappeared into European banks by 1945, and much of it probably remains there. The banker comments that possessing such gold is illegal. He’s right. In September 1946, the United Kingdom, United States, and France formed the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold with the mandate to identify those persons or institutions with claims that gold had been looted from them by the Nazis and the goal of restoring that gold to its rightful owners. The Tripartite Commission was created as part of the Paris Peace Treaties which brought about the end of the war. The Commission’s task took a long time, and it was only dissolved in 1998 with something like 65% of the claimed gold returned. Congress addressed the issue with the “Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. Law No. 105-158 in 1998. The Act basically authorizes the US representative to the Commission to dispose of what assets remained in the Commission’s possession at that time.

Still, there’s one little wrinkle. Lensherr, being a Jew and victim of the concentration camps, could in theory have a valid claim to the gold in question, which would make the legality of his possession of the ingot less clear. But as this issue was dealt with on a really high level, it’s doubtful that law enforcement would care much one way or the other. The Commission was mostly concerned with the gold possessed by sovereign governments, not individuals.

II. Acts of War

First, there’s the operation to nail Shaw when he meets with the Russian general. This is a CIA-directed op, with CIA agents on the ground, leading a group of what amounts to mercenaries—other than Moira and the other agent, it isn’t clear that anyone else involved was a federal agent—in attempting to infiltrate a sensitive military compound to assassinate a high value target. Several major wars have been sparked because of the assassination of a high-ranking official, so this is kind of a big deal. Granted, in most cases where a war follows an assassination, the actual death is a pretense for armed conflict really motivated by more serious underlying tensions, but this kind of thing is dramatic enough to push things over the edge.

But the appearance of the X-Men on the scene at the climax of the Cuban Missile Crisis? That might not be, because the government had not authorized them to do anything. They were not acting under anyone’s orders (or at least anyone with the authority to give those kinds of orders), and it’s far from clear that the CIA even knew what they were up to. So Professor X causing the Russians to fire on their own ship could plausibly have been disavowed by Washington as rogue agents acting without authority. The fact that the Russians had already ordered the ship to turn around means that they’d probably be willing to grasp at any excuse not to go to war, so this explanation may well have been accepted, whether Professor X was acting under orders or not.

Magneto springing Emma Frost from the CIA holding center wouldn’t count either, as he wasn’t acting on the authority of any sovereign entity. At the time, it probably would have been classified as a criminal act, because the government’s rush to classify everything it doesn’t like as “terrorism” did not really get its start until the events of 2001. But it is plausible that, if apprehended, he could have initially been charged with espionage. Granted, Magneto does not seem to have any particular interest in working with any human government, and his little trip into the facility did not appear to include the acquisition of any information. Still, he damaged a bunch of property and may have killed some agents at a highly classified facility, so the feds would be understandably upset about that. They might not be able to make a charge of espionage stick in the absence of any connection to a foreign power though: the Espionage Act generally requires that one transmit or intend to transmit something to someone. Acquiring classified information and doing nothing with it isn’t espionage.

III. Employment Discrimination

At one point in the film, Moira’s CIA boss states in a meeting that “there’s no place for a woman in the CIA.”  Today that kind of comment might well give rise to a discrimination claim, but what about in 1962?  As it turns out, an employer—even a government employer—could probably have gotten away with it because the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (specifically Title VII) had not been enacted yet.  Without those important Acts in place the courts were generally pretty tolerant of both de facto and de jure discrimination against women.  For example, it wasn’t until 1971 that the Supreme Court first struck down a state law on the basis that it discriminated on the basis of sex.  Reed v. Reed, 404 US 71 (1971).  And fully equal participation in jury service was not mandated until Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).  So kudos to the writers for working in that accurate (if depressing) “sign of the times.”

IV. Conclusion

X-Men: First Class isn’t exactly a courtroom drama, but the legal issues that are there were treated pretty well.  We’re looking forward to the all-but-inevitable sequel.  In the mean time, check it out.  It’s a pretty good flick.

Mercenaries and Bounty Hunters

Today’s post is inspired by David, who wondered about mercenary characters like Deadpool and Deathstroke, and a comment by John, who wanted to know about bounty hunters (in the “wanted poster” sense).  We touched on some of the legal issues surrounding bounty hunters, particularly the bail bondsman type, in the comments to our post on Superheroes and Citizen’s Arrest, but there are some more topics to discuss.  We’ll address mercenaries first, then bounty hunters.

I. Mercenaries

The term mercenary doesn’t really have a particular legal meaning outside the international law context (i.e. “a professional soldier hired by someone other than his or her own government to fight in a foreign country,” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)).  Mercenary is also used to describe military security contractors like Blackwater/Xe.  But in comics the term is usually used to describe a “gun for hire” or private security typically employed by private individuals or companies rather than governments.  Frequently comic book mercenaries are hired to steal things or kill people, which leads us to two criminal law concepts: solicitation and conspiracy.

A. Solicitation

Solicitation is one of the inchoate offenses, and at common law consisted of soliciting, requesting, commanding, or importuning another person to commit a felony or serious misdemeanor.  These days solicitation is typically defined by a statute such as 18 USC 373(a):

Whoever, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against property or against the person of another in violation of the laws of the United States, and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent, solicits, commands, induces, or otherwise endeavors to persuade such other person to engage in such conduct, shall be imprisoned …

Something to notice here: the solicitor must intend that the other person actually commit the felony, so it’s not solicitation if, for example, an undercover police officer ‘solicits’ the commission of a crime in a sting operation.  Related to the intent requirement, the federal statute (like some state statutes) provides a defense of abandonment in 373(b):

It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal intent, the defendant prevented the commission of the crime solicited.

So what happens if the mercenary agrees to take the job?  Then the solicitor and the mercenary are guilty of conspiracy (some jurisdictions also require that the solicitor or mercenary take an affirmative step towards completing the crime; more on conspiracy later).

And if the mercenary finishes the job, committing the crime he or she was hired to do?  Then a curious thing happens: the solicitor and mercenary both become guilty of the crime (e.g. theft, murder) but the solicitation charge goes away.  In legal terms, the crime of solicitation merges with the underlying offense.  The solicitor can be charged as a principal (i.e. as though he or she committed the crime himself or herself) because he or she acted as an accessory to the crime.  See, e.g., 18 USC 2.

Fun Fact: In many jurisdictions, contract killings are automatically first degree or capital murder for the solicitor and the killer. See, e.g, N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(vi).

B. Conspiracy

Like solicitation, conspiracy is generally defined by statute these days.  The general federal conspiracy statute is 18 USC 371:

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned …

However, unlike solicitation and attempt, conspiracy does not merge with the underlying offense if the underlying offense is completed.  Instead, it’s a separate crime.  The usual rationale for this is that criminal conspiracies are especially dangerous because two or more people can do far more damage than one person acting alone and because people are more likely to go through with a crime if they are in agreement with others.

Like solicitation, some jurisdictions provide for a defense of abandonment or withdrawal in conspiracy cases, but it usually requires more than just ceasing one’s involvement in the conspiracy.  The defendant must also show that he or she tried to stop the commission of the crime, and that can be difficult to prove.

The practical upshot of all of this is that most comic book mercenaries are criminals, as are the folks that hire them.  Although we’ve seen that self-defense, defense of others, and citizen’s arrest are all useful legal tools for superheroes, those looking to stay on the right side of the law should probably look for work as bodyguards rather than mercenaries.

II. Bounty Hunters

First, some nomenclature: Strictly speaking, most bounty hunters are actually seeking a reward rather than a bounty.  A bounty may be claimed by multiple people performing the same service, while a reward may only be claimed by one person performing a unique service.  For example, a bounty may be offered for the destruction of dangerous animals (e.g. coyotes), whereas a reward may be offered for the arrest and return of a particular fugitive.

States generally have the power to post rewards as part of their general police power.  However, political subdivisions of states usually do not have general police powers, and so cannot post rewards without statutory authorization.  See, e.g, Brite v. Board, 21 Cal.App.2d 233 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937).  Courts have generally held that when statutes authorize rewards, the language of the reward has to hew pretty closely to the language of the statute.  See, e.g., Smith v. Vernon County, 188 Mo. 501 (1905).  Many statutes still have reward laws on the books.  See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. 544.150, 145.  And those statutes do get a work out, even today.

Note, though, that the reward statutes generally only allow rewards for the capture or arrest of fugitives or felons, not their killing or the production of their bodies.  So “wanted: dead or alive” won’t work these days.  Frankly, I doubt it would work even with statutory authorization, since it amounts to a reward for an extrajudicial killing that couldn’t possibly survive modern due process analysis.

Private individuals and organizations can also offer rewards so long as the reward doesn’t request or require anything illegal (that would be solicitation, as discussed above).  In that case the reward is simply a unilateral contract (i.e. a contract that is accepted by performing the requested service).

Most states require that someone seeking a reward knew about the reward before they did whatever it is the reward requires.  See, e.g., Smith.  So going around arresting fugitives in hopes that a reward has been or will be posted is a good way not to get a reward.  Professional bounty hunters should wait for a reward to be posted first, then go get the bad guy.

As a final note, most modern “bounty hunters” are actually bail bondsman, i.e. people whose line of business is posting bail for criminal defendants and then rounding them up if they fail to appear in court when required. There isn’t really a public reward posted in these cases. Rather, a defendant contacts a bail bondsman when arrested, and the bondsman agrees to post bail in exchange for a commission, usually 10-15% of the bail amount. If the defendant fails to appear, the bond is forfeit, so the bondsman has an incentive to make sure that he does. But there isn’t any sort of general bounty or reward posted which would incentivize other persons to go after the defendant. Rewards are usually only posted for the most dangerous and notorious criminals. Bail bondsmen deal with mostly lower-end offenses and are thus far more common and far less interesting, story-wise.

III. Conclusion

Under the right circumstances, bounty hunting is a legally sanctioned way for a superhero to make money while fighting crime.  Mercenary work, by contrast, is usually more legally questionable, at least in the comics.

Non-Human Intelligences III: Categories

Now, at last, we get to the good stuff. We’ve laid the foundation and talked about existing law, now it’s time to talk about specific types of non-human intelligences and how the law might treat them.

From the main comic book stories, we can identify three main types of non-human intelligences. The first are individuals from animal species who become intelligent for one reason or another. Gorilla Grodd would be a good example here, but there are also Gorr and the New Men. Then there are genuinely alien intelligences, like the Skrull and Shi’ar, i.e. species we’ve never encountered before. Finally, there are machine and non-biological intelligences like Bastion or one incarnation of The Thinker. Unsurprisingly, the law is likely to treat these categories differently.

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Non-Human Intelligences II: Existing Law

Last week we started the conversation about non-human intelligences, mostly by examining the historical reasons why humans have been treated differently by the legal system for pretty much as long as it’s existed. We also looked at some of the philosophical problems involved in coming up with some kind of bright-line rule for deciding what gets counted as a person and what doesn’t.

This time we’re going to look at some of the law that would probably get a workout if a non-human ever sued for the violation of its alleged civil rights (or someone brought suit on its behalf).

Before we start, we’ll again set the parameters of the problem we’re examining. A fictional legislature could, in its wisdom, simply pass a law granting various rights to, e.g, Kryptonians, at least as far as the Constitution would allow. Or a constitutional amendment could be ratified that says Kryptonians count as people for all legal purposes. Thing is, it’s all well and good to pass a law giving a certain species (e.g. Kryptonians) status as persons, but what if the legislature or the constitutional convention wanted to draft a more all-encompassing rule so they wouldn’t have to do it every time we ran across a new intelligent species? Then we’re back to square one. So that’s not the issue here. The issue here is whether there is a judicially workable way to include non-human intelligences in our concept of a person without invoking the political branches, i.e. the executive and the legislature.

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The Green Hornet

The new Green Hornet movie came out this weekend, and it’s… just okay? Something like that. Again, not reviewing this as a film critic as much as a legal critic, and it’s surprising how much this movie gets both right and wrong, sometimes on the very same issue. This time we’re going to focus mostly on two legal issues which explicitly show up in the film: sexual harassment in the workplace and a peculiar little wrinkle related to self-defense.

As always, spoilers follow.

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Non-Human Intelligences I: Introduction

One of the most common questions we get is how the law would treat a genuinely non-human intelligence. Such characters appear with regularity in most of the major comics universes. The DC universe has Superman and various other Kryptonians as well as Gorilla Grodd, etc. Marvel has described entire galactic empires, including the Shi’ar and Skrull. Both universes include intelligent machines of various kinds.

This is a big subject, and as there is currently no law on the books which would directly answer this question, finding an answer is going to involve at least as much philosophy and history as it will law. But it is an important question, so we will consider it here.

This is likely to be the first in a series of posts. Most of the consideration of actual examples will be in later posts; this one attempts to set the stage for such questions by examining the reasons for and history of human beings’ rather unique status in the legal system.

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